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ABSTRACT 
Gregory Bateson and a Language for Psychotherapy 
(December 1975) 
F. Alexander Blount, B.A., Wesleyan University 
Ed.D,, University of Massachusetts 
Directed by: John W. Wideman, Ed.D. 
In Chapter I the difficulties which the "scientific" 
approach has with psychotherapy are discussed. "Science" 
attempts to find knowledge which is independent of the knower 
and tries to reduce phenomena to component bits which can be 
measured in the service of gaining this knowledge. By "science" 
is not meant a particular branch of science. Rather, we are 
speaking of a general approach, widely accepted in the behavioral 
sciences, which is the method generally used by the critics of 
the "ineffectiveness" of psychotherapy. Also discussed in 
Chapter I is the contention of many therapists that something 
is happening in psychotherapy, but that the most important 
aspects of the process elude isolation and quantification. 
With only the language of science, i.e., the language of 
entities and forces, at our disposal, we could describe psycho¬ 
therapy only as a sham or a mystery. 
In Chapter Two is offered an alternative to the language 
of entities (e.g. "knowledge", "variables") which might be 
demystifying of the process of psychotheraoy. For our lan, ua. 
Vi 
we have used the work of Gregory Bateson to help us speak 
clearly in terms of form rather than substance, of processes 
rather than entities. From Bateson we get the notion of con¬ 
text and hierarchies of contexts in communication. These 
notions help us clarify the systemic or interactive nature of 
perception and knowing. Bateson’s use of Russell and Whitehead's 
Theory of Logical Types as an explicative model gives us a way 
of applying some of the truths of systems theory to human 
beings in their systemic interaction with their environments. 
When applied to the specific interaction known as psychotherapy, 
Bateson's language allows us to discuss the relationship 
between individual perception and learning on one hand and 
the form of the interaction as a whole on the other. We can 
say that abstract form of the psychotherapy relationship 
offers a corrective change in the way the client punctuates, 
i.e,, gives form to or understands relating and experience 
generally. We call these changes Learning II and Learning III 
respectively using Bateson's terms. Learning II is a change 
in Level II premises about interaction which are manifested 
in the way a person participates in any specific relationship 
and Learning III is a change In Level III premises about relat¬ 
ing which are manifested in a person's stance toward relating 
and experiencing generally. 
The third chapter attempts to show that using Bateson s 
way of thought, much of Freud’s work becomes available and 
useful from a "systems theory" or "cybernetic" point of view. 
vli 
Freudian concepts such as "transference,” "primary process," 
and "unconscious" are completely at home in a Batesonian 
language, though the processes which they describe are thought 
about in ways very different from Freud's. Many of Freud's 
descriptions of his technique, such as his early descriptions 
of free association, the treatment of compulsives and the evolu¬ 
tion of his approach to transference exhibit the formal charac¬ 
teristics described by Bateson and his colleagues as the 
"therapeutic double bind." 
The fourth chapter is entitled, "Freud, Binswanger, 
and Learning III". In his article, "Freud's Conception of Man 
in the Light of Anthropology," Ludwig Binswanger puts forward 
an excellent assessment of Freud's work from the point of view 
of an existentialist. In the terms of this paper, he says 
that Freud's language cannot deal adequately with certain 
human experiences. This chapter offers a comparison of Freud's, 
Binswanger's and Bateson's languages which involves an attempt 
to come to a clear understanding and statement of Bateson's 
crucial concept of Learning III. In the context of the develop¬ 
ment of Bateson's thought and the outlining of Binswanger's 
understanding of how a language must deal with "Homo existential!s 
Learning III is, hopefully, made understandable. 
The fifth chapter involves using the language to talk 
about other therapies. The "how" of cure in Network Therapy, 
and the therapies of Jessie Taft, Fritz Peris and John F.osen..are 
discussed in Bateson's terms. This makes systems whose 
vlii 
terminologies and emphases seem hardly to intersect, available 
for easy comparison as to what they are attempting to accomplish 
and how helpful change using each approach is effected. 
In the last chapter a brief summary of the language as 
it has been developed is offered to give the reader a better 
sense of the unity and form of the work as a whole. Finally, 
there is a brief discussion of the relation of the language to 
the act of writing the thesis. This offers a final reminder 
of the interactive nature of all the processes touched upon 
in the work including the writing of the study itself. 
ix 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. THE NEED FOR A LANGUAGE 1 
II. GREGORY BATESON AND THE BEGINNINGS OF A LANGUAGE 15 
A. Context 17 
B. Logical Types 24 
C. Categories of Learning and Communication 32 
D. Pathology ^8 
E. Therapy 58 
III. FREUD’S PSYCHOANALYSIS: PARALLELS AND PARADOXES 71 
IV. FREUD, BINSWANGER AND LEARNING III 100 
V. THE LANGUAGE AND OTHER THERAPIES 125 
VI. SUMMARY AND CLOSING REMARKS 168 
1 Q 1 
VII. REFERENCES 

THE NEED FOR A LANGUAGE 
One of the testimonies to the importance of psycho¬ 
therapy to Western people’s understanding of themselves and 
their possible ways of being is the great breadth of interest 
in it and the universal lack of concensus on almost any aspect 
of the process one might want to consider. Theories, metho¬ 
dologies, and "schools" of theraoy continue to proliferate. 
People with an incredibly wide diversity of formal training 
consider the practice of psychotherapy a logical and fruitful 
way of bringing their training to bear on the world around 
them. 
One would think that as different therapies were tried 
and compared, ways that were "better" would have come to be 
generally agreed upon and "results" would have become more 
assured and predictable. Diagnosis would become, in this way 
of understanding, ever more accurate and finely matched to an 
appropriate method of treatment. This has not been the case. 
As new therapies, theories, and terminologies have arisen, it 
has been the people who had hoped for a refinement and elimi¬ 
nation of theories, leading to the identification of the "best 
methods, yielding predictable and demonstrable results, who 
have been most disappointed and critical of psychotherapy as 
it was being practiced. In the last twenty years or so many 
articles have called the effectiveness of psychotherapy 
1 
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severely into question. (92, 186, 98) 
Unfortunately the studies which are most emphatic in 
their assertion that psychotherapy is "ineffective" seem generally 
to be the studies most limited to the "effective" vs. "ineffective" 
dichotomy. When a field of the extended history, the multitude 
of formal approaches and the myriad of personal therapeutic 
styles which are incorporated under the term "psychotherapy" 
is reduced to a single dichotomy, it is obvious that most of 
the complexities of the experience involved must be screened 
out by the language used. 
Psychotherapists as well as their critics tend to be 
grounded in a faith in "science". Even though they may be 
successful in terms of relieving the suffering of their patients, 
most therapists are uneasy when they cannot say why they are 
successful in "provable" scientific language. Frieda Fromm- 
Reichmann, one of the most successful (in the terms used above) 
and influential therapists of recent times, in agreeing with 
Zilboorg that one is unable to say satisfactorily why one is 
successful puts her hope in science to provide the explanatory 
system which would make her successes repeatable by others. 
She says that, "'our aim is to replace intuition with under¬ 
standing' and to convert the intuitive truths with which all 
psychotherapy works by necessity, into scientific truths, s. 
that they may become 'public property . . . ready to be used, 
tested, questioned, probed, and experimented with by anyone 
else who is interested in science.’" (lW 
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There are two fundamental problems with the approach 
Fromm-Retchmann would like to be able to follow. One is the 
assumption that there Is knowledge to be had which, when 
properly catagorized and specified, can be known and used 
equally by "anyone else who is interested in science." With 
the proper formulations, supposedly, one can have a body of 
"true" knowledge which allows the knowers to be interchangeable. 
This separating of knowledge from the knower isolates a part 
of an interdependent process, and is then by its nature 
incomplete, a skewed picture of what is in fact a larger whole. 
This is the subject/object separation. It is an approach 
which fosters, for example, the investigation of "consciousness" 
rather than "consciousness of . . Yet, consciousness is 
not a "thing". It is a process in which there is always one 
who is conscious and "something" of which one is conscious. 
Everywhere the "scientific" approach makes "things" where 
there are only processes. Generally this involves subdividing 
into studiable bits, "isolating variables • 
In the practice of isolating variables is the second 
problem of the "scientific" approach in the behavioral sciences. 
In the application, this method seems to let the essence of 
an interaction or process slip through its methodological fingers. 
It is almost axiomatic in psychotherapy research that 
crucial aLtgeneranyenotWacces3ible'tonmea»urement and yield 
low reliability among observers. 
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While there is a movement in the sciences back to study¬ 
ing whole entities as processes, this approach which promises 
so much for our understanding is still relatively new and has 
had little impact on the mainstream of the behavioral sciences. 
Barry Commoner, a noted biologist, describes clearly the need 
for holistic ways of seeing. 
If we consider all the forms of matter that we know 
about, only in regard to a narrow spectrum [nuclear physics] 
is there a possibility of what might be called the "atomis¬ 
tic approximation" succeeding. Everything else is necessarily 
holistic, so that what has appeared to be a universal basic 
approach to science since the Greeks —atomism—is really a 
special case, which only worked where it has worked and is 
not going to work anywhere else, up or down. It’s a narrow 
window, a special case; but, because of the enormous conse¬ 
quences of understanding the atom, it has misled everyone 
into believing that atomism is synonomous with science. I 
think this is the great evil of Western science today. (93) 
From a beginning with whole processes one is able to, 
and should, work toward an understanding of component parts. 
The minute is as important as ever. However, whenever or.e is 
dealing with systems (which, as we shall see, is most of the 
time), the whole is more than, and different from, the sum of 
its parts. One cannot build from an understanding of the 
small to an adequate description of the large though this is 
what is usually attempted in research on psychotherapy. 
Though the peoole trying to explain psychotherapeutic 
change "scientifically” have had little success, that does not 
mean that change which is helpful to a client does not occur 
or that it occurs randomly. Some therapists, in all probability, 
are better for particular clients than others. Some clients 
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are more likely to improve than others. Something certainly 
happens for some people (though change may in some cases be 
more significant for the therapist than for the client). C1P2) * 
One is, however, looking in the wrong way when one seeks to 
correlate client gain with the "school" of psychotherapy adhered 
to be the therapist. (99) 
There are many theories of psychotherapy, but is impres¬ 
sive how often the therapist’s technique is more an expression 
of his personality than an adherence to any particular school 
of thought. Various studies have established that competent 
psychotherapists of different schools agree more closely 
with each other regarding the most important elements in 
therapy than do not-as-competent therapists belonging to the 
same theoretic school. In addition, the competent therapists, 
regardless of their theoretic persuasion, agree more closely 
with the patient’s appraisal of the important elements in 
his therapy than do the not-as-competent therapists. The 
patients who feel they have undergone a significant change 
as a result of psychotherapy uniformly place their response 
to the therapist ahead of "insight." (173) 
We are left here in a very "unscientific" position. We 
can say that there are some "elements" of therapy more important 
than others. At the same time no specific technique can be 
prescribed as most successful, therapists seem to use a technique 
which is uniquely a product of their own personalities. 
In reporting on an extensive study of two groups of 
therapists, one with a seventy-five per cent improvement rate 
and one with a twenty-seven per cent improvement rate in their 
work with schizophrenic people, Whitehorne says the difference 
KSiss'.?: ss/ssss srs 
rr.s*ss,rrsp:s-.;:2.Es.1"srr;.2 a r........ 
on the basis of their questionnaires and behavior rating data 
that the differences among therapists were "°re evi ent * 
the therapists thought than in how they or the patients behavec. 
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in effectiveness between the two groups seemed to be attri¬ 
butable to: 
...the differences found among physicians in the extent 
to which they were able to approach their patient’s prob¬ 
lems in a personal way, gain a trusted, confidential rela¬ 
tionship and Darticipate in an active personal way in the 
patient’s reorientation to personal relationships. Tech¬ 
niques of passive permissiveness or efforts to develop 
insight by interpretation appear to have much less thera¬ 
peutic value. (231) 
A therapist has to ’’participate in an active personal 
way." He has to "invest" personally in the therapeutic process. 
There is evidence that this same sort of investment is 
required, at some level, of the patient. In a study restrict* d 
to factors "in" the patient which influenced their continuing 
in psychotherapy in an outpatient clinic in Chicago, Heine and 
Trosman had interesting results. The presenting complaint 
(whether it was emotional or somatic) and the degree of convic¬ 
tion on the part of the patient that treatment would be helpful 
proved not to be significant as factors in whether or not they 
continued in psychotherapy beyond a very brief time. The 
significant factors proved to be the "active collaboration in 
the therapeutic process by the patient as opposed to passive 
cooperation", and whether the patient was seeking "help in 
changing behavior" or simply expecting medicine or diagnostic 
information. 
Though we can say that "active investment" on the part 
of both people in individual psychotherapy (therapist and 
patient) is a very important element in a "helpful" therapy. 
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and that in such therapy there will be substantial agreement 
between the therapist and patient on what are the important 
elements of the therapy, we have not begun to say how any 
element in the therapy is productive of helpful change. 
In fact the language mostly used to talk about psycho¬ 
therapy, and therefore that which is available for "naturalis¬ 
tic" (nonquantative) research, is riddled, according to Gregory 
Bateson, with: 
...a number of imperfectly defined explanatory notions 
which are commonly used in the behavioral sciences—"ego," 
"anxiety," "instinct," "purpose," "mind," "self," "fixed 
action pattern," "intelligence," "stupidity," "maturity," 
and the like. For the sake of politeness, I call these 
"heuristic" concepts; but, in truth, most of them are so 
loosely derived and so mutually irrelevant that they mix 
together to make a sort of conceptual fog which does much 
to delay the progress of science. (64) 
Given the,lack of specificity of "process oriented" 
language and the general inadequacy of the usual atomistic 
(reductionist) scientific approaches, it is no wonder that a 
therapist and a patient find themselves in the situation which 
Bateson describes so well: 
The patient and the therapist are both virtually unable 
to tell you what happened that led to psychotherapeutic 
change. ... I do not know of any school of psychotherapy 
that, as yet, has enough language for talking about these 
levels to even attempt to give insight at these levels. 
We need a language which can speak rigorously about 
the whole of the process of psychotherapy, not just about what 
is happening "in" the patient or what is done by the therapist. 
In order to accomplish this goal a language and the concomitant 
t be able to deal with the system of way of understanding mus 
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of therapist-patient, with that in the process which is more 
than the sum of the parts. 
In the work of Gregory Bateson, I believe, there is a 
way of thinking about phenomena which could allow for the 
development of a language which could speak rigorously about 
the process of psychotherapy in a holistic way. Since Bateson 
himself has never attempted such a project in a systematic 
fashion, it will be the work of this study to develop such a 
language. 
The language when developed should be able to speak 
coherently and in the same general set of understandings and 
terms about all the phenomena surrounding a field as general 
as "psychotherapy." While it may not offer a theory in all 
areas adequate to the phenomena, it should allow one to dis¬ 
cuss and understand, and therefore do further work in, areas 
which up to now have had very different approaches and termino¬ 
logies. Examples of the phenomena.which should be accessible 
to the language are: human learning, human development, fami¬ 
lies, psychopathology, bits of interaction (usually called 
"stimulus," "response," and "reinforcement"), profound inter¬ 
relating (the "I-thou relationship"), communication generally, 
and "intra-psychic" processes. 
A language is an approach to phenomena which embodies 
in itself a way of sorting and assigning meaning, an epistomology. 
A change in language, in epistomology, does not necess¬ 
arily imply a change in behavior (as it usually understood). 
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In this case, it does not necessarily imply that a new form 
of psychotherapy will result from using a new language to 
understand this process. However, a change in ways of under¬ 
standing does imply a change in possibilities. In a different 
epistomological context, the evolution of psychotherapy as a 
formal interactive process will, in all likelihood, be modified. 
So, while a "Batesonian language" does not imply a "Batesonian 
therapy", it is probable that if many therapists began to think 
about therapy as a whole and to perceive the "bits" of thera¬ 
peutic interaction in Batesonian terms, the therapy which they 
practiced would gradually modify (evolve) in the direction of 
more fully and clearly embodying these understandings. As we 
will see over and over in the course of the study, basic 
premises involved in how one understands interactions, the con¬ 
text of meanings or "punctuations" in which an interaction 
occurs, tend to be self-validating. We will also see that the 
more one's abstract epistomological premises are adequate to 
the complexity of the phenomena under consideration, the more 
one is able to give form and meaning to aspects of the pheno¬ 
mena which otherwise would seem random and of no consequence. 
Our goal, then, is to develop a language which can give 
formal expression, i.e. expression in a coherent form, to a 
greater complexity of aspects of the psychotherapeutic process 
than are presently available to the languages commonly used. 
It should be remembered In reading this work that a 
language is a different sort of an enterprise than a specific 
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theory or experiment. It cannot be stated In any short com¬ 
pact form which can then \ be discussed or proved. It exists 
only in its use, and that is the only way it can be learned. 
In the title of the next chapter, the term "beginnings" is 
meant to imply that the language is in the process of develop¬ 
ment and explication throughout the entire work. Where the 
reader encounters a part that seems unclear or that does not 
conform immediately to his experience, he is asked to continue 
reading. The point will, in all likelihood, be discussed again 
in a different context later in the work. Through the use of 
the language in serveral different contexts, it is hoped that 
this study will enable the reader to utilize the language in 
the contexts of his own experience. 
Perhaps a brief description of the form which the study 
as a whole will take will better prenare the reader for his 
encounter with our language. The study will have the chapters 
listed below. In the explanation of each of the succeeding 
chapters should be apparent the scope, methodology and limita¬ 
tions of the work. 
GREGORY BATESON AND THE BEGINNINGS OF A LANGUAGE 
In this section of the paper the attempt will be made 
to present Bateson’s thought as it has developed over the years 
so that the reader will experience the formal elegance inherent 
in the whole as well as coming to understand concepts which are 
the particulars. The individual concepts will be developed 
as fully as possible using some of the different ways of 
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approaching them and different language in which they have 
been couched at different points in Bateson's career. Only 
when ideas have been explained and have been set forth in 
their interrelationship which makes for the coherence of a 
language or approach will the study attempt to come back to 
any sort of a "shorthand” or a set of terms which can be taken 
conveniently along when talking about other people's thought 
or therapy. 
Though several different ways of talking about a concept 
used by Bateson at different times may be offered, the general 
approach to his thought will not be historical. Only when an 
account of the different forms that a theory or concept took 
over the years seems to be the best way to show the present 
concept in its full resonance will such an account be under¬ 
taken. The history of the "double bind" theory in its trans¬ 
formation from "binder versus victim" to "schizophrenic (i.e., 
bound) family" will be such a case. 
Though much of this section will be quite abstract, 
dealing with the orderedness of contexts, the nature of differ¬ 
ence, and so forth, there will also be discussion of the pheno¬ 
mena out of which these patterns are drawn. Hopefully, the 
language which is developed will be demonstrably convenient 
when speaking about therapy, families, and the like. 
FREUD’S PSYCHOANALYSIS: PARALLELS AND PARADOXES 
There is a remarkable correspondence between the ordered 
levels of the contexts of learning which Bateson talks about 
and the levels of intra-psychic process which Freud described. 
The study will show that using Bateson’s way of thought, much 
of Freud’s work becomes available and useful from an "informa¬ 
tion theory” or "cybernetic" point of view. Freudian concents 
such as "transference," "primary process," and "unconscious" 
are completely at home in a Batesonian language, though the 
processes which they describe are thought about in ways very 
different from Freud’s. Many of Freud's descriptions of his 
technique, such as his early descriptions of free association, 
the treatment of compulsives and the evolution of his approach 
to transference exhibit the formal characteristics described 
by Bateson and his colleagues as the "therapeutic double bind." 
In working as fully and concretely as possible with a 
language as broad and rich as that of Freud, the application 
of Bateson's language can be demonstrated and refined. 
FREUD, BINSWANGER, AND LEARNING III 
In his article, "Freud’s Conception of Man in the Light 
of Anthropology," Ludwig Binswanger puts forward an excellent 
assessment of Freud's work from the point of view of an exis¬ 
tentialist. While giving Freud great respect for illuminating 
the patterns of functioning of human beings, Binswanger finds 
Freud's basic concept of people as "Homo Natura", as organism, 
fails to take into account people in their existential being. 
The being who can say "my organism," "my history," "my growth" 
is a being unrepresented in Freudian thought, according to 
Binswanger. 
13 
Binswanger's argument, when followed In a much more 
careful way than the sketch presented here, Is quite forceful. 
In the terms of this paper, he says that Freud's language 
cannot deal adequately with certain human experiences. If, 
In the parts of the study up to this point, the parallel 
between Bateson's language and Freud's has been convincingly 
drawn, it seems likely that some examination or comparison of 
Bateson with Binswanger will be In order. 
This comparison will involve an attempt to come to a 
clear understanding and statement of Bateson's concept of 
Learning III. In the context of the development of Bateson's 
thought and the outlining of Binswanger’s understanding of how 
a language must deal with "Homo existentialis" Learning III 
will, hopefully, be understandable. The concept of Learning III 
will enable us in our language to discuss a. given therapy's 
approach to the most fundamental aspects of human existence. 
THE LANGUAGE AND OTHER THERAPIES 
By this point in the study the language will have been 
set out in Its full scope and resonance. This chapter will 
involve using the language to talk about other therapies. ibe 
"how" of cure in such therapies as Network Therapy, and the 
therapies of Jessie Taft, Fritz Peris and John Rosen will be 
discussed in Bateson's terms. This should make systems whose 
terminologies and emphases seem hardly to intersect, available 
for easy comparison as to what they are attempting to accomplish 
and how helpful change using each approach is effected. It is 
for this purpose that the study is undertaken and the language 
constructed. 
SUMMARY AND CLOSING REMARKS 
This section will attempt to knit together the loose 
ends left in the study up to this point, 
A brief summary of the language as it has been developed 
will be offered to give the reader a better sense of the unity 
and form of the work as a whole. Finally, we will very briefly 
discuss the relation of the language to the act of writing 
this thesis. This will offer a final reminder of the inter¬ 
active nature of all the processes touched upon in this work 
including the writing of the study itself. 
GREGORY BATESON AND THE BEGINNINGS OF A LANGUAGE 
In this chapter we will attempt to develop the language 
of this study and give the reader an initial sense of its use¬ 
fulness. We will begin by trying to make a connection between 
the language and the experience of the reader. We must begin 
on common ground. We then hope to show that the connection 
we have chosen to make with the reader’s experience and the 
subsequent development of our way of describing experience is 
neither capricious nor arbitrary. By discussing the basic 
form of human experiencing and learning we hope to show that 
the language we want to use embodies this same basic form. 
The two are "isomorphic", to use a term which will be used 
several times in this work. As we develop our language into 
more rigorous clarity, the same clarity should be available 
for describing human experiencing and learning. We will use 
the mathematical theory of Logical Types to help give clarity 
to our language, and then we will try to apply the theory to 
human learning. In both of these processes we will be retrac¬ 
ing the steps of Bateson. The last two sections of this chap¬ 
ter will use the description of human learning we develop to 
talk about how this process can go awry (pathology) and what 
can be done about it (therapy). It is the language for dis¬ 
cussing psychotherapy toward which we are building. Hopefully, 
the steps we take in working toward this goal will ultimately 
each prove themselves necessary, helping the reader to have 
a fuller sense of the size and complexity of the task we are 
undertaking. 
In allbthis task we will be using the work of Gregory 
Bateson. While some of the specific points in this chapter 
are original to the present author, the thinking is so deeply 
rooted in Bateson’s thought that separating the original from 
paraphrase of Bateson has become impossible. Only the organi¬ 
zation of the chapter as a whole and some of the examples of 
various points are clearly original. The additions and refine¬ 
ments of the language in subsequent chapters will to a much 
greater degree be the work of the present author. Unfortunately, 
any confusion or unnecessary complexity involved In our language 
and its use is original with the present author and cannot be 
attributed to Bateson. 
Having set out the plan for this chapter and our debt 
to Bateson, we will begin in our attempt to establish a. meeting 
place between our language and the experience of the reader. 
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CONTEXT 
A certain mother habitually rewards her small son 
with ice cream after he eats his spinach. What additional 
information would you need to be able to predict whether 
the child will: a. Come to love or hate spinach; b. Love 
or hate ice cream, or c. Love or hate Mother? (6s) 
This is an example Bateson uses to convey the importance 
of the notion of "context." It is, hopefully, a good entry 
point into his way of thinking, a way of thinking by no means 
unique to him, but which is in his work presented through a 
range of subjects and with a clarity and depth which is truly 
unique. 
Take a moment with the example above. Consider what 
information or what kinds of information you would need to make 
the predictions involved. 
The question is explosive in its implications. Each bit 
of information one gets increases one's sense of how much infor¬ 
mation is needed. Consider the change in the meaning of the 
situation any one of the following pieces of information would 
effect: The child is diabetic and ice cream is dangerous. 
The exoense of ice cream greatly taxes the family budget. The 
mother learned her eating habits in exactly the same or a very 
different way. The father considers this bribing the child. 
The other children don't get ice cream for eating spinach. 
The other children get ice cream and cake while this child 
gets only ice cream. The father raises spinach for a.living. 
Each possibility completely modifies the situation and 
each begs further clarification and modification. The contextual 
18' 
information one would need to confidently predict the outcomes 
in question is potentially infinite. Knowing only what one 
knows in the example, one knows nothing. Or, more properly, 
without the context, what one knows has no meaning. It has 
no meaning to an observer. This point must always be under¬ 
stood in talking of meaning. Meaning is always perceived 
meaning. Information is only information to a perceiving entity. 
Differences only makes a difference when it is in some sense 
(or by some sense) perceived. 
Explanation involving context is always hierarchical. 
Every context has a context. The unit of meaning is the pheno¬ 
menon as perceived in its context. As one focuses on the con¬ 
text, however, a new context appears. 
A phoneme exists as such only in combination with other 
phonemes which make up a word. The word is the context of 
the phoneme. But the word exists as such—only has ''meaning" — 
in the larger context of the utterance, which again has 
meaning only in a relationship. (36) 
Context is a difficult sort of notion. One can never 
locate "a context." It is the greater set of nhenomena which 
in-forms a sub-set. In the relationship between the sub-set 
and the greater set is the demarcation of the sub-set, the out¬ 
line. The outline is necessary so that there can be a relation¬ 
ship. "It is this and not that (outline)," and, "You don't 
know what this (sub-set) means until you relate it to that 
(context)." Because there Is a perceived outline, there is 
a difference. Because there is a perceived difference, there 
is relationship. Because there is relationship, there can be 
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perceived meaning. 
Is this actually how people perceive? Watzlawick and 
his colleagues say it definitely is. 
Sensory and brain research has proved conclusively 
that only relationships and patterns of relationships^ can 
be perceived and these are the essence of experience. (222) 
Some examples of what this statement means In actual 
perception may make its implications more immediate. Consider 
that the eye does not "look" in the sense of pointing at a 
thing and taking it in; the eye scans. It moves picking up 
differences. A star is not a beam of light to the eye. It 
is a beam of light which is different from its dark background. 
Stare directly at a star without moving your eyes (if you can) 
and it disappears. Pribram describes an experiment conducted 
in Moscow by Eugene Sakolov which demonstrates the same process 
happening with auditory perception. 
A tone beep of specified intensity and duration was 
presented at irregular Intervals to a subject whose 
electroencephalogram, galvanic skin response and plethysmo- 
graphic record were traced. At the onset of such an experi¬ 
ment characteristic changes in these traces are observed. 
These accompany behavioral alerting and are known as the 
orienting reaction. As the experiment proceeds, these 
Indices of orienting become progressively more attenuated 
until the beep of the tone no longer seems to have any effect. 
This is habituation. At this point Sokolov reduced the In¬ 
tensity of the tone without changing any of its other char¬ 
acteristics. Immediately the electrical traces from the 
subject signalled an orienting reaction. Sokolov reasoned, 
therefore, that habituation could not be simply some type 
of fatiguing of sensory and neural elements. Rather, a 
process must be set up In the central nervous system against 
which Incoming sensory signals are matched. Any change in 
signal would result in the orienting reaction. He tested 
his Idea by habituating his subjects anew and then shorten¬ 
ing the tone beep. Now the orienting reaction occurred at 
the moment the shortened beep ended. The electrical traces 
showed the alerting reactions to the period of silence. 
(Pribram’s emphasis) (195) 
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When one considers the perception of differences over 
time, the notion of context falls more comfortably into place. 
Each event is part of the perceptual context of an immediately 
subsequent event. At the simplest level, the tone is the 
context for the silence that follows and vice versa. It is 
the event against which a difference appears when the subsequent 
event is perceived. At the next level up the hierarchy of con¬ 
text, in this case, we find the first order of pattern forma¬ 
tion in perception, of "redundancy”. The original patterns of 
tone and silence are the context against which a later pattern 
of softer tone and silence or shorter tone and silence can make 
a difference. This difference is certainly of a more abstract 
or higher order than the difference between tone and silence. 
This difference is perceivable only when the original differ¬ 
ence between tone and silence no longer evokes the orienting 
reaction, i.e, is no longer a difference which makes a differ¬ 
ence . 
It would appear that the organism had made a generali¬ 
zation about the pattern of tone and silence which allowed it 
no longer to expend its attention in reacting to each individual 
tone and silence. Only when this pattern was changed was the 
orienting reaction, the person’s awareness that something 
different was happening, evoked. 
A difference-perceiving or relationship-perceivin^ entity 
which can be described as learning or adapting will preceive 
redundancy or pattern. Redundancy is the sort of relationship 
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discussed above in the notion of context when this relation¬ 
ship is perceived over time. In Bateson’s language the terms 
"redundancy,” "pattern," and "information" are used almost 
interchangeably in his description of the phenomena involved 
in perception and learning. 
Any aggregrate of events or objects (e.g. a sequence 
of phonemes, a painting, or a frog, or a culture) shall be 
said to contain "redundancy" or "pattern" if the aggregrate 
can be divided in any way by a "slash mark," such that an 
observer perceiving only what is one side of the slash mark 
can guess , with better than random success, what is on the 
other side of the slash mark. We may say that what is on 
one side of the slash mark contains information or has mean¬ 
ing about what is on the other side. Or in engineer's lan¬ 
guage, the aggregrate contains "redundancy." Or, again, 
from the point of view of a cybernetic observer, the infor¬ 
mation available on one side of the slash mark will restrain 
(i.e. reduce the probability of) wrong guessing. (^7) 
In Pribram's example of the tone/silence, when redundancy 
was perceived, i.e. when a pattern of tone and silence was 
perceived, the context for change in pattern was established. 
As there is a hierarchy of contexts, so there is a hierarchy 
of redundancies perceivable. One can perceive a change in a 
pattern, a change in a pattern of patterns, etc. 
Organisms are thrust into the perceptual/communicational 
world of redundancy and context and the hierarchies of both 
by the most basic nature of perception. Organisms perceive 
relationship by perceiving difference. Yet when we are faced 
with an object/event (if only difference can be perceived, 
the use of the word "object" must be carefully modified), the 
perception of a book, for example, there is an infinite number 
of differences (contexts) possible which could be perceived. 
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There are the differences between the book and the Brooklyn 
bridge, a Bach concerto, a humming bird, another book, Planck’s 
constant, ad nauseum. Somehow some differences are perceived 
and some are not. If this were not so, the perceiving entity 
would be faced with much more information than it could possibly 
take in. Somehow a sorting or screening must occur. This mean? 
that while "objects of perception" may fall in one's path in 
a random manner, what is oerceived of those objects will be 
sorted or screened in a non-random fashion. There must be 
redundancy in the act of perception. And, if this is true, 
the hierarchical nature of redundancy and context must be re¬ 
flected in or be a reflection of the basic form of human percep¬ 
tion. 
What we have been describing so far are some of the 
basic characteristics of the world of information and percep¬ 
tion, the world of form. This is the world of learning and 
meaning. It Is a world of interaction, always Involving a 
perceiver and a perceived. Both are necessary for meaning, 
redundancy, context or learning to exist. 
The first major contribution Bateson made to the 
investigation of the world of form was his using the mathe¬ 
matical theory of Logical Types, originally advanced by 
Whitehead and Russell in 1910 as a formal explicative tool 
in describing the hierarchical nature of patterns of meaning 
as they are manifested in human learning and interaction. 
Hopefully the groundwork has been laid showing that this world 
and its laws are basic to all human activities. Now we 
proceed to the more formal and rigorous descriptions of 
world involved in the Theory of Logical Types. 
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shall 
this 
LOGICAL TYPES 
In looking for an explanation to the Theory of Logical 
Types in Bateson’s work, one can turn to almost any article 
to find the theory set forth. Yet each time the description 
is a bit different. In each case the part on Logical Types comes 
near the beginning of the essay and is a part of the context of 
understanding Bateson is trying to construct. Though the main 
theme of the essay may be primitive art, animal play, learning, 
alcoholism, schizophrenia, somatic change in evolution or oom- 
parative cultural anthropology, an understanding of logical 
types, when presented in a way appropriate to the subject, seems 
crucial to understanding Bateson’s thinking on that particular 
subject. Here is the explanation of the theory which preceeds 
a discussion of "The Logical Categories of Learning and Communi¬ 
cation . ” 
First, it is appropriate to indicate the subject matter 
of the Theory of Logical Tyoes: the theory asserts that no 
class can, in formal logical or mathematical discourse, be 
a member of Itself; that a class of classes cannot be one 
of the classes which are its members; that a name is not the 
thing named; that "John Bateson" is the class of which that 
boy is the unique member; and so forth. These assertions 
may seem trivial and even obvious, but we shall see later 
that it is not at all unusual for theorists of behavioral 
science to commit errors which are precisely analogous to 
the error of classifying the name with the thing named—or 
eating the menu card instead of the dinner—and error of 
-Somewhat*"^ess obvious is the further assertion of the 
theory: that a class cannot be one of those items which 
are correctly classified as Its nonmembers. If we classify 
chairs together to constitute the class of chairs, we can 
go on to note that tables and lamp shades are members o, ! line oils* of "nonchairs," but we shall commit an error 
in formal discourse if we count the class of chairs among 
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the items within the class of nonchairs. 
In as much as no class can be a member of itself, the 
class of nonchairs clearly cannot be a nonchair. Simple 
considerations of symmetry may suffice to convince the 
nonmathematical reader: (a) that the class of chairs is 
of the same order of abstraction (i.e., the same logical 
type) as the class of nonchairs; and further, (b) that if 
the class of chairs is not a chair, then, correspondingly, 
the class of nonchairs is not a nonchair. 
Lastly the theory asserts that if these simple rules 
of formal discourse are contravened, paradox will be gener¬ 
ated and the discourse vitiated. (Bateson’s emphasis) (^9) 
Mathematics can make the structure of logical types very 
clear because of the different languages available to It. Con¬ 
sider the statement, "The addition of two positive real numbers 
will always result in a positive real number". This is obviously 
of a different logical type from, a meta-statement to, the 
statement, "4+6=10." It is unlikely that one would confuse the 
two levels because one is stated in discursive language while 
the other is in mathematical symbols. However, once one begins 
to make statements of a higher logical type than the two examples 
here, only discursive language remains, and paradox is more 
likely. The statement, "All mathematical propositions must be 
proved before they can be used," embodies such a paradox. It 
is a proposition about all propositions, a member of a class 
which also encompasses the class as a whole. 
In the study of digital communication the Theory of 
Logical Types can be almost rigorously applied. Digital Commun¬ 
ication is that in which the messages bear no formal relation 
to the things for which they stand. The word "chair" does not 
look or sound like the object for which it stands, and you can't 
sit in it. This is analogous to the digit "4" which bears an 
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arbitrary relation to the quantity for which it stands and 
is not in itself particularly larger or smaller than any other 
digit. In digital communication difference of Logical Type 
is indicated when one message describes or types another. Th® 
message, "What are we talking about?" is of a different logical 
type than whatever messages made up the discussion which one 
can imagine to have preceeded it. It is a meta-message; a 
message about a class of messages. Unfortunately for rigor, 
there is no such thing as a purely digital message. All spoken 
language is accompanied by analogic communication such as ges¬ 
ture, facial expression, tone of voice, etc. An analogic 
message is one in which there is a formal relation between the 
message and its referent. How broadly you smile tells me how 
happy you are or how happy you want me to think you are. 
Usually the aspects of analogic communication which accompany 
a digital spoken message can be said to be of a higher logical 
type to the digital message. They establish a context by tell¬ 
ing the receiver how the message is to be understood. They are 
statements about the relationship between the speakers while 
digital information is being exchanged. In written as well 
as spoken digital communication the importance of context 
remains true. There are statements about how one is to under¬ 
stand a message in the structure of the message itself as well 
as in all the other sorts of contexts in which any message is 
conveyed. These are of a higher'.logical type, but here the 
ladder of the hierarchy begins to seem more like an ascending 
net. The Theory of Logical Types has become a formal description 
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of a very useful way of approaching and understanding phenomena 
rather than a rigorous mathematical theorem. 
In the study of living organisms, the Theory of Logical 
Types Is helpful In understanding the inevitable hierarchy In 
the communication among these organisms. Still, there are 
certain other differences besides those already ennumerated 
between the logical types involved in a logical system and the 
phenomena occurring in communication which we can use logical 
types to understand. In a logical system, if it can be proven 
that a certain combination of premises leads to a paradox or 
untenable conclusion, the whole structure of premises and para¬ 
doxes can be discarded. It is as if they never existed. Organ¬ 
isms, however, existing In time, must embody their premises in 
some form before a paradox can occur. At the point of the 
paradox, the experience of the organism in its embodiment of 
ultimately paradoxical premises does not cease to exist. 
An example of this phenomenon is found in the experiments 
described by Bateson in which dogs have been taught to discrimi¬ 
nate between a circle and an elipse. Gradually the elipse is 
rounded and the circle is flattened. At the point where the 
two look so much alike that discrimination is impossible, the 
trained dogs consistently begin to exhibit bizarre behavior. 
They cease eating, bite their handlers, or demonstrate vabicus 
other behavior which seems to indicate a mistrust for '-heir 
environment. A naive dog facing the indistinguishable circle 
and elipse will simply guess, accepting his reward as he gets it 
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In this experiment a dog not only learns that he will 
be rewarded for picking a circle, he learns the meta-nremise, 
"This is a context for discrimination," Bateson theorizes 
that gradually the smell of the laboratory or the harness In 
the experiment comes to be a "context market" which can sig¬ 
nify to the dog that the patterns of learning which he has 
encountered there before are again in effect. Yet faced with 
indistinguishable configurations, he is in paradox. His 
"experience" in trying to discriminate is in fact a comment on 
the class of activities involved in discrimination. In trying 
to discriminate, his experience is, "discrimination is impossible." 
Because he is unable to change meta-premises from "I should 
discriminate" to "Discrimination is impossible, I should guess," 
the dog seems to embody the paradox as it becomes pained and 
disoriented. It’s communicational pattern dls-integrates. 
The fact that an organism cannot quickly cease to operate 
on certain premises, or to perceive in certain patterns when 
those premises or patterns lead to nain or paradox is one aspect 
of the economics of the adaptation of organisms. It is the 
difficult aspect of what is still a necessary process. Bateson 
uses logical types to explain the way in which an organism 
"sinks" certain abstract premises in order to retain flexibility 
in immediate sorts of interaction. The process which we saw 
in the experiment where people became habituated to a specific 
tone/silence pattern can be seen as happening universally among 
organisms (or any system of a certain complexity). Once the 
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pattern of tone/silence is perceived or generalized, the person 
stops responding with the orienting reaction. The person then 
can save the attention involved in the orienting reaction for 
new and refined perceptions. The generalization gives new 
flexibility of perception. Any premise which can be acted upon 
in a more general or abstract form (at a higher logical type) 
allows the organism this flexibility of immediate perception 
and action. 
Some types of knowledge can conveniently be sunk to 
unconscious levels, but other types must be kept on the 
surface. Broadly, we can afford to sink those sorts of 
knowledge which continue to be true regardless of changes 
in the environment, but we must maintain in an accessible 
place all those controls of behavior which must be modified 
for every instance. The lion can sink into his unconscious 
the proposition that zebras are his natural prey,but in 
dealing with any particular zebra he must be able to modify 
the movements of his attack to fit with the particular terrain 
and the particular evasive tactics of the particular zebra. 
The economics of the system, in fact, pushes organisms 
toward sinking into the unconscious those generalities of 
relationship which remain premanently true and toward keep¬ 
ing within the conscious the pragmatics of particular 
instances. 
The premises may, economically, be sunk but particular 
conclusions must be conscious. But the "sinking," though 
economical, is still done at a price—the price of inaccess¬ 
ibility. Since the level to which things are sunk is charac¬ 
terized by iconic algorithms and metaphor, it becomes difficult 
for the organism to examine the matrix out of which his 
conscious conclusions spring. (^B) 
The formal description of the "sinking" of premises 
continues to be useful even as one moves out of areas which 
could in any way be conceived of as involving learning or 
adaptation on the part of the individual organism. It is a 
natural systems phenomenon of the process called "evolution . 
In the human being and other land mammals the presence of air 
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around the nose is certain enough so that the control of breath¬ 
ing can be sunk into the more primitive or autonomic portions 
of the brain only to be overridden when immediate conscious 
control of breathing is necessary. Though we can breathe in 
many different patterns which we consciously choose, rendered 
unconscious, we continue to breathe just as our hearts continue 
to beat. A porpoise, on the other hand, cannot count on air 
being around the blow hole at any given time. For that reason 
control of its breathing is located in the highest, most complex, 
most conscious part of its brain. The difference this makes 
was tragically learned during early experiments with dolphins. 
When for one reason or another they were anesthetized and be¬ 
came unconscious, they stopped breathing and died. 
So far we have described what might be called the "evolu¬ 
tionary purpose" of the sinking of premises from one perspective. 
The process of generalizing and sinking premises allows flexi¬ 
bility at the level of immediate resoonse. There is another 
evolutionary purpose equally important. Flexibility of response 
allows for stability of general premises. This is every bit 
as important for an organism or any system capable of adaptation. 
The most general or abstract premises must change slowly, if 
the system is to maintain its coherence. Bateson describes 
how this works in a finite system such as the human brain. 
Gestalt perception—the perception of pattern—enables 
the brain to'discard details and to name complex unities. 
It is necessary, however, to consider in somewhat more 
detail the role of pattern in the economics of circuitry. 
The brain is finite and,while the possible linkings of 
neurons must be astronomically numerous, there is still 
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a. problem of accomplishing what must be accomplished with 
the finite means available. Where Freud envisaged an 
economics of psychic.energy, the engineer of today would 
argue for an economics of circuitry. If the same way of 
thought can be appled to two separate problems, this is a 
saving of circuitry. At the highest level, this sort of 
economy is practiced by scientists who use the differential 
calculus both for the computation of trajectories and analysis 
of chemical processes. 
The basic analysis of this economics has been begun by 
Ross Ashby, whose Design for a Brain must be regarded as an 
important landmark in both psychiatry and communications 
theory. Ashby’s primary thesis concerns the interdependence 
of variables within complex systems, where every variable 
is directly or indirectly linked with each other. He points 
out that when such systems have adaptive characteristics, 
that is, when they tend to seek a steady state, there is 
a necessary relationship between those variables which change 
their values rapidly and those others in which change is 
comparatively slow. Broadly, when the system encounters 
load or stress, the rapidly changing variables act to main¬ 
tain the stability of the slowly changing variables. The 
general idea may be illustrated by considering an acrobat 
with his balance pole. The acrobat maintains the ongoing 
truth of the proposition, "I am on the high wire," by vary¬ 
ing the position and angle of his balancing pole. The 
effect of pegging the rapidly changing variable—fixing the 
relationship between the pole and the acrobat’s body—will 
result in rapid disruption of the more lasting proposition: 
the acrobat will fall. (33) 
It is In the interest of the organism to have the more 
changeable premises vary so that more abstract^ more deeply sunk 
premises can remain stable. If an organism learns certain 
abstract premises in a certain defineable context, when it 
again finds itself in what seems to be the same context, it will 
endeavor to operate on the previously learned premises even if 
it has to manipulate Its perception of immediate data to do this. 
The necessary redundancy in the act of immediate perception 
acts in service of maintaining more abstract patterns of perception. 
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CATEGORIES OP LEARNING AMD COMMUNICATION 
Bateson has formalized his descriptions of the processes 
discussed here in the article, "Logical Categories of Learning 
and Communication." In this article (which we will follow 
rather closely in this explanation) he discusses the different 
"levels of learning." Using his numbered levels of learning 
may give us a more useful set of terms for talking about such 
processes as "sinking" than we have had to this point.* 
Bateson describes the simple receipt of a message with 
a specific response as "Zero Learning." The message received 
in a Zero Learning situation may be of any logical type. While 
other levels of learning may be characterized by the level or 
logical type of "error" to be corrected by trial and error, 
Zero Learning does not involve trial and error at all. It Is 
mostly a concept to help in definition. The likelihood is small 
that anything occurs in the lives of organisms which is completely 
this simple. Bateson offers the following list of "phenomena 
which approach this degree of simplicity:" 
(a) In experimental settings, when "learning" is complete 
and the animal gives approximately 100 per cent correct 
responses to the repeated stimulus. 
(b) In cases of habituation, where the animal has ceased to 
give overt response to what was formerly a disturbing 
stimulus. , . , 
(c) In cases where the pattern of the response is minimally 
determined by experience and maximally determined by 
•Bateson is'rsther casual with his use of the terms "learning and 
"level” in this article. For the sake of clarity we can say that 
change of premises of a certain numbered level shall be called 
"learning" of that number. So change In premises of punctuation whic. 
are at level II we would call Learning II. Usually this distinction 
Is not necessary, or is supplied by the context. In such cases 
the abbreviation "L II " will be used. 
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genetic factors. 
(d) In cases where the response is now highly stereotyped. 
(e) In simple electronic circuits, where the circuit struc¬ 
ture is not itself subject to change resulting from the 
passage of impulses within the circuit—i.e., where the 
causal links between ’’stimulus" and "response" are as 
the engineers say "soldered in." (Bateson’s emphasis) 
(50) 
Learning I is a change of response in a given context 
when both responses are from the same "set of alternatives." 
This is the learning usually talked about and experimented with 
by psychologists who work in laboratories with animals. Bateson 
offers the following examples of that which could be considered 
Learning I; 
(a) There is the phenomenon of habituation—the change from 
responding to each occurrence of a repeated event to not 
overtly responding. There is also the extinction or loss 
of habituation, which may occur as a result of a more or 
less long gap or other interruption In the sequence of 
repetitions of the stimulus event. 
(b) The most familiar and perhaps most studied case is that 
of the classical Pavlovian conditioning. At Time 2 the 
dog salivates in response to the buzzer; he did not do 
this at Time 1. 
(c) There is the "learning" which occurs in contexts of 
instrumental reward and instrumental avoidance. 
(d) There is the phenomenon of rote learning, in which an 
Item in the behavior of the organism becomes a stimulus 
for another item of behavior. 
(e) There is the disruption, extinction, or inhibition of 
"completed" learning which nay follow change or absence 
of reinforcement. (51) 
It is important to note that the notion of repeatable 
context,(redundancy of perception) is absolutely essential 
for all levels of learning above Zero Learning. If repeatable 
context is not a valid description of how an organism organizes 
its perceptual world, then all learning is Zero learning. If 
the context at time B when the dog salivates in response to a 
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bell is the same to the dog as time A when it did not salivate, 
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then it can be said that "learning" has occurred. If the con¬ 
text is not the same, then we can only say that the dog’s 
experience is somehow a discrimination between the events of 
time A and the events of time A plus time B which caused it 
to salivate in response to the bell. "It would logically 
follow that all questions of the type, ’Is this behavior 
"learned" or "innate"?* should be answered in favor of 
genetics." 
We would argue that without the assumption of repeat¬ 
able context, our thesis falls to the ground, together 
with the whole general concept of "learning." If, on the 
other hand, the assumption of repeatable context is accepted 
as somehow true of the organisms which we study, then the 
case for logical typing of the phenomena of learning necess¬ 
arily stands, because the notion "context" is Itself subject 
to logical typing. (52) 
The idea of certain events functioning as "context markers" 
which was mentioned briefly earlier is here helpful in under¬ 
standing how an organism knows from which set of alternatives 
it must pick a response to a given stimulus. (The word "stimulus" 
i s used here with the understanding that in the flow of an inter¬ 
action any event may be regarded as "stimulus," "response,' 
or "reinforcement" depending of one's point of view, i.e. how 
one punctuates or gives order to the sequence.) The harness 
tells the dog that- he is back in the experimental context 
with all that that implies. When context markers are not 
readily apparent, an organism will often spend its energy 
trying to find one. It cannot settle into operating within 
the set of alternatives implied by the context until the context 
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is established. Questions like, "What is this course all about?" 
or, "Is this serious?" are verbalized examples of organisms in 
search of context markers. Usually the markers are clear and 
understood. A classroom with a blackboard, being seated by 
a maitre d’, a white flag, a cow’s stall in the milking barn, 
the opening or closing of the elevator doors—all these can 
easily be understood in the way in which they might function to 
tell an organism from what set of alternatives it was choosing 
its behavior at a given time. 
A change in the set of alternatives elicited by a given 
context marker is an example of Learning II. Any change in the 
set of alternatives in a context or in the pattern of punctuat¬ 
ing events into contexts or of identifying context markers would 
be Learning II, The dog who,went into "experimental neurosis" 
as a result of no longer being able to discriminate between the 
elipse and the circle did so because of being put in the wrong 
at the Level II. In Hull’s experiments with rote learning he 
found that all his subjects gradually improved in their ability 
to memorize meaningless syllables even though the specific 
syllables learned one day were of no help in remembering the 
syllables on subsequent days. They learned to learn within 
that context. This is Learning II. 
In talking about Learning II we will be using the term 
"punctuation" a great deal. Punctuation is the act o ordering 
perceived phenomena into meaningful units. An example drawn 
from Watzlawick, et. al., may help to make the conceDt clearer. 
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Suppose a husband and wife interact according to a pattern in 
which he is withdrawn and she is a nag. Each person’s behavior 
in the pattern can seem perfectly logical, depending on how you 
punctuate the series of interaction, i.e., where you choose to 
start a "cause and effect" explanation of what is happening. 
He may punctuate the series as follows: "When she nags me, 
all I can do is withdraw, and then she nags me more—She is 
never satisfied." She may punctuate the same series differently 
and therefore draw a very different conclusion as to what the 
whole interaction means: "He is withdrawn so I nag him to get 
some interaction going, but he only withdraws more It Is impossible 
to get any response from him." Withdraw—nag-withdraw, or nag- 
withdraw-nag: the only difference'is punctuation. 
One's habits of punctuating events are of a higher 
logical type than the stream of events in an interaction which 
one perceives. They are one's Level II premises about inter¬ 
action in action. These habits are commonly enumerated when 
talking about an individual by adjectives which are meant to 
describe a person’s "character." Descriptive terms such as 
"dependent," "morose," "competitive," "reasonable," etc., are 
all ways of naming a person's habits of organizing experienc- 
of interactions and therefore of contributing to the type of 
interaction which occurs. For example, a person who constantly 
suspects other people of talking *out him will probably act in 
a manner which will cause other people to talk about him. 
Seen from the point of view of the person being described, 
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the adjectives above name habits of punctuation. Seen from 
the point of view of an observer, these abstract patterns, 
as Bateson reminds us, are ways of interacting: and do not exist 
in a vacuum. 
The critical reader will have observed that . . . adjec¬ 
tives . , . which purport to describe individual character 
are really not strictly applicable to the individual but 
rather describe transactions between the individual and his 
material and human environment. No man is "resourceful" or 
"dependent" or "fatalistic" in a vacuum. His characteristic, 
whatever it be, is not his but is rather a characteristic of 
what goes on between him and something* (somebody) else. 
(Bateson's emphasis) (53) 
The reader may have noticed that in the study so far the 
terms "premise" and "pattern" have been used almost interchange¬ 
ably, The above quotation helps to explain why this is so. 
A "habit of punctuation" is effectively the same thing as a 
"premise about interaction" which, in the only place where this 
premise may be observed in operation, i.e., in interaction, is 
the same as a "pattern of interacting." This is an extremely 
important point. It means that what at first may seem to be 
a laziness or lack of precision in our language is actually an 
embodying of a phenomenological truth which is denied in the 
structure of one's usual thinking and speaking. We tend to 
think about phenomena in spacial terms. A "premise about inter¬ 
action" would exist "in" someone's head while a pattern of 
interacting would exist "outside" of the person. The premise 
"flows through" the intermediate realm of the body or is trans¬ 
lated by the body into action and "in" the action is the pattern. 
It is very hard to think in terms or images other than those of 
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space and substances. Yet here we are talking about forms of 
communication which are distinguishable only by the different 
perspectives of the observer in relation to each. The act 
of giving form to one's perceptions of interactions and the 
act of participating in interactions are transforms of what 
is inevitably one inseparable overall activity. They are 
thought of as different acts only because one is observable 
to an outside observer (patterns of interaction) and one is 
not (habits of punctuation). These terms ("premise" and 
"pattern") will continue to be used interchangeably. Where 
one is more helpful as an explanatory term in a certain con¬ 
text, it will be used, though always a minor change of word¬ 
ing would make another of the terms as appropriate. 
Patterns of the level of abstraction of Learning II, 
those which can be named by descriptions of "character," are 
those patterns or characteristics which one seeks to be able 
to know or comment upon when one is engaged in a "search for 
identity." It is this kind of pattern which one will almost 
inevitably name in answer to the question: "What kind of a 
person are you?" j 
Premises of Learning II are enduring enough to be 
terms part of one's identity because they are of a high level 
of abstraction. Abstract premises are less modifiable by day 
to day interaction and learning. 
We suggest that what is learned in Learning II is a way 
of punctuating events^. But a way ojT punctuating is nc. ru~ 
or false. TEere is nothing contained in the propositions of 
the learning that can be tested against reality. It is like 
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a picture seen in an inkblot; it has neither correctness 
nor incorrectness. It is only a way of seeing the inkblot. 
(Bateson’s emphasis) (5*0 
r, .. 
The premises of Learning II do not. In fact supply a 
base from which the details of experience can be deduced. 
The actual details which the subject encounters can commonly 
be found to fit the orocrustean bed of whatever premises 
he has learned. (34) 
This means that Learning II premises, because of their 
abstraction, are inevitably self-validating. 
In fact, the propositions which govern punctuation 
have the general characteristic of being self-validating. 
What we term "context’' includes the subject's behavior 
as well as the external events. But this behavior is 
controlled by former Learning II and therefore it will 
be of such a kind as to mold the total context to fit the 
expected punctuation. In sum, this self-validating charac¬ 
teristic of the content of Learning II has the effect that 
such learning Is almost ineradicable. It follows that 
Learning II acquired in infancy is likely to persist 
through life. Conversely, we must expect many of the im¬ 
portant characteristics of an adult's punctuation to have 
their roots in early infancy. (55) 
One further characteristic of Level II premises is that 
because they are abstract premises:' learned in Infancy and more 
deeply sunk than the premises of Learning I, they tend to be 
unconscious. A person, given clear reflections of bis actions 
by those around him, may be able to see the results of his Level 
II premises. For example, "I am foolish, loving, up-tight, 
dependent," or whatever. It Is still very difficult for a 
person to be conscious of the actual patterns of punctuation 
which go into these statements, Bateson points out in several 
places that the economics of sinking premises makes the unconscious 
evolutionarily necessary for human beings. To be continually 
conscious of how one structures one’s perception would overload 
one with information while greatly limiting the attention one 
could pay to one’s environment. In fact full awareness of how 
one perceives is impossible. A television set, to use Bateson’s 
example, could never be made to report on the screen both «-he 
picture it received and all the electronic processes that went 
into putting that oicture on the screen. To do this would take 
additional circuitry whose functioning could not be reported on 
the screen without additional circuitry . . . 
The interactional manifestation of Learning II premises 
are called "emotions.” These pre-verbal "signals of state" 
are the same precise algorithms* of punctuation which we have 
been discussing. Poets have known for years that the division 
between "intellectual" and "emotional" is an arbitrary cutting 
of an organic continuum, Blake said, "A tear Is an intellectual 
thing," and Pascal makes the same point (which Bateson maintains 
the French as a culture understand better than Americans), 
"Le coeur a ses raisons que le raison ne connait point." (The 
heart has its reasons of which the reason knows nothing.) 
Describing the emotions as "signals of state" in their 
interactional significance, Bateson says: 
Signals of state in the language of psychology thus 
become either reinforcements or signals about the con- 
tingincies of reinforcement in the language which would 
describe relationship ... ^ . . , . 
Next, I think I should underline the fact which Is 
*An ”alg'oVitKm" is "any particular procedure for solving a 
certain type of problem" according to the Random House Die,-onary 
of the English Language: Unabridged Edition, Random House, 
Hew“7ork, 
familiar to all of us: these signals of state which func¬ 
tion to define the contingencies of relationship are usually 
nonverbal, often unconsciously emitted, and often uncon¬ 
sciously received. We do not stop to analyse the structure 
and grammar of our relationships while we are participating 
in them. Instead, we trust to the fact that we ere all 
members of a culture and have therefore been trained in 
expectations regarding the contingencies of relationship. 
This training, of course, involves a more abstract order 
of learning - learning of a higher logical type - than that 
which I was talking about in discussing the triads of stimulus, 
response, and reinforcement. I call it a "higher" type of 
learning because the Gestalten with which it deals are larger, 
but this is learning about contingencies of relationship 
is In general more archaic and more unconscious than the 
learning of a single adaptive act. (my emphasis) (29) 
Premises or expressions about patterns of relationship, 
whenever they are manifest, involve Learning II. Dreams orovide 
us with another example of this. Most dreams, according to 
Bateson, are pure expressions of relationship with the "true" 
relata often exchanged of others. He gives the example of a 
dream about a small man in the desert and a spring on top of 
a high mountain. This dream expresses one possible set of the 
contingencies of relationship between a man and his mother. 
Like nonhuman mammalian communication, dreams are about rela¬ 
tionship with no way of designating the true relata and with 
no way of expressing tense (time) or the negative. They can 
only say "doing", never "did" or "will do", and they can say 
"this Is happening" but not "this is not happening". Dreams 
often deal with material from very early in life, as they are 
expressing patterns of relationship learned early in life of 
which the dreamer is often unconscious. 
The pattern we are developing here will be used again and 
again when we come to try to understand different forms of 
psychotherapy in Bateson’s terms. It is the crudest beginnings 
of a "calculus of personality". The more "fundamental" the 
"characteristic" of person - the higher the logical type of 
the interactional premises involved - the earlier in life these 
premises were learned - the less available these premises/patterns 
are to consciousness. Using the designations of the different 
levels of learning, we can talk specifically about what order 
of premise a therapy is trying to correct and what "correcting" 
means to that therapy. But we still have another level of learn¬ 
ing to discuss. 
It may be helpful to recapitulate the levels of learning 
out of which the above generalization comes. This recapitulation 
should also be helpful as we move on the Learning III. 
Zero learning is characterized by specificity of response, 
which—right or wrong—is not subject to correction. 
Learning I is change in specificity of response by correc¬ 
tion of errors or choice wTthin a set of alternatives. 
Learning II is change in the process of Learning I> e.g. , 
a corrective change in the set of alternatives from which 
choice is made, or it is a change in how the sequence of 
experience is punctuated. 
Learning III is change in the process of Learning II, e.g., 
a cor re cti ve change in the system of sets' of alternatives 
from which choice is made. ... 
Learning IV would be change in Learning III, but probably 
does not occur in any adult living organism on this earth. 
Evolutionary process has, however, created organisms whose 
ontogeny brings them to Level III. The combination o 
phylogenesis with ontogenesis, in fact, achieves Level I/. 
(Bateson’s emphasis) (56) 
In talking about Learning III we are in areas of experience 
where words are inevitably Inadequate and even misleading. We 
are trying to describe by conscious use of words a corrective 
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change in the sets of premises of Learning II, when the Learning 
II premises are the abstract, archaic and mostly unconscious 
premises which make up one's "identity" or "character". Whst. 
Bateson achieves with the help of the Theory of Logical Types 
is a clear exposition of the formal outlines, though not the 
actual experience, of Learning III. 
Bateson points out first that it is possible to exchange 
premises of a certain logical type without necessarily learning 
any premises of a higher logical type. It is possible to change 
a response learned as a result of Learning I for the opposite 
response, also Learning I, without necessarily learning anything 
about the pattern of reversal of learning (Learning II). By 
the same token, it is possible to exchange one way of punctuat¬ 
ing experience for another without increasing one's facility 
to make such corrective changes or being able to understand 
the pattern involved in the exchange. Achieving new Learning II 
premises does not require Learning III. 
The following is Bateson's list of the sorts of changes 
he would be willing to call Learning III 
might learn to form more readily those 
of which we call Learning II. 
to close for himself the "loopholes" which 
avoid Learning III. 
to change the habits acquired by Learning 
that he is a creature which can and does 
Learning II. 
limit or direct his Learning II. 
(f) If Learning II is a learning of the contexts of Learning 
then Learning III should be a learning of the contexts of 
those contexts. (57) 
(a) The individual 
habits the forming 
(b) He might learn 
could allow him to 
(c) He might learn 
(d) He might learn 
unconsciously achieve 
(e) He might learn to 
II 
Consider again the economics described in the "sinking 
of premises. An abstraction at a higher level gives flexibility 
at a lower level. We must be describing in the term "Learning III" 
some abstraction which will give flexibility in the premises in¬ 
volved in one's identity, or "freedom from their bondage," as 
Bateson puts it. 
But any freedom from the bondage of habit must also de¬ 
note a profound redefinition of the self. If I stop at the 
level of Learning II, "I" am the aggregate of those charac¬ 
teristics which I call my "character." "I" am my habits of 
acting in context and shaping and perceiving the contexts 
in which I act. Selfhood is a product or aggregate of Learning 
II. To the degree that a man [sic.] achieves Learning III, 
and learns to perceive and act in terms of the contexts of 
contexts, his "self" will no longer function as a nodal argu¬ 
ment in the punctuation of expression. (58) 
Learning III can be the resolution of the paradoxes 
which must develop when one tries self improvement. When one 
says, for example, "I should not be so dependent," one Is put 
in a paradoxical position In which the aim,(being less dependent) 
is precluded. In making the statement, one is moving to a posi¬ 
tion which is of a higher logical type than that of being 
dependent, yet one is still a dependent person. A member of 
the class being described, a dependent person, seeks to comment 
on the class as a whole, "I should not be dependent." One is 
in the same paradox as when one Is told to be "spontaneous. 
(Being spontaneous on request is the opposite of spontaneity.) 
The only difference Is that here one is both the teller and the 
told, the commander and the follower, the strong one and the 
dependent one. One car never tell one's "self" what to do. 
The split inevitably generates paradox and makes accomplishment 
impossible. It should be obvious, however, that this paradoxical 
position is one which most of us are in a great deal of the 
time. 
Learning III would involve what Bateson calls a "burst¬ 
ing open" of the categories which made up one's dependency. 
Events and interactions which formerly were punctuated similarly, 
forming the pattern of dependency would take on a new particu¬ 
larity as the old unifying pattern of "dependent self" was 
transcended. Each event which was formerly part of a pattern 
would take on a new uniqueness. This would involve the resolu¬ 
tion of the contraries of self-improvement by a redefinition 
of each particular context of interaction in such a way that 
the unifying concept of "self" was not relevant. One would 
have flexibility in punctuating events. The habits of punc¬ 
tuation formerly identified as "my self” would be seen to be 
relative, changeable, situational. As they became situational, 
each situation could be both more immediate (because there were 
no rigid Level II premises to be protected) and more profound 
(because one’s experience was congruent with and confirmed under 
standings of the most abstract and fundamental nature). 
If, as I have suggested above, the creature is driven 
to level III by "contraries" generated at level II, then 
we mayexpect that'it is the resolving of these contraries 
that will constitute positive reinforcement at Level III. 
Such resolution can take many forms. 
Even the attempt at level III can be dangerous, and 
some fall by the wayside. These are often labeled by psychia- 
try as psychotic, and many of them find themselves inhibit 
from using the first person pronoun. 
For others, more successful, the resolution of the c 
traries may be a collapsing of much that was lezrn* a 
level II revealing a simplicity in which hunger leads 
Erectly to elting* and the identified self is no longer 
in charge of organizing the behavior. These are 
*J6 
incorruptible innocents of the world 
For others, more creative, the resolution of contraries 
reveals a world in which personal identity merges into all 
the processes of relationship in some vast ecology or aes¬ 
thetics of cosmic interaction. That any of these can survive 
seems almost miraculous, but some are perhaps saved from 
being swept away on oceanic feeling by their ability to 
focus in on the minutiae of life. Every detail of the uni¬ 
verse is seen as proposing a view of the whole. These are 
the people for whom Blake wrote the famous advice in the 
"Auguries of Innocence:” 
"To see the World in a Grain of Sand, 
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower, 
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand, 
And Eternity in an hour." 
(59) 
We will talk at great length later in the study about 
people who are driven out of the unifying concept of "self" 
by the contraries of Learning II, but who do not achieve 
Learning III where the concept of self Is no longer necessary. 
These people are commonly called "schizophrenics". 
It is important to note that positive reinforcement at 
level III involves the resolution of contraries at level II. 
This pictures the ultimate state for an individual human being 
as a congruence of patterns of all logical types. Such a con¬ 
gruence would eliminate the need for the process which we des¬ 
cribed earlier in which one has to manipulate immediate perception 
in order to maintain Learning II premises. As Bateson has 
indicated, the congruence involved in resolutions of Learning II 
contraries offers a return to the possibility of immediate 
perception. We will return to this notion at the end of Chapter IV 
In our talk of the "resolution of contraries" we have 
landed squarely In the realm of the great wisdom literatures 
and teachings which humans have evolved. It will be enough for 
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now to note that this is where we are. Perhaps a little later 
in the work we can say a bit more about the terrain. 
Learning III is not necessarily a description of the 
sort of awakening which is talked about when one discusses 
the great wisdom traditions. Though "resolution of all con¬ 
traries" and "total congruence" are certainly synonomous with 
as pure a state of’fenlightenment" as a person can achieve, 
Learning III can be used to describe far more modest sorts of 
changes, as Bateson’s list of what might be called Learning III 
indicates. As this author has experienced it, Learning III 
has involved a gradual improvement of the facility for identi¬ 
fying constellations of feelings and responses with contexts 
which "resonate" with, or are isomorphic with contexts of early 
childhood. When such an identification of feeling constella¬ 
tion with context takes place, new options are available. For 
example, when a comment such as the following can be made, 
"The intensity of sadness and loneliness I feel at getting 
accidentally separated from my wife in a shopping center has 
to do with much earlier experiences of separation and fears of 
abandonment," a needless conflict ("Where the hell have you 
been?"), can be avoided. 
There is little that can be said about Learning IV at 
this time, Bateson's mention of it in the listing quoted at 
the beginning of our discussion of Learning III is the only time 
he ever uses the term. When we have gone into the nature of 
systems in greater detail, we may be able to put a bit of flesh 
on the bones which Bateson provides. 
H8 
PATHOLOGY 
In his explanation of levels of learning, Bateson is 
talking about a specific system: an individual human being 
considered over time. Yet the patterns which were described 
as reflecting the interaction of the different levels of learn¬ 
ing, patterns such as the sinking of premises to higher levels 
of abstraction to give flexibility at lower levels, the protec¬ 
tion of abstract premises in the system by the adjustment of 
more flexible variables, and the possibility of gaining flexi¬ 
bility in the abstract patterns which define the nature of the 
system by changing the boundedness of the system in relation 
to the larger system of which it is a part, these descriptions 
are true of any information processing system. Bateson’s con¬ 
tribution has been to take the learnings about the nature of 
patterns and systems which the fields of cybernetics, systems 
theory and information theory have gained and to apply them to 
human interaction. 
Bateson’s earliest use of the sort of understandings we 
have been discussing to illuminate patterns of human interaction 
was in his ’’double bind" theory of the etiology of schizophrenia 
which he put forward in 1956 along with Jackson, Haley, and 
Weakland. (18) In that paper he described patterns of inter¬ 
action in a family which had a schizophrenic member. This is 
a slightly more complicated version of the setting we described 
earlier in which the dog endeavored to discriminate between 
a circle and an elipse where discrimination was no longer possible. 
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The dog’s "embodying the paradox" in its subsequent behavior, 
its psychosis, is a paradigm of the process involved in human 
schizophrenic behavior. 
We hypothesize that there will be a breakdown in any 
individual's ability to discriminate between Logical Types 
whenever a double bind situation occurs. The general char¬ 
acteristics of this situation are the following: 
(1) When the individual is involved in an intense rela¬ 
tionship; that is, a relationship in which he feels it is 
vitally important that he discriminate accurately what sort 
of message is being communicated, so that he may respond 
appropriately. 
(2) And, the individual is caught in a situation in which 
the other person in the relationship is expressing two orders 
of message and one of these denies the other. 
(3) And, the individual is unable to comment on messages 
being expressed to correct his discrimination of what order 
of message to respond to, i.e., his cannot make a meta- 
communicative statement. (19) 
An example of this sort of communication is seen in the 
following excerpt from the beginning of a family therapy session 
with a father, mother and their 26 year old son, John, who has 
been diagnosed schizophrenic. John has been hospitalized 
following an incident in which he smashed several windows in 
his parents’ home. John is bitter about being hospitalized. 
Therapist: (to Mother and Father) How was your Thanksgiving? 
Father: (in a sad voice) I couldn’t eat a bite without 
thinking of him. (meaning John) 
John: I want to come home. 
Father: (very angry) And break more windows? 
John in the relationship with his father is in a situa¬ 
tion in which it is very important for him to discriminate 
accurately what sort of message a message is. He takes his 
father’s first statement to be an expression of pain that he 
(John) is away from home. He also takes it that he is to blame 
for his father’s pain. He offers a solution. The father’s 
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second statement seems to tell John that he was completely 
wrong about what sort of message his (father’s) first statement 
was. It Imputes madness and/or badness to John. The father's 
Intense anger raises the spectre of John's being rejected and 
puts the continuance of their relationship In question. Yet 
the cause of this "challenge to the relationship" Is attributed 
to John's behavipr. Any metacommunlcative statement by John 
is effectively preempted by this demonstration of how such a 
statement would further jeopardize his relationship with his 
father. John’s response in the session was to sit for some 
minutes with a glazed look in his eyes. 
As Bateson refined his understanding of the "double bind" 
situation, he dropped the "binder" and "victim" element of the 
formulation, (61) Also, the name lent itself to reification. 
People tended to think of a "double bind" as a thing. It is 
not a thing, even if thought of as a "thing" which one person 
does to another. The double bind is immanent in the messages 
which make a relationship. In the interweaving of contexts, 
that is, of the means of classifying messages, there are embodied 
inconsistencies or "tangles", to use Bateson’s later term. 
If we return to the family session above, this later 
way of formulating the "double bind" can be illustrated. Any 
message proposes a certain sort of relationship between the 
sender and the receiver. The premises about what sort of rela¬ 
tionship one is a part of which each person uses in understand¬ 
ing the "meaning" of a given message are what we have earlier 
called LII premises. Each message in this family proposes a 
paradoxical sort of relationship. In the particular sequence 
above, each message is taken by the receiver to propose a rela¬ 
tionship in which the receiver of the message is the cause of 
the sender’s predicament. Father seems to propose John as the 
cause of his sadness, John, responding to the message, assents 
to the content of the message, but proposes the blame be on 
the father for being the cause of his hospitalization. He 
reclassifies the relationship that the content proposes. The 
father responds by justifying himself as he proposes John as 
the cause of the trouble at home which caused him (John) to 
be hospitalized. This chronic "yes, but" pattern is part of 
the LII premises of everyone in the family. It is a way of 
punctuating an interaction into a form, (i.e. of understanding 
a relationship) which inevitably denies the punctuation in the 
particular Instance of anyone who shares the same habits of 
punctuating. In the old sense, John is in a double bind, but 
in the more refined way of describing, John shares a pattern 
of communication with all the members of his family. Each con¬ 
tinually "binds" the other. Each reinterprets any statement 
by the other as blaming to himself and responds in a self- 
justifying way. The other takes the justification as blame 
and continues the pattern. Messages are continually being re¬ 
classified by each succeeding response. 
While communication patterns may be formally similar 
throughout a family system, the assumption about particular 
roles within the system is quite divergent. In the family 
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above, the formal pattern, that of always assuming- one 5s 
being blamed and attempting to restructure the relationship 
to one In which the other is to blame, is also a description 
of roles individuals take. The need for someone to blame is 
largely filled by the son’s behavior. This makes the communi¬ 
cation pattern and relationship premises (LII premises/patterns) 
of both parents consistent with their experience without the 
marriage relationship having to be the focus. If the parents 
were to focus this habit of punctuation on each other continually, 
either their marriage or their ways of understanding relation¬ 
ships would have to radically change. 
LII patterns are the abstract patterns which describe 
a whole relationship. When one person is dominant and the 
other submissive, both are learning the formal pattern of the 
whole relationship. This trait is evolutionarily necessary in 
human beings largely because of the great complexity involved 
in the job of parenting. Because of the ways humans learn the 
abstract form of the whole relationship even while engaging 
in only one role, a person can be a competent parent with only 
the experience of having been a child in a parent-child relating 
system. Laing calls the phenomenon "mapping" (185) and seems 
to see it restricting freedom and inducing pathology in family 
systems. The fact that paradox and therefore pathology are 
made possible by the hierarchical nature of human learning does 
not make this less necessary. 
An example of LII patterns being maintained in a whole 
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family system is seen in the common phenomenon of a family 
which has a schizophrenic member generating a new sick person 
when the original schizophrenic gets better or leaves the system. 
Each member of the family shares LII premises which require 
that the family have a sick member in order to be experienced 
as consistent. When the sick member is removed (truly leaves, 
not just enters a hospital) great anxiety comes upon the re¬ 
maining family members. This is the intense anxiety of being 
in an inconsistent world, one in which one cannot understand 
or give form to relationship messages. One's level II premises 
are inappropriate. Very quickly experience in the system is 
made to conform to the premises that organize It. A formerly 
"well" person has a breakdown. 
An epitome of this process in which the emotional life 
of one member will alter drastically to make the whole system 
consistent can be seen in what we will call "emotion transfer" 
for lack of a better term. 
When two or more persons share the same LII premises 
about their pattern of relationship, they "feel" the emotions 
which express that this pattern is taking place. wor example, 
in a context of financial distress, both husband and wife 
may unconsciously expect their pattern to be one in which one 
person Is depressed and the other is comforting and supportive. 
At such times the stage is set for what often seems to be a 
transfer of emotion. At one moment A is depressed and B is 
comforting. Shortly, through processes neither of them can 
explain and which neither is likely even to notice, A is 
comforting a depressed B. Here the LII premise in this context 
is the pattern of one depressed and one comforting. If the 
pattern cannot be maintained by A being depressed, B will 
gradually become so. Often there is a great deal of unconscious 
maneuvering on the part of the "down" person to effect the 
switch of roles. The "feelings" of depression and solicitation 
(or any other emotions experienced in relating) are the individ¬ 
ual’s expression of patterns of punctuation,LII premises, which 
are the transform of the LII patterns embodied in the whole rela¬ 
tionship. To put it another way, each person in a long term 
relationship will have LII premises in that context which are 
isomorphic with the form of the relationship as a whole. 
In discussing the double bind we begin to see the LII 
premises in their manifestation as patterns of interaction. 
We are in an area of human systems phenomena which seems almost 
magical. Person A can seemingly take B’s depression onto him¬ 
self. Emotion seems to transfer by magic from one person to 
the other as the more abstract form of the relationship is kept 
constant. One begins to understand the feeling many "schizo¬ 
phrenics" describe when they call themselves "Crod," "Jesus," 
or "the Virgin Mary." It Is the experience of taking onto cnc- 
self the anger or guilt of others in a family through processes 
that seem magical. The "schizophrenic's" only conclusion can 
be "X must be doing it, therefore I must have supernatural 
powers." 
Perhaps a little more detailed description of the family 
above, we will call them the Jones, will make the way LII 
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premises interact in a family system more understandable. We 
have said that each of the Jones maintains a similar way of 
understanding the messages of the others. Each experiences him¬ 
self being blamed whenever the other describes any situation 
that is less than perfect. Each attempts to communicate in 
such a way that the relationship will be redefined so that he 
can no longer possibly be to blame. In this situation, the 
punctuation which makes people feel blamed where no blame was 
overtly offered introduces the message, "Someone is to blame," 
In the Jones family the youngest child turned out to be the one 
to make this pattern consistent. It is he who makes the family 
relating pattern as a whole isomorphic with the punctuation, 
the LI I premises of all of the members. He (John) feels least 
secure in the relationship with his parents and so feels it 
most incumbent upon himself to make things be consistent. He 
takes the message "someone is to blame" as an attribution to 
himself. He must be to blame. Yet he does not "consciously" 
know he is being blamed. It is only part of the logical struc¬ 
ture of other messages. Since no overt blaming messages were 
given him by his family until he did something "bad" to actua¬ 
lize them, he often experienced himself as being blamed though 
he could not find the reason for it. Ultimately he began to 
experience voices in his head blaming him. 
The message, ."You are to blame," is a paradoxical attri¬ 
bution. At the level II it means "If we are to agree on the 
form of our relationship, you are to be a Derson who is to blame." 
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At Level I It means, "You are doing wrong and should change 
if we are to relate satisfactorily." John gradually evolved a 
way to resolve the paradox. He did many things which overtly 
made him the cause of blame in his family. That made the 
punctuation patterns of his parents and siblings logically con¬ 
sistent. They were not to blame because he was to blame. Yet 
he did the things he did for reasons he couldn’t control (he 
was "sick"). He was not to blame. This embodiment of the 
premises of the family allows everyone, including John, to have 
his punctuation, that someone other than himself vras to blame. 
Unfortunately, such paradox in human communicating/relating 
patterns is extremely costly. John's resolution of the problem, 
that he was to blame but he was not to blame for being to blame, 
cost him just what he was trying to keep, a relationship as a 
loved son to his parents. The harder he worked to make his 
family's LII premises consistent with his experience, the more 
he made impossible relationships as he wanted them to be. His 
resolution of the problem cost him the ability to organize his 
own experience into congruent patterns. 
When LII premises embody a paradox, the person who has 
learned to punctuate relationship messages in this way is 
unable to participate in a coherent consistent pattern cf 
relating. This is the situation of people who are called 
"schizophrenic". In John Jones' case, any relationship in which 
he participated which was close or important to him, he organized 
into a pattern in which he was "to blame". He put a great deal 
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of energy into structuring and controlling the relationships 
in his life, yet he always seemed to find the other person 
furious at him for behavior he felt he could not control. 
A person who is "neurotic" is someone who operates on 
LII premises inappropriate to the context. He punctuates re¬ 
lating into patterns which are stylized, inflexible and often 
unsatisfactory. A "psychotic" person operates on LII premises 
which embody a paradox and which tend toward the denial of relat¬ 
ing. To be inevitably "wrong" at LII leads the psychotic 
person to an inability to understand patterns of relating. In 
practice this means he loses the ability to tell what sort of 
message a message is. Nothing in relationship can be taken for 
granted and be assumed to be understood by both parties. There 
is no place to start. As Watzlawick, et. al., put it: 
Paradox not only can invade interaction and affect our 
behavior and our sanity, but also it challenges our belief 
in the consistency, and therefore the ultimate soundness, 
of our universe. (223) 
We have seen how the attribution, "you are to blame" 
is inherently paradoxical and some of the ramifications of 
this paradox in John Jones’ life. A further discussion of 
paradox in its more formal logical manifestations will help 
us lay the base for our discussion of psychotherapy and is 
offered early in that section. "Paradox" is the common denomi¬ 
nator of systems which generate pathology and those that generate 
"health" such as psychotherapy. 
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PSYCHOTHERAPY 
Though Bateson himself has written very little about 
the specific ways in which psychotherapy causes change, a 
number of people who see him as their mentor have described 
this process in detail. Haley, Jackson, Watzlawick and Weakland 
are perhaps the best known of the therapists who have used 
conceptualizations derived from the Theory of Logical Types 
to describe the way in which therapy causes change. These 
people have talked at length about the "therapeutic paradox" 
or "therapeutic double bind". This is a way of using hierarchies 
of contextual meanings which are inevitable in communication 
to create paradoxical situations similar to those which were 
a part of the cause of the patient’s dilemma. The therapeutic 
paradox, however, is aimed at giving the patient no choice but 
to begin to move out of his difficulty. 
The phenomenon of paradox is central to the conception 
of how therany promotes change. Paradox, according to Watzlawick, 
et. al., is "a contradiction that follows correct deduction from 
consistent premises." (22*1) It is possible for a contradiction 
to follow correct deduction from consistent premises because 
of the hierarchical nature of the world of form. In mathematics, 
semantics and human behavioral communication the confusion of 
the name of the class with the members of that class is basic 
to the occurrence of paradox. It is, in other words, the result 
of a confusion of Logical Types. 
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Consider a classic paradoxical situation. A barber shaves 
every man in the village who does not shave himself. Do°s the 
barber shave himself? According to the situation as defined, 
if the barber shaves himself, he cannot shave himself. If he 
doesn’t shave himself, then he does. The confusion is in the 
definition of the situation. The barber is part of the identi¬ 
fication of a class of men, i.e., those who don’t shave themselves 
and are shaved by the barber, and he is also a member of that 
class, i.e,, when we are discussing how he himself shaves. 
As we have seen, this doesn't work. The solution to the para¬ 
dox is that there can be no such barber. 
Now consider the plight of a. real barber who is ordered 
by some authority which he is unable to question to perform 
as the situation was originally described. This is the inter¬ 
actional model which the "double bind" defines. 
Haley, in his book. Strategies of Psychotherapy,(155) 
which is dedicated to Bateson, analyses hypnosis and several 
forms of psychotherapy. He endeavors to show that all forms 
of therapy depend for their effect on putting the patient in 
some sort of paradox. He uses as a paradigm of this process 
his analysis of trance induction in hypnosis. Hypnosis Is a 
way of bringing about changes in the subject’s perceptual, 
interactional and even somatic experience all through communi¬ 
cation. It is certainly a focused and powerful way of one 
person influencing another. 
Haley says people are hypnotized by paradox. They cvr. 
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asked to do things voluntarily and are given no choice but to 
comply. If a subject resists, he is asked to resist. Anything 
the subject does is defined by the hypnotist as being In service 
of the hypnosis,. The hypnotist takes complete control of all 
LII questions. He defines the relationship completely. This 
renders the subject’s usual LII premises irrelevant. When the 
hypnotist has taken complete control of the definition of the 
relationship while defining the subject’s participation as 
voluntary, he asks the subject for involuntary cooperation. 
"Your eyelids will be heavy, you cannot open them." "Your 
arm is to rise by itself." This is the second pha.se of trance 
Induction. When the person responds involuntarily to commands, 
Haley says most hypnotists consider the subject to be in trance. 
The paradox is in the multi-leveled aspect of who is 
in charge. At first the hypnotist is in charge. He enforces 
the subject’s voluntary cooperation. He enforces this by 
defining any of the subject’s attempts to be in charge as part 
of the planned Drocedure. Prom this position, he orders the 
subject to make something happen, to be in charge, but what 
happens must be involuntary; the subject must not be in charge 
of it. The subject's only resolution is to experience what is 
ordered as happening by itself. This special state of disorienta- 
tion is called trance. 
The subject is caused by the hypnotist to reflect in 
his patterns of experiencing the same paradox which exists In 
the pattern of relating between the hypnotist and subject. 
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The subject is in an enforced voluntary relationship with the 
hypnotist and is asked to experience voluntarily involuntarily 
(enforced) phenomena. The pattern of the hypnotic relationship 
is isomorphic with the pattern of punctuation induced in the 
subject. This most important point about the form of the inter¬ 
action Haley does not consider. 
The parallel of this process to that in the Jones family 
is striking. The paradox is in the structure of the messages 
in the family. If all is to be consistent, John is to blame, 
yet John should not do the things which bring blame upon him. 
He must do them and he must not control doing them. The volun¬ 
tary vs. enforced nature of this pattern is considerably more 
difficult to describe because of the complexity of messages 
which demand and preclude one and the same response. What is 
important is the fact that the pattern of John’s personal punc¬ 
tuation of relationship is isomorphic with the pattern of inter¬ 
action in the family. John personally perceives himself not 
being to blame, but as being caused to be to blame by forces 
out of his control, in the voices which blame him. His is a 
mirror image of the family’s punctuation come back to haunt 
them. The LII premise of the family is that someone (John) is 
to blame. Their LI premise is that John should not do things 
that bring blame on him. John’s LI premise is that he only 
does his best, he should not be blamed, John’s LII premise 
as reflected both in his voices and in his actions is that he 
is to blame. 
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Using the model of hypnosis, which, as we have seen, Is 
formally similar to the interaction of learning patterns in 
a schizophrenic family, Haley explains psychotherapy as a way 
of gaining some control over the way a person "classifies" 
messages. We would say a therapist is able to use paradox to 
influence a person’s LII premises. 
In working with psychotic people one must initially 
overcome the way in which their evolved patterns of relating 
deny relationship. Haley discusses several tactics of forc¬ 
ing psychotic patients into a relationship with the therapist. 
By prescribing the patients "voices", catatonia or whatever, 
the behaviors which deny that what the psychotic is doing is 
in response to the therapist are redefined by the therapist. 
Any evasion is defined as In service of the therapeutic rela¬ 
tionship. As in hypnosis, the therapist uses paradox to pre¬ 
clude the patient’s not relating or not cooperating. 
• • .it, Is. necessary to persuade or force the patient to 
respond in such a way that he is consistently indicating 
what kind”'of relationship he has with the therapist instead 
of indicating that what he does is not in response to the 
” With a neurotic, the therapist may attempt to bring about 
change in the type of relationship consistently formed by 
the patient. With the schizophrenic, the therapist must 
require him to form any type of relationship. ... 
When the therapist forces the patient to concede that 
he is responding to him, no matter what the patient does, 
the patient can no longer continue schizophrenic symptoms. 
The further process of therapy is the clarification of what 
kind of relationship they are having and the encouragement 
of the patient in searching behavior to learn to define t 
different types of relationship with the therapist. (156)(Haley s 
emphasis) 
The schizophrenic operated on LII premises which are 
paradoxical or self-denying. All relating is wrong relating. 
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Only non-relating is satisfactory (unpainful) relating. For 
the schizophrenic the initial therapeutic double bind is a bind 
at the level of whether or not there will be relationship. 
One cannot not relate to the command of the therapist and there¬ 
fore cannot not be in relationship and in one that the therapist 
is defining. This is an intervention at the level of interac¬ 
tional pattern formation. The therapist offers options to the 
patient’s relation-denying patterns by thwarting the patient’s 
ability to deny relating. By placing the patient in an inescap¬ 
able ongoing relationship, the therapist opens the possibility 
of reforming LII premises which are consistent. As LII patterns 
are interactional transforms of LII premises, all relating 
involves pattern learning. One learns the patterns one is a 
part of t1ust as one engages in patterns one has learned. The 
therapeutic intervention is, for the schizophrenic, enforced 
pattern learning by enforced ongoing relationship. 
In the therapeutic relationship the patient is bound to 
an experience of the process of pattern formation. In the 
bind is an experiential comment on the fact of hierarchies and 
paradoxes. That this metacomment must be consciously made so 
that re-formation of patterns and premises about interaction 
can begin Is doubtful. It is true, however, that people who 
have been able to comment at this meta—level often have glimpsed 
the resolution of the inconsistencies of their "who am I" pre¬ 
mises in the loss of "I” which can be involved in L HI. We 
will deal with this much more fully later. 
Once the therapeutic relationship can he assumed by 
both therapist and client as an important and ongoing interaction, 
the form that the interaction will take becomes the central 
issue of therapy, according to Haley. He sees the therapist, 
through the paradoxical structure of the therapeutic situation, 
remaining in control so that the client's LII premises in regard 
to several aspects of relating can be violated. This gives 
the client the possibility of forming new LII premises about 
that particular aspect of relating. Some of these aspects of 
relating which he discusses are seen in his subheadings in the 
chapter describing the basic form which the various therapies 
have in common: "Domination by the Undominating," "Dead Serious 
Play," "The Benevolent Ordeal," and "Resistance to Change". 
While explaining all of these aspects would require too much 
space, it seems useful to go through Haley’s discussion of one 
carefully. In this way one of his discussions can offer us an 
onportunity for clarifying his approach and adding our own 
understandings. 
Haley sees psychotherapy, with few exceptions, as being 
labeled a voluntary relationship. Yet the conduct of the rela¬ 
tionship is often as if it were not voluntary. 
The patient is advised that he is seeking help of his 
own free'will and the success of the treatment depends upon 
his willingness to cooperate and continue the relationship 
despite difficulties which might arise. Within that frame 
work of a voluntary relationship, the therapist Indicates 
that the relationship is compulsory by insisting that th 
patient not miss appointments and defining his attempts 
end treatment as resistance to change. From the patients 
point of view, he Is being posed a paradoxical defini’-.on 
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of the relationship: it is compulsory within a 
voluntary frame. (157) 
Where the relationship is not voluntary, as with many 
hospitalized people, Haley sees the therapist forcing the 
relationship only until it can be assumed that it will go on 
without force. Then the therapist, by such strategies as mov¬ 
ing the patient to an unlocked ward or changing to outpatient 
therapy, begins maneuvers to redefine the relationship as volun¬ 
tary. Once this is achieved the above description applies. 
While Haley’s analysis of this asoect of the therapeutic 
relationship is concise, he does not relate this analysis to 
therapeutic change very well. 
This issue continues to be central as the patient is 
continually faced with it throughout treatment. The resolu¬ 
tion of the problem is the end of treatment. (158) 
He then goes on to show that the same "issue" is reflected 
in the patient’s unclarity as to whether the therapist is volun¬ 
tarily treating him or is compelled to do so. 
At the other end of the relationship, the patient is 
always somewhat uncertain whether the therapist is seeing 
him out of choice or as a paid duty - does he choose to see 
him or is it compulsory? ...The interest and concern of the 
therapist appears within a framework of a lack of sharing 
any other aspect of social life together. The patient has 
difficulty clarifying the interest or disinterest of the 
therapist and so the voluntary or compulsory nature of the 
relationship. (159) 
Here again Haley offers an analysis which is potentially 
enlightening but can say only that the patient's "difficulty 
clarifying" the relationship raises the voluntary/compulsory 
issue which is somehow therapeutic. 
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Finally, Haley relates the voluntary/compulsory issue 
to the life history of people seeking help. He demonstrates 
the relevance of the issue, but says nothing of how such life 
experience leads one to interact in therapy or other situations. 
"A major problem, particularly for psychiatric patients, is 
whether people associate with them because they wish to or be- 
(ause they must." (160) This questions arises for children in 
relation to their parents, for parents in relation to their 
children and for married partners in relation to each other. 
In this area resides the problems of dependency, threats 
of abandonment, and fears of separation. If the issue be¬ 
comes a major one, a child [or any person in a relationship] 
might test the definition of the relationship by running 
away or by creating difficulties to see if his parents [the 
others in the relationship] really want him. (l6l) 
Using our language we may be able to shed a good deal 
of light on what is happening in the aspects of relating Haley 
describes. 
People in therapy have often been described as coming 
from families which are excessively bound together or excessively 
distant. In these families we can say that at Level II they 
are not voluntarily together. This message is part of either 
the idea "we are so close because we cannot be apart" or "we 
would not be together at all if not bound into being a family 
by accident of blood." Within both families the members are 
treated as if they do what they do because they want to. LI 
is that what a family member does is his own fault. 
The transform of this pattern for any Individual’s exp^r^- 
ence is: LI - "I control what I do, I should do better." and 
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LII - a symptom or gambit of whatever kind that is involuntary 
and usually aimed at making certain adjustments in the rela¬ 
tionships in the family. Since the relationship is involuntary, 
strategies which change relating patterns are involuntary. 
Therapy reverses this pattern. A patient is not allowed 
out of the set that this is a voluntary relationship. The LII 
pattern is one of voluntary relating. The LI pattern is one 
in which the patient has many demands made on him. Each time 
the patient does or does not comply with the demands, the meta- 
message or LII message is reiterated. He is choosing to comply 
or not to comply. 
The individual transform of this pattern of relationship 
for the patient gradually comes to be one which makes symptom- 
free relating possible. The LII premise involved can be stated: 
"One cannot make relationships happen. They are voluntary for 
both people. I am voluntarily in my important relationships." 
This means that at Level I a person can say, "I have a real 
right to negotiate how a relationship will be. I can have 
conscious intentionality in relating." 
This same principle holds true for the other aspects of 
relating involved in psychotherapy. The formal pattern of the 
therapeutic relationship provides a corrective change in the 
individual’s pattern of experiencing and participating in 
relationships. Haley realizes this, though he does not stress 
it. 
The change which occurs In psychotherapy would seem 
to be discontinuous; although a patient may improve gradually, 
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he appears to change in discontinuous steps. At one moment 
he is in distress and in the next he feels relief. Typically 
he suddenly feels more casual about aspects of his life which 
were grimly serious to him. . , .Usually the patient shows 
a great flexibility in his strategies with other people. 
Presumably the shifts in his organized relationships have 
Induced a shlftTn his classification system. (162)(mv emphasis) 
Haley's language, largely derived from Bateson's work, 
allows us greater breadth in describing the psychotherapeutic 
situation by giving the possibility of seeing it as an inter¬ 
active system. These insights are carried on with only slight 
revision by Watzlawick, Jackson and Beavlns in their discussion 
of the "therapeutic double bind" (225) and by Watzlawick, Weak- 
land and Fish in their discussion of "reframing" and "second- 
order change". (227) Our language, derived from somewhat lat°r 
work by Bateson offers the possibility of saying more specifi¬ 
cally what is happening in the therapeutic relationship and why 
that would involve change for the client. Our language also 
offers a way of assessing the limitations of Haley's. 
In hypnosis and psychotherapy the LII questions, the 
questions of what form the relationship will take are in the 
hands of the therapist, if Haley’s analysis of several different 
therapies Is correct. The LI premises are in the hands of the 
client. The client is told, "You decide what to do." or 
"Keep doing what you’re doing." This hierarchy is reflected 
in the punctuation of the client, most of whose immedia^ 
experience remains the same, yet gradually it seems to Lav- 
different meaning. The therapist is able to intervene through 
this paradox to make a change in the subject’s LII premises. 
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It should be pointed out that this isomorphic relation¬ 
ship between the overall pattern of relating and the individual's 
punctuation is a necessary feature of systems Interacting. A 
smaller system as it becomes more fully integrated into a larger 
system, i.e., as it more truly becomes a subsystem, will tend 
toward this isomorphic state with the form of the larger system. 
The other side of the systemic coin is that the larger system 
will be affected in its form by the incorporation of any sub¬ 
system. On the level of LII the theranist has offered a. set 
structure for the larger system which will adapt toward integra¬ 
tion of the subsystem, i.e., the client, but will maintain its 
essential structure, inducing restructure in the subsystem. 
The subsystem of the client's punctuation is rendered ada.ptable 
by the paradoxical set up of the therapeutic relationship which 
renders the client's previous LII premises unworkable. The 
client is in a system in which new punctuation will have to be 
evolved. 
The significant shortcoming of Haley's analysis, especially 
when stated in systems terms, is that the therapist as a subsystem, 
however congruent his punctuation is with the structure of the 
larger system, should be considered. Haley, the dominant, 
proponent of an interactional point of view, in the last analy¬ 
sis leaves the therapist out. Not only is the therapist as a 
subsystem not discussed, the tenuousness of the ability o^ a 
subsystem to control or structure a larger system once that system 
is operative is not dealt with. The therapist offers a certain 
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pattern of relating, yet once that system is begun, he has 
little power to restructure it. He is a subsystem in a larger 
process. It may not be coincidental that Haley, Watzlawick, 
Weakland and other therapists who use the "theranist in charge" 
model practice mostly short term modes of therapy. The longer 
a system runs, the more it is a product of the totality of its 
subsystems. The longer a therapist works with a patient, the 
less the therapist is in charge of the total LII form of the 
relationship. 
In this chapter we have introduced much of the episte¬ 
mology which is embodied in our language as well as the few 
terms which are unique to it. In our final restatement of Haley 
we have begun to use the language to discuss psychotherapy. 
There has been no clear demarcation between the development 
and the use of the language generally, as such demarcation is 
impossible. As we go on discussing psychotherapy, the language 
will be continually elucidated in the context of its use and 
so will be in a continual process of development throughout 
the rest of the work. 
In the next chapter we will examine the work of a man 
who first gave Western therapists consistent access to the re¬ 
structuring of maladaptive LII premises/patterns: Sigmund 
Freud, In the following chapter we will return to questions 
of the whole system of therapeutic interchange and to a possible 
curative transform of the whole system for the client, Learning 
III. 
FREUD’S PSYCHOANALYSIS: PARALLELS AND PARADOXES 
If the language and modes of thinking we have been 
developing so far are truly useful, they will have their use¬ 
fulness in the possibility they offer for discussing phenomena 
which have been previously described extensively in other 
language systems in ways which are newly Illuminating. It 
would seem that one of the best possible tests of the language 
would be to compare it to another language, one that Is already 
fairly fully developed and useful to many people to see if our 
language offers the possibilities we are describing. The most 
fully developed and widely used language of psychology, psycho¬ 
therapy and psychopathology is that of psychoanalysis and the 
most penetrating exposition of it is in the work of Sigmund 
Freud. In this chapter we will be talking about Freud's language 
of therapy; its development, potentials and limitations, all 
within the understandings derived from Bateson's work. It will 
be our thesis that Freud was an observer £ar excellence of 
pathology, therapy and human Interaction in general, but that 
he was limited by the intellectual approaches available to him 
in his ability to build a language which fully did justice to 
the honesty, depth and accuracy of his observations. In develop¬ 
ing this thesis, we will begin with a discussion of Freud’s 
habits of mind. 
Freud, according to Ernest Jones, his most noted biographer. 
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was a man who felt compelled toward philosophical speculation 
and who thoroughly distrusted this compulsion. He spent 
several of the early years of his work engaged in the study 
of the structure of various cells. Only gradually did he evolve 
away from minute scientific research toward the other end of 
this spectrum: metapsychology. If Jones is correct, Freud 
felt a great deal of uneasiness about the direction of his 
intellectual evolution and constantly looked to the "hard 
sciences" for an antidote. Though later in his life he was 
to warn his students away from too much "fascination with 
endocrinology", it was a warning he learned to give from his 
own experience. Everything in his own training had steered 
him toward such a fascination. 
In medical school Freud was most Influenced by his 
teacher Brucke who lived and taught in accordance with a pact 
he (Brucke) had made with other famous German scientists (of 
whom the best known is Helmholtz). The pact was that they 
would endeaver to: 
Put into effect his truth: "No other forces than the 
common physical-chemical ones are active within an organism. 
In those cases which cannot at the time be explained by 
these forces one has either to find the specific way or 
form of their action by means of the physical-mathematical 
method or to assume new forces equal in dignity to the 
chemical-nKysical forces Inherent in matter, reducible to 
the force of attraction and repulsion." (loO) (my emphasis) 
Freud was trained In this the best medical tradition 
in the world when he was becoming a physician. It was a tradi¬ 
tion of scientific excellence. He learned, as seen above, that 
where one encountered an unexplained phenomenon, one always 
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sought for an explanation in terms of "forces" and of "attrac¬ 
tion and repulsion." -It was natural, therefore, that later in 
his career when he encountered the unexplained phenomenon of 
a cure for hysteria, Freud turned to his earlier training for 
guidance in developing an explanation. This cure which involved 
patients talking about events which preceeded the onset of their 
hysterical symptoms, and finally reexperiencing the emotion 
associated with these traumatic events had been discovered 
accidentally by Breuer. 
It [cathartic abreaction] brings to an end the operative 
force of the idea which was not abreacted in the first instance, 
by allowing its strangulated affect to find a way out through 
speech. (107) (my emphasis) 
Freud discovered that physical symptoms could be "caused" 
by memories, by "ideas". For an explanation of this, he turned 
to the fundamental laws of the world of substance, the "physical" 
world. To him ideas must have "forces" in order to have 
physical effects. Psychoanalysis as an explanatory system was 
built to explain the fact■ that ideas can act as forces in 
people’s bodies as well as their lives. Freud used "energy" 
and "forces" as a bridge between the fundamentals of science 
and the behavioral data he observed. Bateson believes that in 
this he made a fundamental error. He and the other scientists 
of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries should have 
turned Instead to the fundamental laws of form, of "ideas." 
"The conservative laws of energy and matter concern substance 
rather than form. But mental process, ideas, communication, 
organization, differentiation, pattern, and so on, are matters 
of form rather than substance(66) 
In order to relate our language to Freud's we will begin 
by following some of the development of his language with particu¬ 
lar attention paid to the notion of transference. We want 
initially to look over Freud's shoulder as he attempts to clarify 
his notions of what is happening in the therapeutic interaction. 
We will gradually insert more and more of our own language into 
the process so that the correspondence between the two ways of 
speaking can begin to be built. Where the opportunity arises 
on other more isolated points to compare ways of speaking, we 
will take it. Where a paradigm can be used as a small example 
of the whole correspondence, it will be used. 
Later we will examine the analytic situation, using 
many of Haley's ways of approaching the structure of therapy. 
Be>yond a building of a corresoondence between languages, we will 
want to use our language as fully as possible to illuminate 
the ways in which psychoanalysis is helpful in promoting thera¬ 
peutic change. 
In the article, "Hypnotism and Suggestion" (1688) (103), 
at the beginning of his career in psychology, Freud is already 
at the crux of the issue he will be wrestling with all his life. 
He is describing the "connecting link between mental and physio¬ 
logical phenomena of hypnosis. . ." (10*0 He engages quite 
honestly the fact that suggestions are both physical and mental. 
He is candid that consciousness cannot be localized. He seems 
to generally believe, however, that mental phenomena occur in 
75 
the cerebral cortex while physical phenomena are products of 
the rest of the nervous system. Every phenomenon must have 
a specific cause and a specific place of occurrence. 
In discussing the two sides of the issue of the origin 
of hypnotic trance, he sets out sides very similar to those 
today on the origin of psychotic phenomena. 
One party, whose opinions are voiced by Dr. Bernheim 
in these pages, maintains that all the phenomena of hypnotism 
have the same origin: they arise that is, from a suggestion, 
a conscious idea, which has been introduced into the brain 
of the hypnotized person by an external influence and has 
been accepted by him as though it had arisen spontaneously. 
On this view all hypnotic manifestations would be mental 
phenomena, effects of suggestions. The other party, on the 
contrary, insists that some at least of the manifestations 
of hypnotism are based upon physiological changes, that is, 
upon displacements of excitability in the nervous system, 
occurring without those parts of the brain being involved 
whose activity produces consciousness; they speak, there¬ 
fore, of the physical or physiological phenomena of hypnosis. 
(105) 
Freud sees this as an either/or situation. He inter¬ 
prets the first point of view, one which looks for an inter¬ 
active etiology of specific hypnotic phenomena , as demanding 
the conclusion that therefore all behavior of a patient under 
hypnosis is caused by the doctor. This would make them random, 
merely dependent on the idiosyncracies of the hypnotist. Yet 
he knows and states emphatically that hysterical nhenomena 
(which are manifested under hypnosis) are governed by laws. 
He never considers that these laws might be the laws of inter¬ 
action patterns. He only understands laws in "physical” 
phenomena, so he has to opt for "displacement of excitability," 
for the quasi-physical half of his dichotomy. 
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In 1904 Freud was clear about what In his therapy was 
» 
curative: 
...The transformation of this unconscious material in 
the mind of the patient into conscious material must have 
been the result of correcting; his deviation from normality 
and of lifting the compulsion to which his mind has been 
subjected. (Ill) 
Yet bringing the unconscious material into consciousness is 
difficult. The "bringing of this unconscious material to light 
is associated with ’pain"’. (112) So the process is impeded by 
the patient’s "resistance." And he continues, 
If you succeed In persuading him to accept, by virtue of 
a better understanding, something that up to now, in conse¬ 
quence of this automatic regulation by pain, he has rejected 
(repressed), you will then have accomplished something towards 
his education..,. Psychoanalytic treatment may in general 
be conceived of as such a re-education in overcoming Internal 
resistances." (113) (his emphasis) 
Freud was very conscious of the process which we have called 
"protecting central premises." That central premises (LII) 
change slowly, painfully and not at the drop of an interpretative 
hat, Freud was already very aware. "Resistance" Is his term 
for naming this truth about human change nrocess. Yet In this 
article he is very fuzzy about what causes someone to overcome 
this resistance (or in what cases may the person cease to resist). 
So far he can only speak of "persuading" a person by offering 
a "better understanding." This is not very satisfactory, 
and Freud doesn’t remain with this limited description for long. 
By 1910 (114) Freud’s description of how psychoanalysis 
was curative had evolved toward a more interactional model. 
The importance of "resistance" In therapy had been centralized 
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and the interaction in the therapy room ("transference”) was 
riven a prep-nant but unelaborated mention. 
You know that our technique has been transformed in impor¬ 
tant respects. At the time of the cathartic treatment we 
set ourselves the aim of elucidating; the symptoms, then 
we turned away from the symptoms to discovering- the "com¬ 
plexes," to use Jung’s indispensable word; now, however, our 
work is aimed directly at finding out and overcoming the 
"resistances," and we can with justification rely on the 
complexes coming to light as soon as the resistances have 
been recognized and removed,... The mechanism of our cura¬ 
tive method is indeed quite easy to understand; we give the 
patient the conscious idea of what he may expect to find, 
and the similarity of this with the repressed unconscious 
one leads him to come upon, the latter himself. This is the 
intellectual help which makes it easier for him to overcome 
the resistances between conscious and unconscious. Incidentally, 
I may remark that it is not the only mechanism made use of 
by the analytic method; you all know [he is lecturing to 
analysts] that far more powerful one which lies in the use 
of "transference." (115) 
In this article Freud mentions the possibility of inter¬ 
actional gain for someone by a flight into neurosis (advantage 
through illness). He says that when the tenets of psychoanalysis 
are more generally understood there will be fewer neurotics be¬ 
cause the interactional gains from being neurotic will be lessened 
as a greater number of people understand the dynamics of the 
disease. He has to admit, though, that in some cases becoming 
neurotic is the least destructive response people can have given 
their life situation. The context as a factor in the meaning 
of symptoms is here recognized to be potentially much more 
important than intra-psychic process. 
In another article in 1910 (116) Freud repudiates 
the mere naming of the unconscious material as having "as little 
effect on the symptoms of nervous disease as distributing menu 
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cards in time of famine has on people's hunger," (117) Both 
^^imed interpretation and distributing menu cards for hunger 
are examples of intervention at the wrong Logical Type. 
Since, however, psychoanalysis cannot disnense with making 
this disclosure to patients, it prescribes that two condi¬ 
tions are to be fulfilled before it is done. First, by 
preparatory work, the repressed material must have come very 
near to the patient's thoughts, and secondly, he must be 
sufficiently firmly attached by an affective relationship 
to the physician (transference) to make it impossible for 
him to take fresh flight again. (118) 
Transference here seems to be thought of as that attachment 
which makes a Datient assent to an interpretation of the ohysician 
or continue in therapy in the face of realizations which he would 
otherwise renress. 
In his 1912 article, "The Dynamics of the Transference," 
Freud begins by describing transference In very similar terms 
to Bateson's. He talks about early learned patterns of relat¬ 
ing which later are manifested in inappropriate contexts, 
structuring those contexts in as much as is possible to fit 
expected "impressions." 
Let us bear in mind that every human being has acquired, 
by the combined operation of inherent disposition and of 
external influences in childhood, a_ soeclal individuality 
in the exercise of his capacity to love — that is, in the 
conditions which he sets up for loving, in the impulses he 
gratifdes ’by it, and In the aims he sets out to achieve in 
it. This forms a "cliche" or a "stereotype" in him, so to 
speak (or even several), which peroetualiy repeats and re¬ 
produces itself as life goes on, in so far as external 
circumstances and the nature of the accessible love-objects 
permit, and is indeed itself to some extent modifiable by 
later impressions. (120) (my emphasis) 
In Bateson's language one might say that habits of punc¬ 
tuating experience (LII) are brought into any context. A 
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neurotic person might be said to be protecting habits of 
punctuation which are particularly limiting and usually in¬ 
appropriate for the context. He therefore must adjust immed¬ 
iate perceptions of the context (in this case the interaction 
with the therapist) a great deal to fit the patterns which he 
has come to expect and to act on in interactions. As the re¬ 
lationship with the therapist becomes more and more important, 
patterns learned early in other important contexts, usually 
in the context of the family, will be brought to bear. Yet 
these patterns of relating are not and cannot be conscious to 
the person (see discussion of L.II above). 
Freud’s words are: 
The peculiarity of the transference to the physician lies 
in its excess In both character and degree, over what is 
rational and justifiable — a. peculiarity which becomes 
comprehensible when we consider that in this situation the 
transference is effected not merely by the conscious ideas 
and expectations of the patient, but also by those that are 
under suppression or unconscious. (121) 
When Freud attempts to account, here, as in earlier 
articles for the way the transference prevents the patient 
from seeing what is happening in his life which the doctor 
is describing in his interpretations, he has nowhere to turn 
but to an "impact of forces" model. Bateson would say that 
the ways in which LII patterns govern a person’s interaction 
with the therapist and structure the persons immediate percep¬ 
tions, are the necessary ways in which an information processing 
system protects these more general and abstract premises from 
too precipitous a change. Such a change might destroy the 
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coherence of the whole system by making more abstract premises 
Incongruous with more Immediate perceptions. Freud's account 
Is more visually exciting, but', ultimately, less satisfying. 
Wherever in our analytic delving we come upon one of the 
hiding places of the withdrawn libido, there ensues a 
battle; all the forces which have brought about the re¬ 
gression of the libido will rise up as "resistance" against 
our efforts in order to maintain the new condition. (122) 
Resistance can only be thought of by Freud in terms of 
forces and impacts, in Newtonian terms, while the following 
of the "stream of associations" "back" to the most early patho¬ 
genic experiences is thought of in obviously special terms. 
It is an extended elaborate and very comfortably concrete mixed- 
metaphor. It is reminiscent of the theme of the quest, the 
journey to a goal fraught with opposing forces, obstacles which 
must be overcome. 
In describing how this process of resistance and trans¬ 
ference actually occurs in the analytic situation, Freud's 
language seems to encompass both the metaphor of the analyst 
as knight arrant riding into the enchanted lands of the patient's 
unconscious and a description of the experience which is so 
finely observed as to be still quite useful today. 
Now as we follow a pathogenic complex from its representa¬ 
tion in consciousness (whether this is a conspicuous symptom 
or something apparently quite harmless) back to its root in 
the unconscious, we soon come to a place where the resistance 
makes itself felt so strongly that it affects the next associa¬ 
tions which has to appear as a compromise between th- dema 
of the resistance and those of the work of exploration. (123) 
This "compromise" association which is the expression 
of the complex as allowed by the "resistance" always takes the 
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form of an association transferred onto the physician. "We 
conclude from such experiences that this transferred id°e is 
able to force itself through to consciousness in rreferenc0 
to all other possible associations, just because it also 
satisfied the rresistance*" (124) 
Freud is saying that in the psychoanalytic relationship, 
when a person is expressing an earlier "complex" of feelings 
and way of relating, he always seems to couch this expression 
in his way of relating to the therapist. We might describe 
the whole process by saying that as one moves from an inquiry 
of a L I idea or bit of behavior toward the earlier learned 
and more abstract patterns of punctuation, L II, which give it 
meaning, one moves toward unconsciously enacted patterns or 
unconsciously exoerienced premises which must find their mani¬ 
festation in the interaction between client and therapist. 
While to someone thinking in Bateson’s terms, this seems per¬ 
fectly natural, it seemed inappropriate to Freud in 1917. 
The fact that the therapist must be dragged into the person's 
expression of his complexes can only be the work of the "re¬ 
sistance", and once the therapist (or should we say "knight") 
is challenged personally, the battle is joined. 
This struggle between physician and patient, between 
intellect and the forces of instinct, between recogni¬ 
tion and the striving for discharge is fought out almost 
entirely over the transference—manifestations. (125) 
Yet even while he maintains h5.s feeling that the trans¬ 
ference is a servant of the resistance and that the analyst is 
In unending combat with the resistance, Freud is too perceptive 
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an observer and too honest a reporter not to include a final 
note which seems to confirm our model, that it is only by inter¬ 
acting- in his old inappropriate patterns in the therapy situa¬ 
tion that the Inappropriateness of these patterns can be experi¬ 
enced and options developed. 
It is undeniable that the subjugation of the transference- 
manifestations provides the greatest difficulties fcr the 
psychoanalyst, but it must not be forgotten that they, and 
they only, render the invaluable service of making the 
patient’s buried and forgotten love-emotions actual and 
manifest; for in the last resort no one can be sla.in in 
absentia or In effigle. (126) (his emphasis) 
In the essay on the "On Beginning the Treatment" (1913) 
Freud begins to talk about manipulating the treatment situation 
in order to encourage the most helpful transference. He speaks 
of the necessity of establishing a positive transference before 
the therapist begins offering interpretations which might be 
painful to and resisted by the person in analysis. The right 
kind of transference happens when "...the physician becomes 
linked up with one of the images of those persons from whom 
he (patient) was used to receive kindness." (129) 
In our system of speaking we would say that the thera¬ 
pist endeavors to set a context in which the person will respond 
in the ways he has for interacting In a nurturing, benevolent 
setting. The therapist attempts to provide a context marker 
in his behavior which will allow the client to choose from the 
set of alternatives he has in a nurturing situation. These 
alternatives or ways of interacting will in all likelihood 
be those learned very early in life since the nurturing situation 
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is primarily associated with early childhood. 
Freud says that the transference is often enough to 
overcome the symptoms of the disease but that "this is merely 
temporary and lasts only as long as the transference is main¬ 
tained." Peal psychoanalytic cure, however, comes only when 
"the Intensity of the transference has been utilized to over¬ 
come the resistance." 
We might say that the therapist has originally set a con¬ 
text in which the interaction premises of the client are appropriate. 
Therefore the blocking, splitting or otherwise structuring of 
experience to fit a very limited set of premises about relation¬ 
ship is not necessary. Yet this in itself provides no reworking 
of these premises, no Learning II. It is only in the develop¬ 
ing and elaborating of the relationship that old patterns become 
inappropriate and can be experienced as such. If Bat«son is 
right, that a person’s immediate perception Is structured or 
organized by his L II premises, then this should be even more 
true of a person’s memory of experiences. A person would re¬ 
member events in a way that conformed to his present patterns 
of ordering perception. In cases where the memory of an ex¬ 
perience seemed to be not amenable to reconstruction because 
the most basic nature of the experience contradicted present 
L II premises, one would expect the experience to be forgotten 
completely. 
This is exactly what Freud describes as happening. In 
most cases he says the true experience is "repressed" by the 
substitution of a "screen-memory", a memory which has been 
re-worked to leave out painful elements. In only a few cases 
is the whole experience repressed, though in the early work 
with hysteria this was thought to be the rule rather than the 
exception. Should one, however, wish to describe the way 
early learned patterns of punctuation are involved in later 
contexts, the term "memory" with its connotation of an event 
or scene consciously remembered is quite inappropriate. Freud 
had no other term and lacked the concept of hierarchy in pattern 
learning, yet he was very aware that what he observed was 
"memory" of a unique sort. He clearly supports our description 
of L II premises in their behavioral manifestation as abstract 
patterns of interaction embodying early-learned experiences of 
the structure or "rules" of interaction. Transference is simply 
the attempt by the patient to act on these archaic interaction 
patterns when they are no longer appropriate in the new context. 
...we may say that here the patient remembers nothing of 
what is forgotten or repressed, but that he expresses it 
in action. He reproduces it not in memory but in his be¬ 
havior; he repeats it, without of course knowing that he 
is repeating. 
For instance, the patient does not say that he remem¬ 
bers how defiant and critical he used to be in regard to 
the authority of his parents, but behaves in that way toward 
the physician.. .as long as he is under treatment he never 
escapes from this compulsion to repeat; at last one under¬ 
stands that it is his way of remembering, (130) (his emphasis) 
In speaking about the relationship of transference, 
repetition compulsion and resistance, "Freud says "The greater 
the resistance the more extensively will expressing in action 
(repetition) be substituted for recollecting." (131) We would 
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say that the more abstract the interactional pattem/premises 
touched in therapy, the more the client's whole system of premises 
would be made incoherent by its quick change, the more immediate 
experiences of interaction will be adjusted to protect this 
premise/pattern, the more the premise pattern is unconscious, 
the more it will have to be made manifest in action because 
it is unconscious and cannot be commented upon. Because these 
premises are so strongly evoked in a context in which the analyst 
refuses to participate in the relating pattern in the way that 
the client expects, the client is able to experience the whole 
form of his LII premises. This occurs unconsciously at first 
as in the nhenomenon which Freud called "repetition compulsion." 
The client acts out his old relating patterns at the very point 
when he is blocked from remembering experiences of similar 
relating. In analysis he is able to experience the inappropriate¬ 
ness of these patterns. Gradually as Learning II takes place, 
as relating begins to have different meaning to the patient, 
he is able to consciously state the LII patterns on which he 
formerly operated. This is accompanied usually by a rush of 
memories which could not be remembered earlier. Because LII 
has occurred, old experiences now "make sense", i.e., take 
on coherent form. 
Obviously, in its present state, our way of speaking 
is not as simple or as clear as Freud's, yet it does not require 
speaking in terms of reified "things" and "forces" (resistance, 
compulsion) in conflict, the inadequacy and inconsistency of 
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which we have already discussed. The concrete, tangible nature 
of Freud’s language invites metaphoric excess, as in the follow¬ 
ing: "The past is the patient’s armory out of which he fetches 
his weapons for defending himself against the progress of the 
analysis, weapons which we must wrest from him one by one." (132) 
In a lengthy article near the end of his career, "Analysis: 
Terminable and Interminable", 1937, the great variation in ways 
of thinking about psychoanalytic "cure" which Freud brought 
together in what seemed to him a consistent and coherent intellec- 
tural approach is very apparent. He unashamedly uses his most 
quantitative, Newtonian, "impact-of-forces" language side by 
side with his most subtle descriptions of form, context, and 
meaning in psychoanalytic cure. In this article, Freud’s 
habits of thought are carried to their most clear and logical 
ends. Some of the inadequacies of his language can be apparent 
to us simply by our having access to other ways of thinking 
about phenomena, but many are apparent only because of Freud’s 
honest and clarity in setting out his thought and with it the 
inconsistencies and inadequacies of which he was himself often 
aware. 
In describing the "defensive mechanisms" of the ego in 
dealing with the instinctual demands of the id, Freud says that 
the ego mediates between instinctual demands and external reality. 
To give in to these demands would be to place oneself in a posi¬ 
tion of approbrium in relation first to society around one and 
later to the internalized expectation of society, the super-ego. 
He involves the "pleasure principle" as over-all heuristic device 
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in saying that repression and other reworkings of one's instinc¬ 
tive demands are all done in the service of avoiding "un¬ 
pleasure ." 
The psychical apparatus is intolerant of unpleasure and 
strives to ward it off at all costs and, if the perception 
°f reality involves unpleasure, that perception — i.e. 
the truth — must be sacrificed. (139) 
Freud believed that this applied equally to one's percep¬ 
tion of "internal" and "external" reality. Freud's description 
of this process begins to parallel Bateson’s description of Level 
II premises quite closely. 
Moreover these [defense] mechanisms are not relinquished 
after they have helped the ego through the difficult years 
of its development. ...the adult ego with its greater 
strength continues to defend itself against dangers which 
no longer exist in reality and even finds itself impelled 
to seek out real situations which may serve as a substitute 
Tor the original danger, so as to be able to justify its 
clinging to its habitual modes of reaction .... The' crux 
of the matter is that the mechanisms of defence against for¬ 
mer dangers recur in analysis in the shape of resistances 
to cure. (1*10) (my emphasis) 
To restate in our language: the premlses/ratterrs of 
punctuating Interaction, LII premises, which one learns early 
In life continue to structure ones experience of interactions 
and hence the type of interaction in which one engages, i.e. 
they continue to be self validating in later life. In therapy 
the client naturally attempts to structure the interaction to 
fit his ways of finding meaning, of punctuation. 
Freud goes on to say that patients whose analyses go 
very easily, who achieve facile Insight often prove to have 
achieved less permanent changes than people for whom analysis 
is much more difficult. We would say that for some people the 
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interactive process of analysis with their specific analyst 
requires little modification of their LII premises. Their 
role, vis a vis the analyst is "familiar" in the sense of not 
beinp new and in the sense of being similar to family experience. 
For other people, these specific analytic situations require 
a change in LII premises in order for them to make sense of 
what is happening. Freud also knew that the process of an 
analysis depended on the specific interactive system established 
between patient and analyst. 
Amongst the factors which influence the prospects of an 
analysis and add to its difficulties in the same manner 
as the resistances, we must reckon not only the structure 
of the patient1s ego, but the personal characteristics 
of the analyst. (141) (his emphasis) 
Here we are still talking in terms similar to "habits of reac¬ 
tion" which Freud used earlier. Freud, however, uses the 
notion of differences in "adhesiveness of libido" in explain¬ 
ing the phenomenon. He is in a middle ground between explana¬ 
tions involved form and those using substance, and the direction 
in which he is going for an explanation with which he can be 
comfortable is unmistakable. "Habits of reaction" is not enough 
of a "thing" for Freud to stay with for very long. 
Finally in dealing with the fact that for some people 
in diagnostic categories with which analysis has had great 
success, the therapy makes no difference at all, preud turns 
to the training and habits of mind he learned some sixty years 
earlier. 
Nothing impresses us more strongly in connection with the 
resistances encountered in analysis than the feeling that 
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there a force at work which is defending Itself by all 
possible means against recovery and is clinging tenaciously 
to illness and suffering....If we consider the whole picture 
made up of the phenomena of masochism inherent in so many 
people, of the negative therapeutic reaction and of the 
neurotic’s sense of guilt, we shall have to abandon the 
belief that mental processes are governed exclusively by 
a striving after pleasure. These phenomena are unmistakable 
indications of the existence of a power in mental life which 
according to its aim, we call the aggressive or destructive 
instinct and which we derive from the primal death instinct 
of animate matter. (142) (my emphasis) 
Freud, when he was shown beyond any doubt that people 
will repeat patterns that are familiar to them even when these 
patterns lead inevitably to pain, found his basic premise that 
all behavior is motivated by the desire for pleasure or the 
avoidance of unpleasure shaken at the foundations. He couldn’t 
see that he had already explained the phenomenon. In his 
descriptions of the ego’s defending itself against dangers 
which no longer exist and even seeking out dangers he uses 
the term ’’clinging to its habitual modes of reaction." All he 
lacks is the concept of a hierarchy of "modes of reaction." 
He could then explain why it was more important to maintain 
one’s habitual modes of reacting (of giving order to experience 
in interaction) than to simply achieve pleasure or avoid pain 
in immediate interaction. Freud couldn’t think about the 
difference between LI and LII. 
Lacking the notion of hierarchy in patterns of response, 
Freud adds to his one major heuristic principle (pleasure) 
another opposing one (death instinct). While this 
language is, as we have said earlier, far more developed, 
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more tangible and more easily "experienceable" than ours, 
it can be seen here that however murky our formulations are, 
they are fundamentally more elegant than Freud’s. We do not 
need to compound heuristic devices once the approach is developed. 
We have been trying in this chapter to show that Freud's 
language for describing what he saw in the therapv he did 
would have been better served had he had available to him some 
of the concepts developed in the preceding chapter. Now we 
shall try to use our language to show that the therapy Freud 
was evolving to help the people he treated can be illuminatingly 
understood as a gradual refining of the use of paradox. 
Haley alone (163) and with Donald Jackson (178) has 
already described in quite careful detail the paradoxical 
nature of the formal structure of the analytic relationship 
as it is practiced today by "classical" analysts. This work 
is a refining and specifying of some of the approaches presented 
at the end of the last chapter in discussing psychoanalysis. 
In the latter article, the authors quote a modern text which 
outlines the eight absolutely necessary elements in the prac¬ 
tice of analysis. After quoting the list which includes regu¬ 
larity of time, recumbant position, complete reliance on free 
association, etc., they point out: 
Granting these conditions, and leaving aside whether they 
can be completely carried,out, the question could be raised 
whether transference responses by the patient to this situa¬ 
tion are irrational, inappropriate and regressive, or 
whether any other type of behavior is possible given these 
conditions. (179) (their emphasis) 
Host of the article is an elaboration of this point. The 
point is well made and deserves the attention of anyone who 
wants to see the case clearly stated that what was once under¬ 
stood as intrapsychic phenomena of the patient in therapy can 
be every bit as sensibly described as interactional phenomena 
when the therapist is included in the account. The point Haley 
always fails to emphasize and occasionally overlooks completely 
is that in order to make sense of the change that the patient 
experiences, both the interactional and intrapsychic aspects 
of therapy must be talked about. 
In the last chapter we made a first attempt to use 
Bateson's language to talk about both intrapsychic and inter¬ 
actional aspects of therapy. We tried to show the formal inter¬ 
action of the two, that one is a transform of the other. Now 
we will try to further demonstrate the potential of this 
language in the context of the therapy of Freud. We will 
attempt only to show the potential of this approach. An 
exhaustive treatment would be an enormous task. 
We have already dealt at length with Freud's language 
about therapy and its development. Now vie will try to talk 
about his technique and the refining of paradox. 
Nineteenth Century Europeans and Americans, especially 
women, often found themselves in a difficult, even paradoxical 
position regarding their thoughts and feelings. There were 
many thoughts or feelings, most notably sexual ones, which 
"good", "pure", "righteous" people were not supposed to have. 
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Unfortunately, the prohibition against thinking sexual thoughts 
enforces an Inevitable high level of sexual concern or interest. 
In the logica] structure of the prohibition is a continual con¬ 
cern with these thoughts. The issue is alive as long as the 
prohibition is in force. Consequently, in farr.iles where sexual 
issues were of greatest concern, children learned the prohibitions 
most intensely. These children and adults were the most tor¬ 
mented by the inherent paradox In their LII premises. Much of 
what they inevitably experienced, they had to not experience. 
Among these were the hysterics Freud and Breuer treated. They 
were people caught In the same position as the person in hyp¬ 
nosis who is told he is to keep still and his arm is to rise* 
They developed bodily symptoms outside their control. The symptom 
served to help resolve the paradox, at least temporarily. It 
was a way of experiencing and remembering an incident which 
otherwise could not be experienced or remembered because it 
did not fit any of the person’s ways of organizing or giving 
form to experience. 
Breuer discovered accidentally that when Anra C. in her 
self-induced hypnotic state talked through and experienced 
the emotions of the event just preceding the first appearance 
of a given hysterical symptom, the symptom disappeared. We 
have said that "emotion" is the experience of fully participat¬ 
ing In a relationship of a certain form. It is the internal 
and interactional signal of certain LII premises being in fore... 
For Anna 0. the experiencing of these emotions gave options to 
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the usual paradoxical premises she lived with. She could 
remember the thoughts and feelings she had had to forget. In 
her hypnotic state she could experience alternative LII patterns. 
This allowed a context in which a "repressed" experience could 
be remembered because it could be given form. 
It is possible that this intense anxiety which seemed 
to be associated with the memory of a repressed incident might 
be the anxiety of experiencing one’s LII premises to be in¬ 
appropriate or inconsistent when confronted with a powerful 
experience to which the hysteric was unable to give meaningful 
form. 
The initial drawback of Freud’s technique was the use 
of hypnosis. Anna 0. had used an hypnotic state as a frame 
within which she could experience angry or slovenly thoughts. 
This was her "condition seconde", her other state, to which 
she repaired in the evening and in which she could experience 
the angers and disappointments of the day. It was her process, 
not Breuer's. Afterwards she always remembered clearly what 
had happened. When Freud tried to use hypnosis to the same 
ends, his results were never quite as complete. The person 
often did not remember later the experience under hypnosis. 
They may have experienced LII premises under hypnosis which 
were more congruent with their Level I experience, but the 
amnesia later indicated that Learning II had not occurred. 
Perhaps the greatest single refinement of Freud's 
technique, the most perfect tightening of the paradox for 
helping the hysterical neurotics he was treating was the 
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introduction of free association. Ernest Jones calls the 
discovery of free association "a most decisive step in Freud's 
scientific life, the one from which all his discoveries emanated." 
(181) 
Perhaps Freud's clearest and most complete exposition 
of free association which he called "the fundamental rule of 
psychoanalysis" is in the following; passage from The Interpreta¬ 
tion of Dreams : 
As we fall asleep, "involuntary ideas" emerge, owing 
to the relaxation of a certain deliberate (and no doubt 
also critical) activity which we allow to influence the 
course of our ideas while we are awake....As the involun¬ 
tary ideas emerge they change into visual and acoustic 
images. In the state used for analysis of dreams and 
pathological ideas, the patient purposely and deliberately 
abandons this activity and employs the psychical energy 
thus saved (or a portion of it) 5n attentively following 
the involuntary thoughts which now emerme, and which — 
and here the situation differs from that of falling asleep — 
retain the character of ideas. In this way the "involuntary" 
ideas are transformed into "voluntary" ones. (10F) (his 
emphasis) 
For a 19th century hysteric,Freud is prescribing the 
symptom. He orders the person to have involuntary thoughts, 
any thoughts, no matter how repulsive. If the person attempts 
to operate consistently with the LI I premises he has been operat¬ 
ing on, if he screens out bad thoughts, he is violating the 
"fundamental rule" of the treatment. While anything the person 
says is acceptable, his old ways of classifying messages and 
relationships are rendered inoperable. He has to develop new 
LII patterns if he is to remain in therapy. 
Psychoanalysis developed into a broader more comprehensive 
technique as Freud worked with a wider range of neurotic peonle 
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and their symptoms. The development of the notion of trans¬ 
ference shows Freud’s gradual incorporation into the treatment 
of more and more forms of patients* behavior. Not only was 
anything a person said, no matter how abhorent in other contexts, 
taken to be part of the prescribed treatment, gradually any 
behavior which the patient showed toward the analyst, no matter 
how^ obnoxious, became defined as part of the treatment. All 
LII patterns a oatient might use for defining and organizing 
the relationship with the analyst were invalidated by the 
analysts definition of them as transference, a necessary period 
of acting archaically on the way to recovery. 
The main instrument, however,.for curbing the patient's 
compulsion to repeat and for turning it into a motive force 
for remembering, consists in the handling of the trans¬ 
ference. We render it harmless, and even make use of it, 
by according it the right to assert itself within certain 
limits. We admit it into the transference as to a play¬ 
ground, in which it is allowed to let itself go in almost 
complete freedom and is required to display before us all 
the pathogenic impulses hidden in the depth of the patient’s 
mind. If the patient does but show compliance enough to 
respect the necessary conditions of the analysis we can 
regularly succeed in giving all the symptoms of the neurosis 
a new transference-colouring, and in replacing his whole 
ordinary neurosis by a "transference-neurosis" of which he 
can be cured by therapeutic work. (133) 
We will offer here only one further elaboration on 
Freud’s technique. It is another step toward refining and 
specifying the paradoxical situation to make it most appropriate 
to specific people. In his article, "Turnings In the Ways of 
Psychoanalytic Treatment" in 1919 he described one of the "new 
developments toward which our therapy is tending.' He Is speck¬ 
ing about the best treatment for compulsives. 
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I think there is little doubt that here the correct 
technique can only be to wait until.the treatment itself 
has become a compulsion, and then with this counter conrul- 
sion forcibiy to suppress the compulsion of the disease. 
C135) 
The symptom becomes the treatment. It is perfect 
paradox. 
As we will discuss at much greater length in the next 
chapter, Freud in his writing: about therapy was concerned 
solely with LII issues. He was attempting to help the patient 
bring more and more of his unconscious fantasies and repressed 
experiences into the conscious sphere of the "ego". Patients 
who did not have an "ego" that could be reworked in analysis, 
i.e. psychotic patients, were not good candidates for hi§ therapy, 
though he hoped that someday his therapy would be extended to 
this group. In Chapter V we will see how John Rosen used 
Freudian personality theory to explain the effectiveness of 
his therapy for schizophrenics, but had to violate most of 
the basic rules of analytic practice to be effective with 
these patients. 
Freud’s therapy had several distinct characteristics 
from our point of view. 
1. Level II premises of the client as they are manifested 
in patterns of communication were rendered inoperable through 
the uses of free association. 
2. Level II patterns of interaction which the patient was used 
to fostering were precluded in the Interaction, between patient 
and analyst by the structure of the interaction and by the 
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analysts avoidance of ’'countertransference" feelings or acting 
out. All behavior of the patient to restructure the relation¬ 
ship Is defined as part of the treatment. 
3. Level II premises of the client were forcefully invoked 
in the powerful (i.e. parental) stance taken by the analyst 
toward the patient. 
4. In the acting out of his LII premises In the paradoxical 
structure of the analytic situation, where all behavior was part 
of the cure to be learned about but no behavior gave one control 
of the situation, a patient could experience the whole form cf 
his LII pattern. 
5. In the promotion of insight into the form of one's abstract 
patterns of interaction was a paradigm of the LII premises 
inherent in the analytic situation, premises which the patient 
thus gradually came to adopt In place of his inappropriate 
(pathogenic)ones. 
Point # 5 certairilv requires an elaboration. Freud 
had no method nor inclination to describe the LII premises 
inherent in the analytic situation. When he did describe 
these premises he spoke only in intrapsychic terms. The change 
to be brought about in analysis was the bringing into the 
conscious realm of the ego the unconscious fantasies of the 
id. In this way one’s unconscious wishes could be accepted 
without either being acted upon or overly reacted to (by one's 
repressive super-ego). One could have rational control over 
one's life. Insight is a paradigm of this model In that it 
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is "control" over 8 pattern through meta-comment on the pattern. 
This model of cure through the understanding and accept¬ 
ing of one’s unconscious wishes is a metaphor in intrapsychic 
terms for the LII premises fostered by the analytic situation. 
The analyst is in the position of the ego. He encourages all 
of the early-learned Interaction patterns of the patient and 
accepts them all. He is not judgmental because he is not defensive. 
None of these patterns has power over him. He has complete 
personal integrity throughout the process. Insight puts the 
client in the analysts role vis a vis his own patterns. 
It should be remembered that In learning the abstract 
(LII) form of an interaction a person learns the form of the 
whole interaction. It was stated earlier that this is evolu- 
tionarily necessary for an organism as complex as human beings 
so that an adult can know how to be a parent having only 
experienced the interaction in the role of a child. It is 
far too corolex a task to be left to trial and error. 
In analysis over a period of time a patient learns 
(LII) the form of the whole interaction. When he leaves the 
analytic situation these LII premises, largely unconscious, 
offer an approach to life in which one can take the position 
of the analyst in relation to one’s own sexuality and in rela¬ 
tion to other people. One can be accepting, non-judgmental, 
and ultimately not controlled by one’s urges or the gambits 
of others. One can have personal integrity. 
In the next chapter we will discuss the way in which the 
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ultimate integrity of the self, the ego, may leave one in 
a paradoxical position at a still hieher level of abstraction. 
Eor now we will say that Freud offered neonle freedom fror th°1r 
continuous need to keep their minds "clean", from the Jr 
need to deny the highly sexual nature of their experience. He 
gave them a way of accepting their repressed fantasies and 
experience without having to "give in" to them. He fostered 
a person’s being able to control his life. This was no small 
gift for the driven people he worked with. 
In this chapter we have tried to delineate the habits 
of mind embodied in Freud’s language so that his language could 
be clearly and effectively used as a contrast to our own. Since 
a language is an epistomology in operation, it was necessary 
to trace the development of Freud's epistomology as we traced 
the development of his language about psychotherapy. In trac¬ 
ing the development of Freud's language we also traced the 
development of his therapeutic technique. This meant we had 
an Opportunity to use our own language to understand his 
therapy. A language and epistomology, if they are to be truly 
useful, will offer fresh access to the familiar. We hope in 
our discussion of Freud that this has been the experience of 
the reader. 
FREUD, BINSWANGER AND LEARNING III 
One of Freud’s students and close friends was also 
one of the most Incisive critics of what we have to this point 
been labeling the "impact of forces" aspect of Freud’s model 
of human personality and of psychotherapeutic change. Ludwig 
Binswanger, the founder of the existential school of psycho¬ 
analysis, "Da.se in analysis," said that his teacher had failed 
to take Into account the most fundamental aspect of what it 
is to be human. While we have criticized Freud’s language 
for not being parsimonious in that it needs to compound "basic 
principles"in order to explain a phenomenon such as "repetition 
compulsion," we have only hinted in the vaguest way that his 
language might leave some basic part of human experience un¬ 
discussed. In Binswanger’s criticism of Freud, we have a 
critique of this limitation to which we also must answer. 
In this chapter we will try to give a summary of 
Binswanger’s criticism of Freud and to refine and extend our 
own language in the light of these ways of understanding. We 
will also attempt to show the relationship of Binswanger’s 
approach to our own, though there will not be the attempt to 
"translate" his language into ours as was done in our chapter 
on Freud. His language provides a contrast to our own. In 
seeing the different potentials of the two languages we will 
have our first clear picture of the limits of our own language. 
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In our understanding what our language cannot do, we will be 
on firmer ground In using it for what it can do. 
The critique of Freud by Binswanger with which we will 
be concerned is entitled "Freud’s Conception of Man in the 
Light of Anthropology." (72) It was composed as a commemorative 
address on the occasion of Freud's eightieth birthday. We will 
follow the argument of Binswanger's essay rather closely befor° 
beginning our discussion of its relation to the rest of our 
language system. 
Binswanger says that the impetus for a coherent body 
of scientific work is its basic "idea." To him the word is 
a much larger one than it is usually taken to be. Far more 
than a "notion" of an "original thought," it is to him a unique 
confluence of culturally and historically specific modes of 
apprehending and ordering the phenomenal world which in the 
unfolding experience of a specific person are made into a new 
form. 
The idea behind a scientific work combines the unique 
personal-psychological and cultural-historical conditions 
that made it nossible with the timeless mission it has to 
accomplish In and for the world, namely, the service of 
Truth. (73) 
An "idea" in Binswanger's sense is generative form. 
It gives new apprehension of the world, new understanding, ne^ 
congruence between formally Incongruous exnerience, new refine¬ 
ment of perception, new meaning. 
The idea behind the work of Freud, according to Bins¬ 
wanger, is a conception of man which Binswanger calls "homo 
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natura". It is an idea of "primal man". Because it is an 
idea, we are not talking about an historical "primal man," 
whether we speak of philogenetic history of the species or 
of the ontogenetic history of an individual from "primal" 
infant to adult. "This primal man is not the source and fount 
of human history, but Is, instead, a requirement for natural- 
scientific research." (7*0 Freud’s idea Is bom of and is gen¬ 
erative within a soecific realm of thought. 
The reductive dialectic used by Freud to construct 
his theory of man is, to the last detail, that of natural 
science. In it, his faith that he is discovering something 
about the reality of the world finds its proper support, 
and with it his sense of awe before the mystery and power 
of life tirelessly spurs his work forward. Freud was not 
one to limit his concern merely to the direct object of his 
investigations without at the same time being profoundly 
aware of the intellectual tool that was his method. He him¬ 
self has given us an excellent description of its most essen¬ 
tial prerequisites. He speaks of seeking Identity between 
differences. Psychoanalytic investigations show "that the 
deepest essence of man is instinctual impulse, whose elemental 
nature is the same in all men and which directs him to the 
satisfaction of certain primal needs .**(75) 
This search for Identity beneath differences, for the 
common causes, leads the natural scientist to pay attention to 
observed phenomena only when these may lead to some more funda¬ 
mental force. As Binswanger puts it, "Natural science never 
begins with just the phenomena; Indeed, its main task is to 
divest the phenomena of their phenomenality as quickly and as 
thoroughlv as possible." Freud says it only slightly differ¬ 
ently: "In our method, observed phenomena must take second 
place to forces that are merely hypothesized." (76) 
Thjs is natural scientific knowledge, and to Freud If 
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Is the only knowledge. It consists, in Freud's words, of 
"the intellectual manipulation of carefully verified observa¬ 
tions." Blnswanger points out that the intellectual manipula¬ 
tion of discrete bits (observations) limits one to a certain 
kind of knowledge. 
We can now characterize the idea of homo natura mor° 
preciselv by saying that it is a genuine natural-scientific, 
biopsychological idea. It Is a natural-scientific construct 
like the biophysiological idea of the organism, the chemist's 
idea of matter as the underlying basis of the elements and 
their combinations, and the physicist's idea of light, etc. 
The reality of the phenomenal, its uniqueness and independence 
is absorbed by the hypothesized forces, drives and the laws 
that govern them. (77) 
Binswanger carefully sets out the elements of Freud's 
conception of man, its foundation in "bodiliness," the role 
of the instincts in translating bodily needs Into psychical 
ideas and then into action, the notion of the "wish" as the 
form taken by Instinct in the psyche, the mechanism of repression 
in response to the constraints of civilization as translated 
through the family, and the operation of transference in 
psychotherapy In correction of pathogenic repression. He has 
the greatest respect for many of Freud's contributions made 
possible by this conception of man. Of Freud's relating of 
certain motives and behaviors with certain regions of the 
body, he says, "It was ^reud who first gave us a genuine 
s omatography of exnerience based on natural-scientific observa¬ 
tions and constructs. This Is an accomplishment whose anthro¬ 
pological significance cannot be sufficiently highly esteemed. (78) 
(His emphasis) 
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Binswanger has high regard for the elegance of Freud's 
mechanistic view of man. He quotes from The Interpretatlon of 
Dreams Freud's formula for the action of the derivatives of 
unconscious material in consciousness. "It is as though the 
resistance of consciousness against them [the 'derivatives'] 
were a function of their remoteness from what was originally 
repressed," Of this Binswanger says: 
No one at all familiar with the problems he dealt with 
can fail to realize what an enormous concentration of scien¬ 
tific research and thought was required before even one 
sentence in the language of mathematical functional equations 
could be formulated concerning the psychic life of human be- 
ings. . . . One might even formally express Freud's whole 
life work by stating that the idea of homo nature can lead 
to the possibility of expressing psychic processes in a 
mathematical functional equation. Freud succeeded In demon¬ 
strating mechanism at work in what was apparently the freest 
reaches of the human mind, thereby creating the possibility 
of mechanically "repairing" the mind (with the psychoanalytic 
techniques of unmasking and annulling repression and regression 
by means of the transference mechanism). * (79) 
That Freud should have demonstrated the workings of 
"mechanism" in the "freest reaches of the human mind," Bins- 
wanger considers potentially helpful in that it enables one to 
go forward with a therapy to deal with conditions which earlier 
had been inaccessible to remediation. That Freud would, as 
he did, extend his model of mechanism to all of human experi¬ 
ence, Binswanger finds destructive. 
#Binswanger makes a reversal in this statement. He seems to 
say that the possibility for an effective therapy came from 
Freud's model of man when the opposite is true, Freud's model 
began as a natural-scientific explanation ^or the 
of his therapy, though as his career went on each 
the other. 
effectiveness 
informed 
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The mein result of our Investigation has be«n to establish 
that ^reud’s idea of homo natura Is a scientific construct 
that is only feasible IT 1^ is based on a destruction of man's 
experiential knowledge of himself—a destruction,that is, of 
anthropological experience. (80) (his ernhasis) 
The word "anthropological" is pivotal here a.nd requires 
some discussion. It is an important word for Heideggar which 
Binswanger appropriates. Ernest Angela translator of Blnswanger, 
gives a good brief description of it. 
Binswanger uses this word not in its usual American 
meaning, which is cultural anthropology, the comparative 
study of races, mores, etc., but rather in its strictly 
etymological sense, that is, anthropology as the study of 
man ("anthropos") and specifically ... the study of the 
essential meaning of and characteristics of being human. (70) 
Anthropology is a superior science of which Freud’s 
natural scientific approach to human beings can only be a part. 
That Freudians would claim a primary status for their approach 
is the argument Binswanger seeks to counter. He points out that 
the homo natura model can be helpful to anthropology in that 
it shows how much can be accomplished by a unified intellectual 
approach to human beings. He welcomes whatever amount of human 
experience "mechanism" is able to subsume for this leaves 
what is left more firmly in the camp of "freedom". He appreciates 
the way in which natural science offers unitary morphological 
principles to be found throughout the differences between individ¬ 
uals or in forns taken by a single Individual, but sees this as 
only half an understanding of tha phenomena. 
In Freudian "doctrine", the main stress is placed 
not upon existence as change, but upon ^hat which persists 
and remains amid change, the instinct. But anthropology 
must attend to both the unitary primal form within change 
and the multiplicity of change as genuine metamorphosis. (81) 
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This commitment to fundamental morphological principles, 
to hypothesized forces or drives unchanging1 throughout seeming 
changes robs human beings of their "being" in any particular 
space and time. Heidegger's "Dasein," "being there," is inher¬ 
ently contextual and this is unaccounted for in natural science.« 
But there is "something," according to Binswanger, which continually 
bursts the bounds of natural science. In the subject-object 
split implied by natural science and the subsequent slavish 
attention to the object, ther^ is always one element "bracketed 
out". 
Limiting ourselves to Freud, we need only open one of 
his works at random to come upon this "something." We see 
him, for example, writing of the construction and operations 
of our psychic apparatus, or our psyche as that precious in¬ 
strument by means of which we maintain our lives; we see him 
writing about our psychic life, our thoughts. With all these 
possessive pronouns. what is being spoken of is a being that 
is presupposed as self-evident, and that is just as self- 
evidently being bracketed out, namely, existence as ours. 
(82) (his emphasis) 
In most psychological terminology the "self" is a rather 
small objectified entity which is somehow owned, as in the term 
"my-self". This self has the same sort of status as "Id," "Ego," 
or "Super-ego," a reified entity developed according to certain 
hypothesized laws. For Binswanger the "self" is closely linked 
with the "existence" which is any one person. Binswanger's 
"self" is the hav^-er and the had, the being that says "my" in 
"myself", the existence which makes "having" and "had" meaningful. 
While natural science "leads away from ourselves towards theoretical 
determinations, i.e#, to the perception, observation and destruc¬ 
tion of man in his actuality," anthropology provides another way, 
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a way "which concerns itself with the conditions and potenti¬ 
alities of the Dasein as ours, or—what comes to the same thins_ 
that concerns Itself with the possible kinds and modes of our 
existence." (83) (his emphasis) 
Anthropology, by offering a way of comprehending the 
modes of human existence, offers to the scientist a fundamental 
anproach so often unutilized, the approach to an understanding 
of "scientist" as a mode of human existence. Taking this approach 
offers an understanding of being as "scientist," as "seeker," 
"shaper," and as "spokesman for scientific truth in and for the 
world." And as one understands a specific existence in its 
world, a particular mode of being which is a mode of constituting 
"world" in the apprehension, the seizing and giving form to 
presenting phenomena, all in a certain fashion or according to 
a certain "idea", one gains a step toward the elucidation of 
the "operation" and "structure" of "being" itself. So rich an 
approach is taken by few scientists, perhaps because in what 
they gained they would also seem to lose. To avowedly approach 
"scientist" as a mode of being is tacitly to acknowledge that 
there are other, equally valid modes of being. Human being may 
be scientific, artistic, religious, etc., each with its own 
forms of reason and with its own access to truth. A scientist 
who understands the interactional nature of his mode of existence, 
who has Insight into his ways of knowing, as well as what is 
"known", can no longer claim primacy for scientific knowledge. 
Each of these modes of apprehending being represents 
an essential form of human existence. When one form takes 
m 
on the role of Judge over all the others, then the essence 
of man Is leveled or reduced to one plane. Even though, 
therefore, the picture of man formed by natural science* 
encompasses all regions of human being, it is unable to rive 
unmediated articulation to the intellectual and linguistic 
forms peculiar to these regions and is thus unable to exnress 
the way man lives within each of these repions. (84) 
Natural science cannot give unmediated articulation of 
these regions because it seeks both distance and depth. It s«*«ks 
distance from its object, to be "objective" in its approach to 
nhenomena, and it seeks to plumb the depths of structures and 
forces which underlie the phenomena. Others modes of apprehend¬ 
ing being, particularly the artistic and religious modes can 
more closely approach "unmediated articulation" in these areas. 
In talking about science, art, ethics, and religion Binswanger 
seems to use the terms "modes of apprehending being," "forms 
of existence," and "forms of reason" interchangeably. 
They are types and modes In which the Dasein exists, 
and in which it understands, interprets and expresses 
itself. The fact that all these forms of existence are 
possible reveals to us the historicity of the human Dasein; 
their actual realization reveals its history. ... As far 
back as 1883 Dilthey wrote: "... The Individual always 
experiences, thinks, and acts within a historically condi¬ 
tioned communal sphere." This is but a corroboration of 
what we already knew, namely, that the construction of 
every scientific picture of man must begin with a destruc¬ 
tion of his historicity, i.e., with that which man, as 
historical Dasein in the "structural context" of experience, 
expression, understanding, and meaning, can objectify. («5) 
(his emphasis) 
Here Binswanger’s language seems to parallel our own. 
"Structural context" is a term for all the important elements 
in the "historicity" of each person. Thus, man inevitably 
encounters a world "laden with meaning." This is his "structural 
context of experience, expression, understanding and meaning. 
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Yet only that which can be stripped of meaning, reduced to its 
"components" and finally reassembled to form some new meaninr, 
i«s, , that which can be treated "obiectively," car. be approached 
by natural science. 
By "historicity" in the above quotation Binswanger 
means the ability of the existence to elaborate its own coherent 
form through time in fee interaction with its "meaning environ¬ 
ment ." 
Binswanger’s critique of Freud's scientific point of 
view is not only thoroughgoing, it is also loving. He finds 
Freud's own person and history an eloquent expression of the 
aspects of human existence which were lacking in Freud's intell¬ 
ectual system. (Freud was flattered, honored and unconvinced 
when he read the essay shortly after it was delivered.) 
Binswanger's life's work might be said to have been the 
apprehending of modes of existence of people otherwise described 
in terms of mechanistic pathology (psychosis and neurosis) 
through his use of the work of Heidegger in illuminating the 
processes and structures of "being" in its most general sens®, 
and then attenuating to explain this work to others. In this 
attempt he borrows from Heidegger a language which is hardly 
translatable into English, much less into another language 
system such as ours. In an incredible work of power and 
Intricacy of thought Heidegger attempted to delineate the 
phenomenological structure of being, or in his phrase, "being- 
(166) To do this he had to revivify and even In-the-world." 
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generate whole language structures, at least for the English 
speaking reader. He wrote a rather lengthy book In an attempt 
to reclaim the potential meaning and resonance of .just one word: 
"being." (167) In Being and Time he used at least five different 
rigorously conceptualized words to express the differences of 
meaning which are unwittingly lumped under the word "history" 
in English. Most of the nuances and shadings of Heidegger's 
language are understood and intended by Binswanger as he applied 
the language to his existential analytic studies. 
In the richness, complexity and difficulty of Heidegger's 
aind Binswanger's language when comnared to the rather straight¬ 
forward clarity of Freud’s language is an example of the diff¬ 
erence which the logical type from which one approaches human 
beings makes. Binswanger maintains that Freud misjudged the 
logical type from which he is able to speak. Freud would 
have his natural scientific point of view be the most funda¬ 
mental explanatory outlook possible on human belng. Binswanger 
says that In fact Freud's approach is merely one mode of exis¬ 
tence among several equally primary possibilities. This may 
seem to he the efforts of a pupil simply going his teacher one 
better by claiming to have a meta-view to his teacher’s view, 
but one should understand that Binswanger’s view is fundamentally 
less arrogant than Freud's. Binswanger stays always within 
the phenomenological mode. This means that he always has before 
him the knowledge that one can never learn about the human situation 
or human experience from outside it. The subject—object, 
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knower-known relationship is ultimately inappropriate in this 
case, however much it may facilitate knowing* in certain areas. 
Binswanger, with the language of Heidegger, is abl® to Illumi¬ 
nate aspects of human existence which Freud cannot approach 
because he (Binswanger) has a humbler but more accurate assess¬ 
ment of what is possible. The difficulty of Blnswanper’s 
language reflects the complexity of speaking within the rhenc- 
menological mode without the simplifying objectivity of natural 
s cience. 
In the title of this chapter we listed Binswanger and 
Learning III together as if there were some sort of comparability 
between Binswanger’s critique of Freud and the understanding 
implied by Bateson in the concept of L III. This implication 
is certainly intended, yet in order to say how they are com¬ 
parable, we will need to first go a bit more deeply into L III. 
In speaking about L II in Chapter II we claimed that 
the specific Interaction patterns in the psychotherapeutic 
situation provided a corrective change in the habits of punc¬ 
tuating relationships of the client. We Identified the formal 
structure of these patterns as L II patterns which found their 
transform in L II premises of the client. We further said that 
the L II premises brought by the client to the therapeutic 
situation were mostly transforms of L II patterns of his family 
early in life. We said that this was a necessary systems 
phenomenon, that elements capable of learning in an ongoing in¬ 
formational system must eventually come to embody some transform 
of the formal structure of the system as a whole. L III is an 
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example of the same systemic phenomenon at one greater level 
of abstraction. 
Every person has Level III premises whether or not he 
has ever achieved the change of these premises which we would 
call Learning III, Level III premises are formal transforms 
of the most abstract patterns of relationship embodied in the 
culture as a whole. The Level III premises of most people born 
in Western culture are transforms of a basically purposive 
approach to "environment" which is embodied in the culture, 
Bateson has written extensively about the personal and ecologi¬ 
cal consequences of a culture in which the immediate purposes 
of man, singly or collectively, are final determinants of so 
many actions, (8, 38, ^3, ^6, 60, 62, 63) One of the clearest 
and most enjoyable statements of this point of view Is in 
Bateson’s reworking of a very familiar story. 
There was once a Garden. It contained many hundreds 
of species--probably in the subtropics—living in great 
fertility and balance, with plenty of humus, and so on. 
In that garden, there were two anthropoids who were more 
intelligent than the other animals. 
On-one of the trees there was a fruit, very high up, 
which the two apes were unable to reach. So they began to 
think. That was the mistake. They began to think purposively. 
fey and by, the he ape, whose name was Adam, went and got 
an empty box and put it under the tree and stepped on it, 
but he found he still couldn't reach the fruit. So he got 
another box and put it on top of the first. Then he climbed 
up on the two boxes and finally he got that apple. 
Adam and Eve then became almost drunk with excitement. 
This was the way to do things. Make a plan, ABC and you 
get D, 
They then began to specialize in doing things the planned 
way. In effect, they cast out from the Garden the concept 
of their own total systemic nature. 
After they had cast God out of the Garden, they really 
went to work on this purposive business, and pretty soon the 
topsoil disappeared. After that, several spcies of plants 
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became "weeds" and some of the animals became "pests"; 
and Adam found that gardening was much harder work. He had 
to get his bread by the sweat of his brow and he said, "It’s 
a vengeful God, I should never have eaten that apple." 
(39) (his emphasis) 
The myth tells both the story of the beginnings of an 
essentially purposive culture and of the purposive approach to 
the world which would be natural to the members of the culture. 
Conscious purpose inevitably requires a subject-object split. 
I (subject) do so and so (verb) to that (object). It is likely 
that the development of language had some role in the evolution 
of this purposive culture as digital language is essentially 
purposive. That conscious purpose and language are inextricably 
linked can be seen in any noun. A hammer is only a "hammer" in 
as much as it has a role in a purposive system. Otherwise it 
is steel and wood in a very arbitrary configuration. All naming 
is the assumption of power over the thing named. It is not 
accidental that the God of the Hebrews had several names by 
which "tfe" was known but that no one could say the true name 
of God. To "take the Lord’s name in vain" is to assert one’s 
power over the deity. 
The language that one is forced to use in Western cul¬ 
ture has the purposive nature of the culture firmly fembedded 
in it. This language forces conceptualizing which is inherently 
paradoxical. Here Bateson comes to our aid in helping to unearth 
the paradox. Whenever someone says, "I", he is in paradox. 
He is a member of a class describing the class as a whole. When 
"I" is used strictly in its denotative significance, when it only 
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signifies that what is said is about the person speaking, the 
paradox is not carried through in the rest of the sentence. 
However, when "I" is connotative, when it has specific descrip¬ 
tive sorts of overtones to the speaker, the paradox is likely 
to ramify into the rest of what is said. The paradox is more 
apparent when some of the other ways we express ourselves are 
highlighted. "Ourselves," for instance, is an example. Anyone 
who says "I", can say "myself", yet which is the being that owns 
this self? The term implies two entities, an owner who says 
"my" and a "self" which is owned. All people in Western culture 
who use their language with no sense of being somehow violated 
by its most usual structures are in the same position as Freud 
with respect to Rinswanger’s critique. He said that Freud 
bracketed out the being who was the subject in phrases like, 
"our psyche" or "our consciousness". The being that says "I", 
"myself", etc., is bracketed out of all Western language. "I" 
as it is usually used is a concept, not an experience. The 
experience of being, which is the experiencing being, is lost. 
Even the language we must use to describe the loss process is 
overly tangible as we speak of "splitting" or losing "half" 
the person. No language does justice to human being as process 
and none can describe the injustice of conventional language. 
We have spoken of L XI premises as being those unconscious 
early—learned habits of punctuating interaction into meaningful 
sequences which are best named by descriptions of "character". 
A person is "dependent," "aggressive," "happy, a ^rue --- 
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(fill in family or religious name)1', etc. These are all descrip¬ 
tions of L II constellations. The search for identity is a 
search for clarity of and perhaps a name for ones L II premises. 
A great emphasis on L II premises is natural in a purposive 
culture. Where there is a clear subject and object distinction, 
both require extensive definition. So in a purposive culture, 
people may have Intense concern with "who" they are because 
they each are a discrete definable entity set apart from their 
environment. These extensive L II structures all are embedded 
in a paradoxical L III set of premises. 
Learning III would be a corrective change in the usual 
Level III premises of people and the culture. It involves any 
increasing of the facility for corrective change in L II 
premises. A person Increases his ability to have options of 
L II premises as the unconscious definitions of his character 
become less fixed. This is movement toward more comfortably 
standing within the system that is a person in his environment 
rather than constituting purposive systems of which one is the 
definor. It Is ceasing to embody the highest logical type in 
one’s experiential world. 
The fact that we are contrasting standing within the 
system to a purposive approach to one’s environment does not 
mean that the person who stands within is not an agent in the 
system of which he is a part. On the contrary, when one does 
not have specific definitions of one’s "seir" to protect or 
specific purposes to impose on one’s environment, one is able 
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to experience one's agency in the larger system much more clearly. 
One can more completely be_ what one is doing because one is 
not bound to a particular definition of the doer (oneself). 
At the most abstract level it may be possible to experience 
one's agency in the immediate interaction of the creation of 
form and meaning that is perception. 
The manner in which L II premises can structure and 
limit perception highlights the interactive nature of perception 
itself. It is the sense that the perceiver has of himself which 
is being protected by the limitation of perception. Perception 
is restricted because greater complexity of perception is a 
transform of greater complexity of perceiver. 
In speaking about L III we have spoken of a corrective 
change at Level III allowing a return to "immediate" perception. 
This is not meant to imply that Learning III allows one to 
perceive in ways which have no redundancy. It means that one 
Is able to return to the Interaction of perception with premises 
about perception which do not have to be rigidly protected, 
which can evolve and which are complex enough to allow for a 
great complexity of perceiving. This is the direction of the 
gain as one moves toward a non-paradoxical stance at Level III. 
What Is the experience of functioning with non-paradoxical 
L III premises? Watzlawick, et. al., in talking about Level III, 
try to approach the existentialist's language. 
Only from this level can it be seen that reality is 
not something objective, unalterable, "out there," with a 
benign or sinister meaning for our survival, but that for 
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all intents and purposes our subjective experience of 
existence is reality—reality is our patterning of some¬ 
thing that most probably is totally beyond objective human 
verification. (226) 
When a communication theorist who has a language to talk 
ab°ut human interaction tries to use that language to articulate 
human being, the results are usually inadequate. We can talk 
very well about patterns and patterns of patterns, but when we 
seek to stand within human existence-in-environment, as Watzlawick 
does, we still find outselves talking about it. He denies 
’’objective" viewpoints, but can only affirm the opposite of the 
same logical type: "subjective". This, incidentally, is ever 
the problem that Humanism encounters. In its countering of the 
evils of science and objectivity it offers only the often 
laughable opposite. 
For a language which can offer an alternative to the 
subject-object dichotomy, we must turn back to the phenomeno¬ 
logical mode. Here is an understanding of non-paradoxical L III 
premises which Bateson’s language can point to, can, as it were, 
describe the logical structure of, but cannot nearly adequately 
articulate. 
Binswanger in speaking of how we can know without ob¬ 
jectifying says we must let the thing "sneak for itself," express 
itself "as it is". 
However, the "as it is" contains one more fundamental 
- ontological and phenomenological problem; for we finite human 
beings can acquire information on the "how" of a thing only 
according to the "world design" which guides our understand- 
ing of things. Therefore, I have to return once more to __ 
Heidegger'S thesis of the existence as "being in the world. . 
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^/hat I want to emphasize here is only the identification 
of being-in-the-world and transcendence; for it is through 
nhlS-,^nat,we can understand what "being-in-the-world" and 
world signify in the anthropological application. The 
German word for transcending is Uberstieg (climb! np- over or 
aMVu’4.!!OUI!uting); An Ubtpstleg requires,first, that toward 
which the Uberstieg is directed and, secondly, that which 
is uberstiegen or transcended; the first, then, toward which 
the transcendence occurs, we call "world,"whereas the second, 
which is transcended, is the being itself (das Seiende selbst)* 
and especially that in the form of which a human existence 
itself "exists". In other words, 
itself in the act of transcending—be it as 
world or as objectifying knowledge—but the 
so. (71) 
not only "world" constitutes 
a mere dawn of 
self also does 
While Bateson*s language is as impoverished as most when 
compared to Binswanger’s in the discussion of the phenomenological 
structure of being, pathology and therapy, we can use his language 
to talk about what Binswanger is doing. By using the phenomeno- 
Iqsrical mode, Binswanger is standing within the process he describes. 
The process he describes is of a higher logical type than his 
descrlptlons of it. This is a reversal of the usual relation 
of language to what is spoken of and partly explains the necessity 
for such a great concern with language which both Binswanger 
and Heidegger show. Binswanger is refusing to assert his views 
as the highest logical type in his phenomenal world as is implied 
in the subject-object approach to phenomena. His approach is 
"non-objectifying." It should be remembered that this is not 
the opposite of "objectifying," not "subjectifying," it is of 
a completely different logical type. 
*Seiencl is a noun which can be translated as "a being" and has 
elsewhere been rendered by the constructed word "essent." (168) 
It is "that which is," "that which manifests itself in being 
(sein)". 
That Bateson’s language, built from the study of form 
is so close to, we might say isomorphic with Binswanger's in 
the crucial area of man's relation to his world, may be because 
Bateson, as any good systems theorist would, always took his 
own theorizing into account as part of the system. In any one 
instance, for example, in discussing schizophrenia, the role 
of the "discusser" may not be mentioned, yet, because in other 
contexts the formal relation of human knowing to what is known 
has been carefully attended to (Chapter II above) and the formal 
relationship between human knowing and schizophrenia carefully 
elucidated, ultimately the subject-object split is not invoked. 
But though it is a system which attempts to account for the 
theorizer and the phenomena together in a coherent whole, it 
does not possess the phenomenological immediacy of Heidegger 
and Binswanger. It is a language about experience rather than 
a language of experience. We can go on with our system, know¬ 
ing we are doing no violence to the existential point of view, 
but knowing also that where Learning III is taking place, it 
is more likely that a language similar to that of the exis¬ 
tentialists will be used. Our language will be useful in 
saying what is happening there, in taking the meta-view. 
This point has great significance for our discussion 
of different forms of therapy. Learning III is promoted by 
a language like Binswanger’s, a language which stands within 
the ongoing process of unfolding human being. Learning III 
is fostered by a language which helps call into question the 
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subject-object split, rather than assuming it. It would 
probably be a language which was eliptical, sometimes turning 
back on itself to give a sense of the false assumptions embedded 
deep within its structure, yet without jumping to the meta-view. 
By refusing to take the meta-view and talk about how thing’s 
"really” are, the language would force the staying at the logical 
type of experience, forcing the user toward an experience of 
his own position within the system in the room and in his "world." 
Whether or not Learning III Is promoted in a given therapy 
situation, assuming the client comes to the situation with the 
usual L III premises of the culture described above, is probably 
contingent on the therapist’s L III premises as reflected in 
his premises with reference to therapy. These would in all 
likelihood be expressed in whether the therapist feels himself 
to be standing within a larger process in the room to which he 
can only contribute his best and by which he also will be 
affected. A belief In some innate curative force in the patient 
is probably a transform of this same basic approach. It means 
that the therapist can do his best to facilitate change, but 
in the end is not the causes of change. Change is a product 
of the total systemic interaction among the people in the 
therapy situation. This attitude which might foster L III 
Is not necessarily a stated attitude by the therapist. It must 
be embodied In the most abstract structure of the therapeutic 
interaction. 
It is obvious that the therapist’s most basic approaches 
1?X 
to other people as reflected in the therapeutic situation are 
not the only expression of L III premises encountered in therapy. 
Issues of voluntary vs. involuntary therapy, the institutional 
context, and whether or not there is money paid for therapy, 
while they are largely to be negotiated in the Level II inter¬ 
action of the therapy because they pertain to the form of the 
specific relationship in the specific situation, have embedded 
in them abstract assumptions about relating in general which 
will effect the L III patterns of the interaction. What exactly 
those assumptions are or how "institutional” structures could 
reflect less paradoxical L III premises is a question to*^ complex 
for a general treatment. Some religions of the East would 
consider all these considerations as part of the webs of may a 
that make up most of our social and political lives. Maya is 
defined by Alan Watts as "the Hindu-Buddhist word whose exact 
meaning is not merely illusion’ but the entire world conception 
of culture, considered as illusion in the strict etymological 
sense of a play (Latin, ludege)." (219) For the time being, 
we can say that whatever the most abstract formal implications 
of the contextual conditions to the therapeutic relationship, 
it is likely the experience of options within these structures 
can best be reflected in a therapeutic relationship whose most 
abstract premises are not exactly isomorphic with those of the 
context. This could be possible in the existential clarity and 
compression which is in the nature of the relating of two people 
and which is different from the more amorphous relationship 
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of one person to his ’’contextual world’’. In the process which 
is relating is a possible clarifying of ’’being”. It can be 
experienced that there must be two in order to relate yet In 
the systemic nature of relating the line between the two is 
arbitrary. Experienced over a long period of time with a 
therapist whose premises about relating are congruent with 
the actual systemic nature of relating, it gradually "sinks in" 
for the client. Premises about relationship (L II) as they 
are worked out, made explicit, and no longer needed, gradually 
give way to the meta-experience of relating In general (L III), 
The meta-experience of relating, that relating transcends "I" 
and "you", allows for the immediate experience of relating in 
which "I" is Irrelevant. Abstract premises become congruent 
with most immediate experience. 
The word "congruent" may still need further explanation. 
We use it to mean "of compatible form," Congruence of premises 
means one’s premises about interaction of a given level of 
abstraction are compatible with one's premises at a higher or 
lower level or with one’s premises of the same level evoked 
by a very different context. A schizophrenic person's para¬ 
doxical LII premises are not reflexively congruent, i.e. not 
compatible with any coherent way of organizing experience. 
John Jones operated on L II premises that he was not to blame 
and that someone In his family was to blame, most likely himseli 
In sudden religious conversion often a person experiences a 
sudden change at Level III which is not congruent with his 
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habits of punctuating interactions, L XI. For a while the 
world is made anew. The person is no longer his old self 
struggling to get ahead. He is a "child of Christ" (or what¬ 
ever) , Yet if this position of standing within the greater 
world system, experienced by the convert as his being surrounded 
by the love of God and as a kinship with all other people, is 
not supported by a change in form of interactions in which the 
convert participates, i,e,, by L II change, he will gradually 
revert to his old L III premises. The people who originated 
the practice of cloistering converts were no fools. 
Therapy promotes congruence between various levels of 
abstraction of premises learned. As premises become more con¬ 
gruent, greater complexity of experience is possible. With 
neurotic people, complexity of experience is curtailed in order 
to maintain a restricted congruence, a congruence between 
restricted premises and experience. Psychotic people often 
find themselves awash in complexity because they have lost any 
congruence of experiencing as the paradox inherent in their 
L II premises gradually ramifies throughout their experiencing. 
All experience is potentially significant because they have 
lost the ability to discriminate what is relevant from what 
is irrelevant for them, 
"Congruence" and "complexity" are our distillations of 
the two most fundamental, or, if you will, most abstract concepts 
in Bateson's approach, Bateson himself attaches no special 
significance to either of these specific words and might object 
to any distillation to fundamental principles. It should be 
noted that these are fundamental for understanding. They are 
not fundamental principles such as the nleasure principle or 
death principle which propel, as it were, the events of one's 
life. Concepts of this level of abstraction are self-validating 
organizing epistomological principles which are useful within 
a whole language system such as we have developed here. Stand¬ 
ing on their own, they are useless cliches. Within the language 
system they can lend more understandable form to the language 
itself as well as to the phenomena discussed in the language. 
As we turn away to assess our progress to this point we 
discover that at least in its first exposition, our language 
is comnlete. It has not developed Into a small set of terms 
nearly as much as it has been an expression of an epistomology. 
The numbered levels of learning or pattern formation have been 
practically our only shorthand. In the present chapter we 
have taken it about as far as it will go for understanding 
an individual in the process of developing it. 
In the next chapter we will talk about several forms 
of therapy using the understandings we have developed so far. 
There will naturally be some refining possible as specific 
systems are considered. If what we have been attempting is 
a truly useful enterprise, many of these systems should open 
before us for examination and comparison in newly illuminating 
ways. 
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THE LANGUAGE AND OTHER THERAPIES 
We have talked about our language a great deal In the 
process of constructing it. In this chapter we will attempt 
to put the language to work. We want to use the understandings 
we have developed so far to assess different systems of psycho¬ 
therapy. By ’’assess” is meant an attempt to make clear what 
a psychotherapy is attempting, how it goes about accomplishing 
its ends, and what about the process is "therapeutic." 
We will try not to lose sight of the fact that "a psycho¬ 
therapy" is a very misleading concept. The term is simply a 
descriptive distillation of the process between two (or more) 
people. It may help to keep this in our minds if we use the 
name of the person who developed the system of psychotherapy. 
Instead of saying what "Direct Analysis" would do, we will say 
what John Rosen would do. It should be understood, however, 
that we are discussing the formal aspects of the interactive 
process described by John Rosen. We do not want to speak in 
a way that causes the person of the therapist to be lost, but 
we must speak in terms general enough so that the therapist 
need not be a specific person. 
Further along in this chapter, after we have discussed 
three therapies using the language as it has been developed 
so far, we will attempt to extend it just a bit further, 
ing the identification of premises about interaction with 
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patterns of interaction which we made much earlier, we will 
attempt to anply our numbered hierarchy of levels of learning 
not only to the psychotherapy of an individual, but also to 
the therapy of a family system. Since every attribute of the 
interaction between levels of learning has at one time or 
another been identified as a basic systems phenomenon, we have 
been talking about the individual as a system all along. Our 
hierarchy should be equally applicable to another system, such 
as a family. 
Using our discussion of Freud*s therapy as a model, we 
will discuss the following therapeutic systems: Gestalt Therapy 
of Frederick Peris, "relationship therapy" of Jessie Taft, 
Direct Analysis of John Rosen and Network Therapy of Ross Speck 
and Carolyn Attneave. None of these discussions will approach 
being exhaustive. There will be aspects of any given therapy 
which cannot be discussed clearly because they are undecidable 
in the literature. There may be a great discrepancy between 
what is written about a therapy and the way the process takes 
place in practice. We will only work with what is written. 
There will not be an attempt as there was with Freud to discuss 
the theory behind the therapy extensively in our terms. The 
purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the potential of our 
language for assessing very different therapies built on very 
different theoretical foundations in the same consistent set 
of terms and understandings. If the potential of our language 
can be clearly demonstrated, the work of this thesis will be 
largely completed. 
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Gestalt Therapy 
Gestalt Therapy, as explained by its originator, 
Frederick Peris, is centered on the words "now" and "how". 
I_ maintain that all therapy that has to be done can 
only be done""in the now" Anything else’ Is- Interfering. 
And the technique that lets us understand and stay with 
the now is the "awareness continuum," discovering and be¬ 
coming fully aware of each actual experience. If you can 
stay with this, you will soon come across some experience 
which is unpleasant. For instance, you get bored, or feel 
uncomfortable, or feel like crying, (1B9) (his emphasis) 
In therapy or in any other setting a. person has diffi¬ 
culty staying in the "now". As these difficulties arise the 
word "how" becomes relevant. A person is asked to focus on 
how he keeps himself from being in the now. Each time a-person 
leaves the now, the question of how he is doing this puts him 
back into the awareness continuum. The structure of the approach 
is "unbeatable" in the sense that all one’s efforts to define 
a different relationship by not following the prescribed pro¬ 
cedure are simply more processes for one to be aware of, in 
which one can experience how one is leaving the "now". 
Peris says we run away from the now in various ways, all 
of which are in service of maintaining the status quo. 
The status quo is holding on to the concept that we are 
children. ... We are inf*antITe“Fecause we are_afraid to 
take responsibility for the now. To take our place in 
history, to be mature, means giving up the concept that we 
have parents, that we have to be submissive or defiant, or 
the other variations on the child's role that we play. . . . 
Maturation is the development from environmental support 
to self-support. The baby is entirely dependent on environ¬ 
mental support. As the child grows up, it learns more and 
more to stand on its own feet, create its own world earn 
its own money, become emotionally independent. (190) (his 
emphasis) 
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The neurotic, according to Peris, is clinging to the 
position of the child. In his investment in the past or anxiety 
about the future he maintains himself in an immature, emotionally 
dependent position. The neurbtic is a person, as we said in 
discussing Freud, whose L II premises are inappropriate in his 
present context which calls for "mature" functioning. 
Peris approaches L II premises through their manifesta- 
In the structuring of immediate perception by requiring 
the client to continue in "new awareness". We have talked at 
great length about the way one's L II premises structure 
one's perception of one's world. When Peris requires a person 
to stay attentive to immediate perception, he forces them to 
a reworking of their patterns of perceiving. By doing this 
the person's usual L II premises are rendered inoperable. 
. . . most psychotherapies are trying to get to the deepest 
depth.,We are trying to get to the outermost surface. As 
every need, every unfinished situation emerges, we are 
being controlled by this emergent need and have to get in 
touch with the world to satisfy this need. We use our 
senses to observe, to see what is going on. The world is 
opening up. This ability to see is health. Conversely, 
the neurotic can be defined as a person who can't see the 
obvious, as in Anderson's fairy tale where only the child 
points to the obvious—that the king is naked. (191) 
As L II premises are rendered inoperable one begins to 
struggle to reestablish one's punctuation of relationship. In 
his approach to this phenomenon, Peris is very similar to Freud. 
All behavior is acceptable because all behavior is defined as 
relating to the patient himself. He is not confusing, blocking 
or otherwise sidetracking the therapist, according to Peris. 
He is doing these processes to himself. Peris is simply there 
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to help him experience how he does this to himself. Freud 
defines all behavior as transference, as not really aimed at 
the therapist, but at some person from the patient’s early 
life. Peris defines this behavior as aimed at the patient 
himself. 
For Freud, the definition of behavior as "transferred" 
from its proper object allowed him to accept these gambits as 
part of the necessary therapeutic process. Peris places patients 
in a similar paradox. Every gambit can be part of the therapy 
because the patient is doing it to himself. This is brought 
home as the patient is asked to play all the roles in a given 
relationship in which he is attempting to play only one. A 
patient who is determined to be smarter than the therapist 
might be asked to be both the more intelligent patient and 
the therapist. This playing of roles in a relationship gives 
a quick and powerful experience of the total form of a particu¬ 
lar L II premise. This is especially powerfully carried out 
in working with dreams, which Peris does a great deal. As was 
referred to in Chapter II, Bateson sees dreams as iconic repre¬ 
sentations of patterns of relationship between the dreamer and 
other people or between the dreamer and his environment. They 
are often L II patterns representationally and metaphorically 
experienced. Peris uses dreams as a way,of facilitating ex- 
p erience of a total L II pattern by having a person enact the 
different elements of the dream. In this way the message that 
one does what one does in therapy to oneself is reinforced in 
that all aspects of the dream are seen as a representation of 
130 
oneself rather than as pointing to referents other than the 
dreamer. The whole of the L II pattern is evoked in the dreamer’s 
experience. 
The role of the therapist in Peris’ view is one of great 
freedom in relating to the client. This freedom is guaranteed 
by Peris’ use of paradox. He defines his role not as trying 
to change people but as a person helping people to better experience 
what they already are. And who best knows who the patient is 
or wants to be? Peris again avoids the trap. The patient knows 
best. 
The more you refrain from interfering and telling the 
patient what he is like or what he feels like, the more 
chance you give him to discover himself and not be misled 
by your concepts and projections. (192) 
When the patient attempts to involve the therapist as 
a causer of change or as a fixer of his troubled life, Peris 
says the therapist must firmly demur. 
And you must be very careful to teach your patients 
to differentiate between reality and their fantasies, 
especially the transference fantasy—where they see you 
as a father or someone who can give them the goodies. Make 
them look again and again to see the difference between 
this father and you until they wake up and come to their 
senses. (193) 
With his role protected by the paradoxical definition 
of therapist, Peris is free to be spontaneous in dealing with 
a patient. He is able to "trust the wisdom of the organism": 
himself. 
So, if you feel compelled to 
your patients say, esnecially if 
hypnotize you, put you to sleep, 
the end of the session or of the 
listen to all the garbage 
they are trying to bore you, 
you will be exhausted by 
day. But if you allow 
yourself to withdraw when there is no interest 
find yourself immediately involved again when 
of interest occurs, (194) 
, you will 
something 
The therapist stays in the now, in his own awareness 
continuum. He is able to be spontaneous because he is not bound 
to the patient by obligations in the structured definition of 
the relationship. In this way Peris is able to be a model of 
non-neurotic functioning, as he defines it, in the therapy 
situation, just as Freud was able in the analytic situation to 
model non-neurotic functioning as he defined it, where Freud 
kept personal integrity, Peris is spontaneous. 
Peris sees neurosis as a five-layered process. First 
is the phoney layer, the role playing layer. This is the way 
people typically first present themselves in therapy. When the 
phoniness of their approaches becomes clear, the phobic layer 
takes over. This is the state of reaction of what we are, the 
investment in ’’should not’s”. After this layer is the impasse, 
the feeling of deadness, of inability to move. Next carries 
the implosive layer, full of energy but energy in tension, 
inward directed and fostering no movement or creativity. Finally 
is the explosive layer. Here one explodes into grief, joy, 
orgasm, or anger. 
When Peris sees as the layers of a neurosis are certainly 
the stages of a typical therapy as he has observed them. In 
the first two stages we see a person working with his old L II 
premises. First he attempts to behave the way he is used to. 
Secondly he experiences the other role In most of these relationship 
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premises, the "you should not do such and such" role formerly 
taken by his parents. Thirdly comes the impasse. He can’t go 
on with these inappropriate patterns, but he has no others to 
organize his relating. He feels dead. As the relationship con¬ 
tinues without his being able to organize it, he feels greater 
and greater tens5.on« Finally the tension is released in an 
explosion of spontaneous expression. There have been lots of 
cues all the way along in the "now" orientation of the therapy 
that spontaneity is the solution to the bind the patient has 
been in. 
The L II pattern embodied in the whole therapeutic inter¬ 
action is one in which person is struggling to be in control, 
yet completely tangled up (even talking to himself) while another 
person is in complete control and is able to be quite spontaneous. 
As a person gradually takes on the L II premises embodied in 
the whole interaction to help him make sense of experience when 
his original L II premises are no longer viable, he gains an 
alternative to his position as a tangled up person struggling 
to define the relationship. Everything in the structure of 
the interaction pushes him to learn this pattern quickly and 
then to risk trying the spontaneous role. 
In our discussion of Freud we listed five ways in which 
analysis caused change in a person’s punctuation of experience. 
It is surprising how these same five categories are applicable 
to Geatalt Therapy with only a change of- technique in the way 
they are approached. From our discussion so far we can 
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say that Gestalt Therapy promotes change in the following 
ways: 
1. L II premises usually manifested in the patient's 
thinking (internal dialogue) and communication are rendered 
inoperable by the requirement that he remain in the "now". 
2. L II patterns of interaction which the patient is used 
to fostering in his relating are precluded by the redefining 
of these attempts to foster particular ways of relating as 
things the patient does to himself. All behavior of the patient 
to redefine the situation is defined as part of the treatment. 
3. L II premises are invoked in the patient's enacting of 
his dreams and as a result of trying to remain in the "now". 
They are manifested in "how" the patient exhibits his inability 
to remain in the present. These are the patterns structuring 
his perception which prohibit more immediate sensory awareness. 
4. In the enacting of all the roles in a given relationship 
or dream, the patient is able to experience the whole form of 
the particular L II pattern/premise. 
5. In the building of tension toward an explosion of 
spontaneity, there is the experience of a paradigm of the L II 
pattern embodied in the whole interaction, L II patterns which 
the patient is likely to adopt as a way of giving an organiza¬ 
tion to perception of relating which was lost when his former 
patterns were experienced as no longer viable. 
We have talked exclusively about L II in relation to 
Gestalt Therapy because it Is difficult to ascertain how much 
L III issues are a part of the therapy. There are some indications 
that they are not usually a part of Peris' therapy. He Is 
leary of working with psychotic people, i.e., people who 
lost the ability to form L II premises. While he approaches 
the role quite paradoxically, Peris as therapist often seems 
to be the controller of the therapeutic interaction. This 
makes him seem not to be "standing within" a larger process 
in the room. Phrases he uses to describe a mature person such 
as "emotionally independent" sound like the phrases of a person 
who understands the ultimate form of relating in ways very 
similar to those described in Chapter IV as usually embodied 
in our culture. 
Yet the practice may have been very different. Peris 
in many places in his talking about relating uses language 
which is quite different from the usual L III premises of the 
culture. The orientation to present awareness is an orienta¬ 
tion away from "self" awareness and toward systemic awareness. 
The trust in the wisdom of himself as total organism rather 
than in just his conscious understanding is one expression of 
a willing participation in a larger system. There is certainly 
L III wisdom embodied in the tenets on which Gestalt Therapy 
is based and a potential for learning L III in the therapy 
itself. If ultimately Peris was true to his word, that he was 
not the change agent in the room, if over a long enough period 
a patient was able to experience Peris' trust in the wisdom 
of tfie organism that was the therapeutic interaction as well 
as his ability to be spontaneous in the interaction, then Gestalt 
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Therapy would have been, for the patient, not only an experience 
of other more satisfying ways of punctuating relationships, 
but a less paradoxical experience of the most fundamental nature 
of relating. 
Peris developed a therapy which uses easily descrlbable 
techniques. Because these techniques are dramatic and easy to 
describe, the therapy lends itself easily for analysis of the 
way in which it fosters Learning II, The way in which Gestalt 
Therapy fosters Learning III is much more difficult to describe 
because it depends so much upon the specific therapist and the 
degree to which he is able to stand within the greater process 
of therapy which is implicit in many of Gestalt Therapy's 
theoretical tenets. It is just this characteristic of this 
therapy, the ease with which one can discern techniques which 
the therapist uses In fostering Learning II and the subtlety 
of the Learning III approaches in the therapy which might make 
it a therapy which people who had little sense of Learning III 
concerns would practice. As with psychoanalysis, one would 
be an effective Gestalt therapist without reflecting the 
Level III wisdom which is often stated in the theory on which 
the therapy is founded. 
Relationship Therapy 
In the Introduction to her book, The Dynamics of Therapy 
in a Controlled Relationship, Jessie Taft talks about the 
changes in her conception of therapy over twenty-five years of 
practice. 
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It has developed from the notion of reform of the 
other” through superior knowledge of life and Dsycholorv 
a eoncept closely allied to that of scientific control in 
the field of emotion and behavior, to my present acceptance 
of therapy as presented in this volume, a therapy which is 
purely individual, non-moral, non-scientific, non-intellectual, 
which can take place only when divorced from all hint of 
control, unless it be the therapist’s control of himself in 
the therapeutic situation, (212) 
This sounds like the testimony of a person who has gone 
from a Learning II approach to therapy to one that is more 
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centered around Learning III concerns. Yet it is the "testi¬ 
monial" ring in the words which is likely to make one forty 
years later a bit skeptical. We will take what she says seriously, 
but proceed cautiously. 
We said in the last chapter that a L III approach to 
therapy would probably be manifested in the therapists "stand¬ 
ing within" a larger process in the room rather than maintain¬ 
ing himself as the curer of the patient. We said that a firm 
belief~in a curative force within the client is probably a trans¬ 
form of the above premise. We also said that there will 
probably be some disjunction of premises between the cultural/ 
institutional context of the therapy and those developed 
in the relating system in the therapy room. This disjunction 
offers options at the most abstract level in one's functioning 
in a cultural context, or, put another way, one's context is 
redefined to Involve the most fundamental elements of human 
existence rather than the more paradoxical premises discussed 
in the last chapter which are encountered in the culture. 
Taft's approach fits the above description remarkably 
137 
closely. She starts her book with a discussion of the therapists 
limitations. The therapist has no power to cure the client 
and can only wait for the client to make use of his (the 
therapist’s) skills. She dismisses out of hand all duress in 
bringing a patient to therapy as a contradiction in terms. 
Therapy under coersion is impossible. 
My knowledge and my skill avail nothing, unless they 
are accepted arid used by the other. Over that acceptance 
and possible use, I have no control beyond the genuineness 
of my understanding of the difficulty with which anyone takes 
or seeks help, my respect for the strength of the patient, 
however negatively expressed, and the reality of my acceptance 
of my function as helper not ruler. If my conviction is 
real, born of emotional experience too deep to be shaken, 
then at least I am not an obstacle to the person who needs 
help but fears domination. He can can approach me without 
the added fear and resistance which active designs for his 
cure would surely produce and can find within the limitation 
which I accept thus sincerely, a safety which permits him to 
utilize and me to exercise all the professional skill and 
wisdom at my command. On the other hand, the person who 
seeks the domination of another in order to project his con¬ 
flict and avoid himself and his own development by resisting 
the efforts of the other to save him, is finally brought to 
a realization of the futility of his striving, as he cannot 
force upon me a goal which I have long since recognized to 
be outside my province and power. (213) 
Taft is quick to point out that accepting one’s limitations 
in therapy is not a call for passivity. Far from it. 
As I conceive it, the therapeutic function involves 
the most intense activity but it is an activity of attention, 
of identification and understanding, of adaptation to the 
individual’s need and pattern, combined with an unflagging 
preservation of one's own limitation and difference. (214) 
Taft sees two closely connected themes, or perhaps meta¬ 
themes, as being central to all therapy: the issue of time 
and the issue of union vs. separation. Both themes to her are 
experienced in the relating of any one hour as well as in the 
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whole course of therapy. Each hour Is a limited amount of time 
to be used which mirrors the most profound fact of human limi¬ 
tation and mortality. The gradual development of the patient's 
ability to accept this limitation in its immediate and more far 
reaching significance is one of the main characteristics of a 
"successful" therapy. 
Time in itself is a purely arbitrary category of man's 
inventionj but since it is a projection of his innermost 
being, it represents so truly his inherent psychological 
conflict, that to be able to accept it, to learn to admit 
its likeness to one's very self, its perfect adaptation to 
one's deepest and most contradictory impulses, is already 
to be healed, as far as healing is possible or applicable, 
since in accepting time, one accepts the self and life with 
their inevitable defects and limitations. This does not 
mean a passive resignation but a willingness to live, work 
and create as mortals within the confines of the finite. 
(215) 
The limitations of the therapist in Taft's approach to 
therapy are isomorphic with the limitations with which the 
patient must wrestle. She is constantly struggling to be fully 
alive and active in the therapy situation while understanding 
that she has no power for force a change, beneficial or other¬ 
wise in the client. This is an exact mirroring of the issues 
she sees the client (and any human being) wrestling with in 
terms of the time limitations of each hour and of therapy as 
a whole. Within these limitations, this microcosm of the 
general human condition, the nature of relating can be explored 
and experienced intensely. 
Relationship therapy is an opportunity for the patient 
to experience, step by step, his own habitual ways of relating. 
It is also a process in which the most fundamental nature of 
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relating, inherent in whatever style the patient brinrs to 
the experience, can be highlighted and tried out. 
Taft sees two basic aspects involved in relating. One 
is the experience of union, first exemplified in intrauterine 
experience and later possible in the dissolution of the usual 
ego bounds possible in human relating. The other is the experience 
of separation, of individuality, of independence; the experience 
of oneself as "an autonomous creative will." In the recognition 
of both these impulses and the understanding of the ambivalence 
in which a person experiencing both is caught there is a possi¬ 
bility for a therapist to aid a patient in more clearly ex¬ 
periencing both. When a patient begins to feel warm toward Taft 
she may accept this emotion with a. verbalized understanding 
that the opposite emotion is likely just as real and just as 
present. This, she feels, allows the person to stay with one 
emotion without having to invoke separation reactions in response 
to a therapist’s overly warm response. Thus the patient is 
able to continue toward union, to extend and deepen the experience 
of both aspects of relating. 
The reason why these experiences in relationship which 
I have called therapeutic, work healingly for the individual, 
is that there is present always in every human being under¬ 
neath the fear, a powerful, more or less denied, unsatisfied 
impulse to abandon the ego defenses and let the too solid 
organization of the self break up and melt away in a sense 
of organic union with a personality strong enough to bear it 
and willing to play the part of supporting whole.... That such 
an intense emotional realization of one human impulse should 
arouse equally intense fear goes without saying. It is the 
final overcoming of fear, fear of loss of the self, and fear 
of the loss of the other, to the point of taking the exper_enc.. 
regardless of the consequences, that constitutes the first 
victory for therapy. (216) 
The therapist need have no worry that the intensity of 
the union of the therapeutic situation will lead to the patient' 
permanent dependence on the therapist. 
The patient does not need to be warded off, except as 
he demands response in kind or carries his impulses to 
unacceptable union. He will not cling forever unless he 
meets counter-resistance in the therapist. His own will to 
selfhood which has been held in abeyance during this phase 
of domination by the love forces, will now of its own* accord 
begin to restore the balance and initiate the movement which 
leads to separation. The therapist has only to recognize 
it, to admit its rightness and reality which the patient 
is too confused by guilt to confess it openly. (217) 
When we read Taft's description of union in a. greater 
system and the subsequent promotion of the separation of each 
person in the system as the essence of therapy, we are reminded 
of our own words in Chapter II describing the basic form of 
immediate perception. "Because there is a perceived outline, 
there is difference. Because there is perceived difference, 
there is relationship. Because there is relationship, there 
can be perceived meaning." It would seem that the union/ 
separation model of therapy is isomorphic with the most basic 
form of human perceiving. 
Separation will be difficult, but it is a part of the 
therapeutic process every bit as important as the building 
toward union in the feelings of the client. It need not be 
pushed. It will come organically as the patient gradually 
returns, or perhaps, finally comes to an individuated "ego". 
The overcoming of the fear aroused in union allows new risks 
in independence. The therapist eases the process by accepting 
it, by recognizing the strivings for separation in the patient 
and thereby lessening the guilt which these striving?arouse. 
This long course of therapy is mirrored in every hour. 
Movements toward union and separation are constantly being made 
by the client. 
In every hour there will be minor yieldings and minor 
withdrawals. Underneath these shorter surface movements 
the patient as well as the therapist feels a deeper current 
which flows with a different time span but with the same 
Interplay of conflicting tendencies. The week has its own 
ebb and flow, Just like the hour and yet there is a general 
trend in terms of a still longer span, which carries the 
love impulse to its climax of acceptance and brings the ego 
strivings to the final point of rejection of the supporting 
relationship and assertion of the independent self. (218) 
In our paraphrasing of Taft we have necessarily taken 
on some of her testimonial tone.< It seems inevitable when one 
is so clearly speaking of L III concerns. We have, nevertheless, 
tried to carefully report her approach to therapy and we will 
now i?ry carefully to say in our language what she seems to be 
doing. 
One of the most striking features about her approach 
to therapy is that even with extensive case material supplied, 
it is hard to say exactly what she is doing. There are minor 
instances of technique such as the supplying the negative side 
of a patient’s ambivalent feelings toward her so that the patient 
can continue longer In the positive side. There are also nu¬ 
merous instances of her explicitly stating her limits. "I will 
be here foryouat 10 on Thursday." "No, I cannot see you 
Tuesday." "No, only from 10 to about 11." (She is working 
with children.) These hardly give one a coherent picture of 
a technique. 
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All we can make of Taft’s therapy Initially is how it 
is directed at Learning III. She certainly stands within a 
larger process in the room and sees the potential for healing 
as in the patient and in the process between them. In the 
absolute shunning of pressure on the patient to be in or continue 
in therapy, she sets up a disjunction from the way relating is 
presented culturally in families and institutions. The patient 
is not required to be in the relationship, and there are no 
criteria for success as a member of the relating duo. In her 
talk of the patient's experiencing a dissolution of ego bounds 
as part of the coming to a more integrated individuality she 
describes the L III premises which we said were not paradoxical 
and were a change from those usually presented in the culture. 
Yet where is the technique and what happened to the patient's 
L II premises? 
Because her therapy is oriented to Learning III, Taft 
never had a particular goal for a patient and so never has a 
describable technique for getting someone to the goal. She 
refuses to participate in the patient's attempts to quickly 
define the relationship, yet she does so only because she also 
cannot and will not supply a. definition. If her descriptions 
are accurate, each definition arises out of the process of re¬ 
lating and precludes predetermined technique as it is usually 
practiced. 
The L II premises embodied in the whole relationship 
involve two people both subject to human limitations, struggling 
to make a relationship. One of the people is much clearer about 
her limitations and therefore can be understanding and clarify¬ 
ing for the other, should he wish it. To gradually internalize 
the form involved in this whole relationship is to use a punc¬ 
tuation isomorphic with the most abstract na tnre of relating. 
Both people in the relationship are in the same human situation, 
and this is emphasized in the way Taft presents herself in 
therapy. The paradoxical position of a therapist who refuses 
to be a therapist is supported clearly and consistently by her 
most basic beliefs about human interaction. 
The fact that Taft sees each hour as involving the same 
issues as a long course of therapy and that she takes each hour 
for what is possible in it, always acknowledging the patient's 
right to have that hour be the last one, means the premises 
she works on in the moment to moment interaction are isomorphic 
with the premises which inform any particular therapeutic 
relationship, which are also isomorphic with her own most deeply 
held premises about relating. One can't find the L II elements 
In her therapy because they have the same form as L I interactions 
and the L III premises-r 
We have shown how other therapists promote change in 
a patient's way of organizing and experiencing relating by 
five clear methods: violating a patient's usual communication 
patterns, precluding the patient's organizing the therapy rela¬ 
tionship according to his old L II patterns, envoking his L II 
patterns, allowing the patient to experience the total form of 
his L II patterns, and providing a paradigm of a new pattern of 
relating or premise for punctuation in the situation itself. 
It is like3y that all these aspects of therapy are present 
in Taft’s work. A therapist who believes as she does that he 
is limited in his relating with another person, that he cannot 
exert any force to "cure" the other beyond his own acceptance 
of the other and of the inevitable limitations inherent in 
relating, will have no plan or set of behaviors which the 
patient must live up to. This is a paradoxical approach when 
expeienced by a patient committed to the usual L III perspec¬ 
tive. The patient will expect the therapist to be the fixer 
of his (patient's) troubles. He will expect to be shown what 
to do to feel better. He will find a therapist who accepts 
whatever he does, yet who offers no prescriptions. With such 
a therapist the patient will not be able to structure the 
relationship according to his old L II premises. That this 
would render unworkable his usual communication patterns seems 
probable. That it would invoke his L II patterns more strongly 
as he attempted to order the relationship in familiar ways 
and that he might find the space or freedom in such a situation 
to experience the total form of his L II patterns is likely. 
That there is a paradigm of a more congruent way of ordering 
relating in Taft’s approach to each interaction or each therapy 
hour has been stated above. So, though we cannot offer the 
specifics of her technique, we can speculate that someone 
watching her work would be able to identify the five charac¬ 
teristics of therapy which we have elaborated. Further, we 
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can tentatively say that any therapist operating on non- 
paradoxical L III premises would be found to embody the same 
five characteristics in his therapy. 
Jessie Taft, at least In her writing, presents an 
approach to therapy basically congruent throughout. She does 
not talk about what diagnostic categories of people she works 
best with. Such language would be contradictory to her whole 
approach. We imagine that she could be helpful to anyone, but 
that for someone who had lost the ability to form relationships 
at all, a psychotic person, the process might be very slow. 
Also, for someone who actively denied relating by refusing to 
come for sessions, she could not be helpful at all. In the 
next section, we will examine a form of therapy, involving 
Learning III which offered fast return to productive relating 
for even the people most removed from any ability to relate 
coherently. 
Direct Analysis 
In the late 19^0’s a psychiatrist named John Rosen 
began to have remarkable success in bringing back from psychosis 
the most regressed schizophrenic patients of mental hospital 
poDulations, His therapy, Direct Analysis, was discovered, he 
says, by his own unconscious. He did what care naturally in 
dealing with schizophrenic people, operating on the faith 
that schizophrenia was a psychologically induced illness (a. 
radical view for that time) and that the unconscious of the 
therapist must give him his cues for what to do in therapy, for 
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only in his unconscious did the therapist share any experience 
with the psychotic. There was a period of a few years when 
Rosen was practicing his therapy and having success, but had 
still not evolved a theory to explain what he was doing. 
The term "direct analysis" originally described the 
direct interpretations by Rosen of the "productions" of the 
psychotic * s unconscious. He offered psychoanalytic interpreta¬ 
tions of the metaphoric speech of the patient as the patient 
spoke. When he began to amplify the technique a bit he kept 
the term "direct" because it "characterizes my whole attitude 
toward the psychotic — the forcefulness, closeness and lack 
of formality." 
The theory upon which this therapy is based is classic 
Freudian psychoanalytic theory. Rosen uses many of Freud's 
characterizations of dreams and dream process for his approach 
to the expressions of schizophrenics. Dreams are expressions 
of unconscious forbidden wishes disguised through the various 
dream processes as innocent images. The innocence of the 
images in which the wishes appear keeps the dreamer from 
awaking, according to the theory. Rosen says the psychotic 
is in.the same situation and he seeks to "wake up" the sick person 
by "unmasking the real content of his psychosis." 
Rosen emphasizes that direct analysis is a therapy for 
resolving the psychotic stage of a person's illness. After 
having a few patients experience relapses following direct 
analytic treatment, he began to routinely have patients undergo 
more standard analysis following their recovery from their acute 
psychotic period. He says that these analyses are generally 
quicker and easier than others because the psychotic has experi¬ 
enced so much of the unconscious and has gotten so many insights 
from the direct analytic portion of his treatment. 
In discussing the development of his own insights into 
psychotic process, Rosen discusses what might be called a 
regression in the series of Freudian stages referred to by his 
interpretations. He originally took much of the highly sexualized 
talk of his patients at face value and made direct genital and 
oedipal interpretations. He found that he was a bit more success¬ 
ful with interpretations involving anal cruelty, explosions, etc. 
’When he finally began to make most of his interpretations 
couched in oral language, greatly utilizing the image of the 
baby at the breast, he felt he had found the best way of reach¬ 
ing a psychotic person. 
Psychotics live immediately under the shadow of thfe 
breast. This is able to tell us two things: first, the 
presenting aspect of their psychologic life is again the 
earliest infancy and, second, the nature of the breast upon 
whom they are so dependent threatens their life. (200) 
Psychotics ,according to Rosen, are the victims of "bad 
breasts", of unloving mothers in their earliest infancy. Direct 
Analysis is simply a way of correcting for this situation by 
giving the sick person the experience of good mothering by the 
therapist. 
The governing principle of direct analysis is that the 
therapist must be loving, omnipotent protector and provider 
for the patient. Expressed another way, he must be the 
idealized mother who now has the responsibility of bring¬ 
ing the patient up all over again. This duty must be under¬ 
taken because the patient has been forced, under heavy psychic 
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become again for the moat part an infant,... We 
hold further that the unconscious of the infant is copnizant 
o whether or not its mother has the unconscious qualifica¬ 
tions which allow her to be a benevolent mother. (201) 
Again we see Rosen stressing the unconscious of the 
therapist. To him this is the most important element. It is 
an element which is not available to the therapist through 
scientific training. Only a therapist whose unconscious is 
so secure that he can launch whole-heartedly into a relationship 
whereis cast as all loving and all protecting without any 
need for reciprocation from the other and without danger of 
losing his sense of his own personal organization and boundaries 
can be successful for any length of time doing Direct Analysis. 
The patient can tell whether or not one can give oneself whole¬ 
heartedly. The process is between a therapist who is able to 
be spontaneous and a patient who has no control. 
Rosen dives into relating with a psychotic person. No 
amount of slovenliness or uncooperativeness on the part of 
the patient deters him. No amount of sexual or destructive 
imagery of the patient^directed at him or at others shakes him. 
His message is, ”1 am in control. I will not let anyone harm 
you and I will not let you harm anyone. You do not need to 
make me reject you, for my love is nourishing, not poisoning. 
And besides, you have no choice, for my love is not contingent 
on your behavior." 
He will do whatever it takes to force the patient into 
relating with him. With the first patients whom he treated 
with this method there was no other possibility of treatment 
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than forcing a relationship, and treatment for them was truly 
a life or death decision. Working with people in "catatonic 
excitement" or "catatonic exhaustion", a condition reached by 
people who will literally die of fright in their schizophrenic 
confusion, Rosen listened to their ravings looking for the figure 
with whom the fear was associated. He took on the role of 
that figure establishing his credibility and power by correctly 
interpreting back to the patient the feelings involved in his 
disjointed speech. He then could assure the patient that he 
knew of his sins but that the punishment which the -patient feared 
would not be carried out. 
Later with other sorts of patients he used other methods 
to establish a relationship. Many of the paradoxical methods 
described by Haley for forcing a relationship with a schizo¬ 
phrenic patient were first used by Rosen. He would share a 
patient's paranoia or delusional system until the bond that 
allowed the patient to drop his delusions was established. 
Usually there came a time in a treatment when the 
patient focused upon Rosen the hatred which he had been unable 
to experience in the relationship with his mother figure. Often 
at that time Rosen used attendents and camisol to enforce his 
message of benevolent control, but occasionally only his own 
physical strength and quickness enforced his message and saved 
his own life, 
Rosen modeled a L III premise in his therapy which was 
non-intellectual, totally consuming and thus non-paradoxical. 
He gave himself up to the process in the room, to his urge to 
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help the psychotic and to the Interplay of the "unconscious" 
between himself and the patient. He was a Freudian violating 
the most sacred rule of Freudian therapy. He took the systemic 
aspect of the relating of the therapist and patient as the 
therapist experiences it, the countertransference, and founded 
his technique upon it. To him a psychotic person cried out 
fdf'a strong benevolent mother. This was what moved within him 
when he was around a psychotic and so this is the way he 
responded. 
His therapy was only for the "rescuing" of peoole from 
psychosis. When this was done he carried on what to him was 
a classic analysis with people. Once relating was enforced, 
he could help people rework their L II patterns/premises so 
that they could relate non-paradoxically. Rosen’s own ideas 
seem to have been very similar to Freud’s at this stage, so 
Learning III was mostly involved in allowing people to begin 
to relate again. Once this happened Rosen seems to have offered 
a model of relating in the world which embodied the usual L III 
paradox. In order to clarify this idea it will be necessary 
to go more deeply into Rosen's view of schizophrenia and 
into how schizophrenia and Learning III are related. 
Rosen's model of schizophrenegenic situation being the 
baby at the breast can also be described in the terms of the 
double bind. (20*0 A child at the breast Is taking nourishment. 
As it becomes full and satisfied It feels more and more acutely 
the tension Its presence is causing the mother. Instead of 
relaxing from the relief of the tension of hunger, it becomes 
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more tense. The more things should be made right by satis¬ 
fying hunger, the more they feel somehow wrong. The more the 
child feels full, the more empty it feels. It is bound in 
opposing communications of different logical types from which 
it cannot escape physically or communicatively. We are describ¬ 
ing the development of a premise about relating, that all relating 
is poisonous and thus is potentially life destroying. 
We have come to the same paradoxical premises about re¬ 
lating which we developed in talking about the Jones family 
in Chapter II. In that discussion we were able to show that 
when the formal patterns embodied in the communicational 
habits of all the family members were played out in the family 
as a whole, the inherent paradox in these patterns became 
focused "in" one member of the family who found that he could 
only be coherently a part of his family pattern by losing the 
coherence of his own punctuation. To relate, for John Jones, 
meant to be the one who was to blame, to destroy relating. To 
him all relating was poisonous, it took away any coherent sense 
of himself as he responded in the blame-provoking ways which 
made sense only to someone watching the whole family as a system. 
Rosen*s baby at the "bad breast" is a powerful, graphic 
metaphor which embodies the relationship experience of the 
schizophrenic. We have talked earlier about the way in which 
L II patterns rework memories. Rosen offers schizophrenics 
a memory which has great power because it exactly fits their 
L II patterns. It gives a name and coherent pattern to the 
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incoherence of their experience. Unfortunately, Rosen and 
many other theorists about schizophrenics have no insight into 
the metaphoric aspect of their model,. Many believe in literal 
"bad breasts". 
The great religions of the world deal in transforms of 
our metaphors for particular L III patterns. These are the 
ultimate patterns as humans can know them. Some may speak of 
the absense of the self, of the void one exneriences when one 
experiences congruently with the most basic patterns of being. 
They might speak of ultimate paradoxes. "Each in all, all in 
each." Each being is completely systemically defined in nature, 
but there must be individual parts to have a system. Separa¬ 
tion only through union, as Jessie Taft might see it. In all 
these systems the possibility for true knowledge a human being 
has is in having his patterns of experience more and more con¬ 
gruent with the most fundamental patterns of being. Inside 
and outside become arbitrary when the same form is found both 
"places". Ultimate human coherence is possible only as part 
of a larger coherent pattern. It is a commonplace among the 
group of people around R.D. Laing in London that one door out 
of the morass of schizophrenia is through this sort of knowledge. 
For the trapped schizophrenic, the "buck" stops at him¬ 
self. Because of his L II premises, his experience is that of 
incoherence. If there is to be coherence in the order of things, 
he must make it. In this he is forced against the paradox at 
L III which we described in Chapter IV. If he makes coherence, 
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his own coherence is the highest logical type he can experience. 
He must create the world anew. He can never stand within a 
greater order, for all the order he has stood within in his family, 
was disorder. The average person can live a "happy", "produc¬ 
tive" life with basically paradoxical L III premises. The 
world has a congruence, even if he feels no part of it,even 
if it is object and he is subject. For the schizophrenic this 
is not possible. There is no congruence, except what he makes 
himself. And this pushes him again and. again against the 
paradox of "I". Any order he makes cits him off from systemic 
involvement in a coherent world. 
Rosen offers an escape. Not only does he offer direct 
interpretations which begin to make sense of the patient's L II 
premises, he enforces a relationship which for a time removes 
the patient from his paradoxical stance at L III. Rosen's "I 
am In control" means the patient no longer has to be. The form 
of the relationship Rosen enforces is isomorphic with a non- 
paradoxical stance at L III. 
The power of this intervention used by Rosen is demon¬ 
strated Ip a rather remarkable "cure" rate. According to his 
records close to all of the people he worked with who had not 
had a great many shock treatments or a lobotomy recovered from 
their psychosis. Why then didn't his method foster many more 
people working in the same way? Possibly the level of commit- 
i ment required of the therapist was one factor, Rosen occasionally 
1 spent 16 hours continuously with one patient if he thought it 
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necessary. The investment of himself in working =with each 
individual was very great. Another reason was that, according 
to a highly respected therapist who knew his work well, his 
patients seemed to stay non-psychotic as long as they could keep 
in contact with Rosen. (100) In his person he had taken on an 
organizing role for people*s lives and they did not easily make 
the shift from a model of a healthy relation to their world in 
their relating with Rosen to a relating pattern of the same 
form in which Rosen was no longer central. He had saved their 
lives and he loved them. Pew wanted to give him up, and this 
step wasn't part of the process he had evolved. 
Rosen offered an escape from psychosis through an enforced 
non-paradoxical experience at Level III, allowing for reworking 
of Level II premises. Yet he did not understand Level III him¬ 
self,and so never knew what the relation he was modeling meant 
outside of his metaphor of good mothering. He could not say, 
"This is just an example of something else.” He was not trying 
to break the bondage of "self", he was trying to allow people 
to return to a strong self-concept. But for the people he worked 
with, the reorganization of LII premises depended always on 
a more fundamental reorganization, one which to them, had been 
done personally by Rosen, i^ifc-.likely that many never were 
able to exoerience a world coherent and congruous in and of 
itself. Yet they were saved from chronic hospitalization, 
shook or surgery by Rosen’s Intervention. What he did for 
his people was truly a remarkable service. 
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Already, having looked at Rosen’s therapy, we find our¬ 
selves having to slightly revise our prediction that any therapy 
which was non—paradoxical at L III would embody the five charac¬ 
teristics which we identified in the other therapies discussed. 
Rosen does not need to invoke L II premises, for instance. 
They are everywhere in the metaphoric salad of the patient's 
speech. He is not trying to facilitate the patient's experienc¬ 
ing the whole of his (patient's) relating pattern in the therapy 
situation. The patient's relating pattern is expressed in the 
non-communicative speech he uses. For the schizophrenic, the 
pattern is of not relating. Rosen violates the patient's usual 
communication and relating patterns in that he finds the patient's 
utterances to be communicative and uses them in his enforcing 
of a relationship. Later, when the patient is no longer psychotic, 
Rosen's therapy embodies the five characteristics in the way 
discussed in looking at psychoanalysis. 
In working with schizophrenics one doesn't need to 
invoke and let them experience their particular pattern of 
relating. One must give them any experience of relating. Our 
list of the five aspects of therapy seems only to apply in 
cases in which a person can already form some sort of rela¬ 
tionship, i.e., can give some order to his experience of relating. 
Otherwise we see that the therapy must be directed toward enforcing 
any relating, i.e., toward giving a person any order, no matter 
how simple or archaic, to his relating. The other alternative 
is seen in the next section. One could move one's focus from 
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the individual to the family in order to find a system which 
could function'"' in ordered ways. 
Network Therapy 
Network Therapy is a technique for intervening to help 
a family with a schizophrenic member developed by Ross Speck, 
Carolyn Attneave and others. A discussion of the theory and 
technique of network therapy affords an opportunity for us to 
extend the use of our language of levels of premises/patterns 
of interaction to a family as a system. Our exposition of net¬ 
work interventions will be more meaningful after we have laid 
the groundwork for discussing levels of learning in a family. 
As was discussed in Chapter II, the interrelation of 
levels of learning, phenomena such as the "sinking" of generally 
true premises and the readjusting of immediate variables to 
protect more "hard programmed" variables, are inevitable 
phenomena in information processing systems of a requisite com¬ 
plexity. We have been using these numbered levels of premises/ 
patterns of relating in speaking about individuals. It should 
be possible, however, to use these levels in describing other 
discreet systems. 
Let us consider what we call Learning I for an individual 
and, therefore, what it might be for a family. We said that 
Learning I was a change in resoonse within the same set of alter¬ 
natives, assuming a repeatable context. At time A a dog does 
not salivate in response to a bell and at time B he does. At 
time A a child cannot interpret a given configuration of letters 
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and at time B he can read the word correctly. In’ a family 
the change of one or more individuals’ response in a given 
repeated family interchange, assuming the situation maintains 
the same meaning for the group each time, would be Learning I. 
does not mean that each family member experiences the 
situation in the same way that other family members do. It 
means that each family member experiences the second situation 
in the same way he experienced the first. 
For an example of L I in a family we will need to offer 
a repeating situation. Let us say that in a given family the 
teenage son repeatedly comes home later than allowed at night. 
The father yells at him for being late. The son becomes sullen 
and sulks in his room. The mother who had backed the father 
overtly In the confontation brings the son some milk and cake 
because "he must be hungry this late." A younger sister 
becomes angry at her brother for upsetting her.father and makes 
sure she is very sunny at breakfast the next day to cheer him 
up. 
It is easy to understand how this pattern might repeat 
with very minor variations. Learning I would Involve a change 
in response of any one member for that would be change in 
response by the system. This would in time alter the whole 
pattern, but would not necessarily affect the ways people in 
the family understood their relationship with each other. If 
the mother tired of the son’s behavior In this instance and 
truly supported the father’s rebukes, the father might rebuke 
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less harshly as time went on and the son, losing his ally, would 
certainly modify his behavior which also would effect his sister. 
The original pattern might well be acted out In other contexts, 
but probably the son’s coming home late would cease to be an 
issue. Level I, then, is the level of all the patterns of 
interaction the family could have without changing the way 
that each understood his relationship with the other. 
Learning II for an individual and for a family is a 
change in the set of alternatives from which one selects a 
response. As with an Individual, Learning II in a family is 
hard to distinguish by observation. The son in our mythical 
family might come home late and find no one responded. Is 
this Learning I or Learning II? Have people figured a 
better way of dealing with lateness or have the relating 
premises in the family altered? If the son is able to initiate 
the whole sequence again by announcing, for example, that he 
was experimenting with drugs, then Learning II has not occurred. 
To change the set of alternatives in a relationship is 
synonomous with changing the form of the relationship. When 
this occurs a given action by one or the other person has a 
different meaning to both people from its meaning in the 
previous relationship. 
The inevitable changes in the age and the competencies 
of children in a family normally enforce Learning II. Relation¬ 
ships must change form as a baby changes to an adult. The diffi¬ 
culty of this L II change is demonstrated by the turmoil in 
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families which often accompanies a child reaching adolescence 
or reaching the age of separation from the family. 
It is common that when a family is unable to shift 
Level II pattems/premises when the pressure of a child's 
development would normally make this necessary, maladaptive 
coping patterns in service of maintaining old L II premises 
lead one or more of the family members to be identified as 
needing psychiatric help. It is a commonplace in psychotherapy 
that often a "successful" therapy for one member of the family 
seems to result in the breakdown of another. In these cases 
the therapeutic intervention succeeded in allowing a shift 
In roles in the family, but did not result in any change in 
overall relating patterns, i.e., there was no Learning II 
for the family system. 
Learning III for an individual is a re-drawing or freeing- 
up of the self/environment boundaries, a fundamental shift in 
the approach to all relating. It is the creating of options 
within a system by temporarily or permanently redefining the 
system itself. Learning III for a family would be a temporary 
or perm aient redefining of the boundaries of the system so that 
the notion "family" would become irrelevant. This is exactly 
what network therapy attempts to facilitate. The experience 
of this particular redrawing of systems boundaries Speck and 
Attneave call the "network effect." 
Network Therapy was first attempted by Ross Speck as the 
only alternative for a particular family in which symbiotic 
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attachments were so strong that family therapy seemed impossible. 
He knew that only by adding other people to the system could 
any options be generated. In the course of experimenting with 
larger and larger groups as an adjunct to his usual approach 
to family therapy, Speck and the people who joined him in this 
work found processes taking place in the larger groups of people 
which they had not intended but which they later came to consider 
as the main healing potential of the network approach. 
The process Is difficult and elusive to describe, but 
examples of It are rampant on the contemporary and histori¬ 
cal scene: religious revival meetings, tribal healing cere¬ 
monies, and alumni or "Big Game" celebrations are time-tested 
institutionalized instances; the Woodstock festival, peace 
marches, civil rights actions and revolutionary militant- 
group meetings are more current examples.... The network 
effect is a "turn-on" phenomenon of group interaction. 
Once people have made this initial change, they can never 
step into the same river of human relationships again." (210) 
A "social network" as Speck and Attneave use the term 
is the relational field of a particular person. That means it 
is those people with whom he or his family relate or are related. 
Usually it is a group of 40 to 60 relatives, friends, neighbors 
and school or work associates willing to be gathered in a 
crisis. The "crisis" element in the situation is originally 
stressed to heln overcome people’s usual reticence to "meddle" 
in other people’s personal lives. However, once the group is 
gathered, it is hoped that bonds will be established ( or 
re-established) allowing people to continue to be involved with 
each other even when the crisis is over. The knitting of this 
assemblage of people into a group is called "retribalization". 
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1-v^r.r^vT et^alJ-z®-tlon we hava been cultivating is not, 
therefore, a denial of the realities of today by a literal 
return to some distant past,, but a way of restoring a vital 
roa'Tnf relationship and pattern that has been lost. The 
g 1 ui "etwork intervention is to utilize the power of the 
lnSo^edtnetV?rk rapidly t0 shake up a rigidified svstem 
in order to allow changes to occur that the members of the 
system,with increased knowledge and insight into their predica- 
(211)* W°Uld Wish t0 occur“-and for which they are responsible. 
As retribalization occurs, as people begin to feel them¬ 
selves to be a "special human cluster", people find themselves 
standing within a new system. There is a feeling of security 
and relief. They all are at home together. There is also a strong 
feeling of freedom and optimism. This new system as yet has no 
rules or history to enforce any particular way of relating. 
The rules are up to them. People are free to act in new ways 
in a new system. 
Speck and Attneave have distinguished six phases in the 
overall process which they call the "network effect?. These 
phases are cyclical. In the course of a network intervention 
of one to six three-hour meetings the network may go through 
the process several times and each meeting is conducted so that 
the group will go through the cycle at least once, ending on 
the sixth phase. The phases are: retribalization, polarization, 
mobilization, depression, breakthrough, and exhaustion/elation. 
Retribalization is the making of the assembled people 
into a group. Initially it involves some of the spontaneous 
sorts of interaction which occur when people who are somehow 
"connected" come together. They get reacquainted and catch 
up on the news of each other’s lives. To this is added some 
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encounter-type" techniques to release tension and increase 
relaxation and participation. It is also a stage which natur¬ 
ally follows the exhaustion/elation stage of the process. At 
that time people tend to feel intensely that they truly are 
a group and that each person truly has a place in the group. 
Polarization is a stage in which the intervention team 
allows the problems and deadlocks of the central family to 
come out as issues of the network as a whole. A father-son 
battle is translated into a generation gap which exists in 
the group generally. By heightening the sides of different 
issues, new people are drawn in. These are their issues too. 
As new people begin to participate in stale battles of the 
family, these battles take on new life and new possibilities 
of resolution. 
The polarization process as well as the retribalization 
process are aided by the intervention team's sharing with all 
the network all information gathered within the network. Mo 
professional secrecy is practiced. Secrets are discovered and 
published in an effort to make the whole network into the 
primary information processing system. Part of the information 
the network as a whole must deal with is the experience of the 
true difficulty of the problem of the central family. This 
experience is gained through the polarization process and in 
the subsequent stage. 
Mobilization is the stage in which, having had a great 
deal of energy aroused by the polarization, the members of the 
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network are presented by the intervention team or by their own 
observations with the general tasks which must be accomplished 
in order to resolve the polarization. Perhaps a child should 
move out and set up a life of his own, or perhaps parents 
should find a focus for their life together other than battling 
with and caring for a schizophrenic progeny. The network dis¬ 
cusses and focuses the needs in detail. 
Depression is the stage which indicates a general mood 
which overcomes the network when people have fully experienced 
the intensity of the problems. This is also a time when the 
resistance of the family to the changes which are being discussed 
is encountered. People see no way out. 
Breakthrough is the way out. With the help of the inter¬ 
vention team who try to identify and bring together the "acti¬ 
vists" in the network who will really give time and effort to 
the problem, the network evolves a plan. The team encourages 
step by step approaches. It supports the input of people who 
at the beginning of the evening probably never would have ima¬ 
gined themselves pitching in or taking a leading role in some 
follow-up activity. 
Exhaustion/elation follows an intense and tiring process 
and is a part of further retribalization. People feel good 
about having accomplished something together. Next time 
around they may attempt even more difficult tasks. 
Usually two weeks is allowed between network sessions 
to allow the plans made at the previous session to be carried 
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out. This means that the network as a working unit can be the 
focus of further sessions. At each session a greater intensity 
of network cohesion can lead to greater depth of family problems 
experienced and greater profundity of resolutions attempted. 
In the time spent functioning on its own between sessions, the 
network gets practice for continuing to function after the 
intervention team is gone. This is one of the great strengths 
of this approach. The intensity of the intervention which it 
takes to generate options for the "schizophrenic" family can 
be carried out without fear that the family will later be 
abandoned to their own devices and perhaps to their old patterns. 
The context of the family is, hopefully, permanently altered. 
In network therapy the five aspects of therapy are 
carried out for the family of the schizophrenic person. 1. Their 
usual form of communication is rendered inoperable. Schizophrenic 
families tend to be insular, cut off from outside influence. 
Network therapy reverses this trend. The team actively attempts 
to spread family secrets around the network. In the network 
session, the encounter techniques such as jumping up and down, 
yelling and swaying set a context of different communication- 
from that which people are used to, 2.L II patterns are not 
permitted to go on as before in the family because the creation 
of the larger network forces the development of new patterns 
and because the network team structures the meeting very directly. 
3. The LII patterns are invoked in the beginning of the polari¬ 
zation stage. The family is encouraged to act out its tangles 
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before the whole network. H. LII premises can be experienced 
in their whole form by each family member as the network grad¬ 
ually takes over acting out the tangles and battles of the 
family. In this way everyone, including each family member 
is offered a sense of the whole pattern as each role in the 
pattern is enlarged and even exaggerated. 5, a paradigm of 
the whole punctuation of the therapeutic situation is offered 
in the therapy interaction. The family is temporarily dissolved 
within the network. LIII for the family is possible in the 
temporarily irrelevance of the "family" as a unit within a 
whole larger system. This gives way to more clarity, hopefully, 
for each family member of his own boundaries as each is individ¬ 
ually offered support by network members. Individuals and the 
network are the two systems operative and concentrated on in 
the later stages of the network cycle. 
Learning II and Learning III for the schizophrenic 
person are made possible by network therapy. While a person’s 
punctuation may shift more slowly than the network changes, 
a rearrangement of all the important relationships in a person's 
life makes this shift inevitable. For the schizophrenic, not 
relating to this whole network of the important people in his 
life as he might be able with one therapist is impossible. 
In assembling a person's whole network the premise of 
a person "standing within" a system while still responsible 
for his actions in the system is given tangible form. The 
network is the embodiment of the gamut of the person's 
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relationship patterns. It is his network and it needs fixing. 
His relating needs re-patterning. The work of network therapy 
embodies the attempt to generate more appropriate patterns of 
relating for the identified patient. What is done in therapy 
is LII for the patient. Yet the overall approach to treating 
the network as the client, of trying to realign or redefine 
the family, and of seeing the patient in his total relational 
context embodies Learning III for the patient. The division 
of self vs. other is redefined by the redefinition of the unit 
to be treated. The patient's standing within a total systemic 
process is demonstrated in the most fundamental possible way. 
Through the network intervention Learning II for the 
family as a system has been made possible. People are able to 
think of each other differently. Relationships have taken new 
form. This has been made possible because a change in the 
family at Level III has been enforced temporarily. The 
"family" as a system was temporarily lost within the larger 
system of the network. It is hoped that the network will con¬ 
tinue to be a viable system after the intervention team has 
gone. This means that all people and families in the system 
can continue to have options at Level II because whenever they 
need to, they can experience their belonging to the larger group. 
In this chapter we have attempted to make apparent the 
potential which our language offers for illuminating therapeutic 
orocesses based on very different theoretical perspectives. 
We attempted to show how the same five characteristics for 
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encouraging therapeutic change could be found in all the 
therapies when discussed in our language. These five cate¬ 
gories certainly do not exhaust the possible fundamental unities 
to be found in the multiplicity of psychotherapies. We do not 
even claim that the five characteristics we used are the best 
formulations of the unities they are trying to represent. They 
are examples of what might be possible. 
Should all therapies, no matter on what theory they 
were based, be found to operate in certain fundamental ways 
labeled A, B and C, then any new therapy could be understood 
clearly as one investigated how A, B and C were accomplished 
in this system. Should one find a therapy which did not use 
A,B and C, one might be very close to an even more fundamental 
discovery about therapy in learning how A, B and C were not 
necessary in a specific context. 
In the last chapter of this work we will try to briefly 
summarize our language. We will also try to understand the 
language in its being as an expression of a particular author. 
SUMMARY AND CLOSING REMARKS 
In this final chapter we will try to summarize the 
language we have developed so far and then make a few remarks 
about the dissertation as a whole* The work of this study 
has been largely in the development and use of the language. 
This last brief summary is offered mainly to highlight the 
overall form of the work and to give the reader a strengthened 
sense of the unity of the different parts of the work. 
In Chapter I we discussed the difficulties which the 
"scientific" approach has with psychotherapy. We said that 
"science" attempts to find knowledge which is independent of 
the knower and tries to reduce phenomena to component bits 
which can be measured in the service of gaining this knowledge. 
By "science" we did not mean a particular branch of science. 
Rather, we were speaking of a general approach, widely accepted 
in the behavioral sciences, which was the method used by the 
critics of the "ineffectiveness" of psychotherapy. We later 
studied the characteristics of this approach in our discussion 
of Freud’s "natural scientific" epistomology. We also discussed 
in Chapter I the contention of many therapists that something 
is happening in psychotherapy, but that the most important 
aspects of the process elude isolation and quantification. 
With only the language of science, i.e., the language of 
entities and forces, at our disposal, we could describe 
l6'8 
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psychotherapy only as a sham or a mystery. 
What we have attempted to do In this thesis is to offer 
an alternative to the language of entities (e.g. "knowledge", 
"variables") which might be demystifying of the process of 
psychotherapy. For our language we have used the^ work of 
Gregory Bateson to help us speak clearly in terms of form 
rather than substance, of processes rather than entities. From 
Bateson we got the notion of context and hierarchies of contexts 
in communication. It was these notions which helped us clarify 
the interactive nature of perception and knowing. Bateson's 
use of Logical Types as an explicative model gave us a way of 
aPPlying some of the truths of systems theory, truths about 
the "sinking" of abstract premises by an information process¬ 
ing system and the protection of these premises by the manipula¬ 
tion of more changeable modes of experiencing, to human beings 
in their systemic interaction with their environments. 
When applied to the specific interaction known as 
psychotherapy, Bateson's language has allowed us to discuss 
the relationship between individual perception and learning on 
one hand and the form of the interaction as a whole on the 
other. We can nofa say that psychotherapy involves a change in 
the way the client punctuates, i.e., gives form to or understands 
relating and Dossibly a change in his most fundamental stance 
toward relating and experience generally. We have called 
these changes Learning II and Learning III respectively using 
Bateson's terms. We said that Learning II and Learning III 
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represent a change In premises about interaction of similarly 
numbered levels, and that these numbered levels of abstraction 
also apply to the only manifestation of these premises of inter¬ 
action: as patterns of interaction, whether or not these 
patterns are observable to another person. A "felt" emotion 
is as much a part of a pattern of interaction as a wink or a 
wave. Thus Learning II is a change in Level II premises about 
interaction which are manifested in the way a person participates 
in any specific relationship and Learning III is a change in 
Level III premises about relating which are manifested in a 
person’s stance toward relating and experiencing generally. 
The identification of premises about interaction with 
patterns of interaction has allowed us to discuss the interrela¬ 
tion of the client's levels of learning with the form of the 
psychotherapy relationship as a whole. We saw in discussing 
the Jones family that the pattern of interaction described by 
Bateson and others in the first article on the "double bind" 
can be better understood when we investigate this same rela¬ 
tionship between LII premises of the individual in a system 
and the form of the total relating pattern in the system. In 
both a family and a psychotherapeutic interaction, the LII 
premises of each individual and the form of the interaction 
as a whole gradually come to be isomorphic. In the Jones 
family the paradoxical LII premises shared by every member 
of the family, when manifested in the relating pattern of the 
whole family required the schizophrenic behavior of the son, 
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John. It should perhaps be stressed that LII premises of 
family members do not "cause" the family relating pattern to 
take a certain form, nor is the reverse true. Both are trans¬ 
forms of the same pattern and thus share the same etiology in 
the history of each family member, their interactions together 
and the interaction of the family as a system with its environ¬ 
ment . 
The fact that the LII premises of each individual in 
a relating system and the form of the relating pattern as a 
whole will eventually be isomorphic helps us explain the change 
of LII premises of a client in psychotherapy. In our descrip¬ 
tion of several therapies we showed how the structure of the 
therapeutic relationship both renders unworkable the client’s 
old LII premises and encourages change as the client gradually 
takes on the premises embodied in the interaction as a whole. 
In psychoanalysis the client's LII premises as they are 
manifested in his usual communication patterns are rendered 
inoperable by the requirement that he free associate. His 
LII premises in the sort of relating patterns he understands 
and invites by his actions are inoperable because any relating 
pattern he attempts to structure in the analytic setting is 
labled transference by the analyst, thus enforcing the relating 
pattern which the analyst defines. The powerful stance of the 
analyst vis-a-vis the client is isomorphic with the relating 
pattern of a parent with a small child. This context evokes 
the client's most early learned LII premises. This is the 
regression in the process of transference which Freud describes. 
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In the unique structure of the psychoanalytic setting the 
patient is not only able to experience his own LII premises 
with great clarity and intensity, he is also able to experi¬ 
ence the LII premises embodied in the entire form of the thera¬ 
peutic relationship which offer an alternative, less inappropriate 
and less constricted way of punctuating experience. The 
analyst’s approach to the patient can gradually become the 
patient’s approach to other people and to his experience of 
relating. As the patient gradually takes on new LII premises, 
he is able to experience the pattern of his past experience 
in great complexity. Because his new LII premises are congruent 
with a greater complexity of experience, the patient can give 
Dattem or meaning to hore of his past and so is able to remember 
lino re. 
We said that Freud’s writings on therapy were not directed 
toward LIII issues. Using the work of Ludwig Binswanger we 
talked about the inevitable subject-object split involved in 
the epistomologv of natural science and how that left the exis- 
t ence of any human being bracketed out of the language of 
natural science. We said that this reflected the usual LIII 
premises of Western culture in which any person is placed 
apart from his environment and relational field. The shift 
from Freud’s language of subject-object to Binswanger's 
language of speaking in the phenomenological mode, i.e., from 
within the experience of being, involves a shift in LIII 
premises. We tried to stress that our language which takes 
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into account the act of theorizing; as well as what is theorized 
about seems to be isomorphic with Binswanger's language of 
experiencing, of "being-in-the-world". However, In our dis¬ 
cussions of any particular phenomenon we are speaking about 
experience rather than giving unmediated articulation to ex¬ 
perience. We can describe the logical parameters of Learning III, 
but we cannot begin to give articulation to this exnerience. 
We can say that Leraning III is a change in the most 
fundamental way of experiencing relating, involving a change 
in the experience of who, in fact, is relating. When one 
experiences interaction from within the systemic process that 
is relating, tinmediated by the experience of •’self" that makes 
the rest of the system "other", one is experiencing in a fashion 
that is congruent with the form of the most immediate act of 
perception, of interacting with the stimuli' one encounters. 
The experience of agency which does not require an experience 
of the agent is congruent with the process of constituting 
pattern and meaning in one's most immediate perception. There¬ 
fore, the more one's LIII premises shift from the subject- 
object form to the form described just above, the more richly 
and complexly one is able to experience one's immediate per¬ 
ceptual world. The greater complexity a system emcompasses, 
the more stable are its most deeply sunk,most abstract patterns/ 
premises of operation. 
We have tried so far to summarize our language as it 
was used in Chapter V to assess different therapies. It does 
not seem necessary to summarize the brief treatment which each 
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therapy was able to be given. We endeavored to show the 
potential of our language for general use in understanding 
and comparing various forms of psychotherapy by showing the 
way specific therapies promote change in the client's patterns 
of punctuating relating and even in his most basic stance 
toward experience and relating. 
Perhaps to some degree the therapist is on the same 
position with respect to the therapeutic interactional system 
that this thesis is in in relation to the logical types of 
interactional theory. Both must ultimately be fully a part 
of the system, affected by its currents, mirroring its form 
in some way, and yet at the same time in a position outside, 
observing the form. 
In the therapeutic interaction the therapist offers 
a resolution to the paradox of the patient by taking the para¬ 
dox on himself. The patient had been living with a dis.lunction 
of logical type in his (their) effort to "be spontaneous," 
"be a good family," "be myself," etc. The therapist returns 
the patient to a single logical type by taking over the role 
of permission giver initially. If anything the patient does 
is part of the treatment, the patient is not responsible for 
the designation of the meaning of his behavior, temporarily. 
Yet the theranist may now be in paradox. He must be part of 
the system and still somehow in touch with the system as a 
whole. The therapist has two ways of dealing with this para¬ 
dox. He can offer some separation between himself and the 
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client in the structure of the therapy. This reduces the 
paradox on the therapist by limiting the system of interaction. 
Or the therapist can, through Learning III, come to an under¬ 
standing and trust of the process as a whole that allows him 
to be fully within it. Thus the therapist is no longer in 
paradox, while still offering the patient a temporary escape 
from his. 
A therapist approaching therapy from a non-paradoxical 
L III stance would experience his punctuation at L II in the 
therapy situation to be "relative, changeable, situational" in 
our words from Chapter II. He would be likely to experience 
"himself" differently in each different therapy hour. Here 
is an explanation for a phenomenon which many therapists 
including Bateson (21) have noted, that the best information 
a therapist has about a client is what sort of a person the 
therapist experiences himself to be when relating with the 
client. 
The same potential paradox pointed to above is alive 
in writing this dissertation. To consciously try to describe 
the laws of form in human interaction is paradoxical. It is 
trying to make a member of a class describe the class as a whole. 
One’s only possibility of describing nonparadoxically is in 
allowing the work to be an adequate representation of the class, 
i.e., the laws of form, in the total form of the work. This 
inevitably puts it on the level of the most abstract form of 
the personal experience of the author, which must equally be 
17$ 
represented in the total form of the work. 
It is not possible for the author to say much about the 
total form of the work other than to point out Its potential 
significance. It Is one system which he must Inevitably 
stand within. It may be of Interest to the reader that the 
overall plan for the work emerged almost two years before the 
work was completed and long before most of the problems 
discussed in the work had been thought through by the author. 
Thus in the overall form of the work is a distillation of the 
reading and experience of the author more abstract than is 
available to consciousness. This is the level on which much 
of the originality of the work exists for though the language 
and many of the insights in the thesis are Bateson's, any one 
who has read the preceding chapters will realize that ori¬ 
ginality can take different levels of abstraction. The ori¬ 
ginality of this work is in the simplicity it finds in the 
complexity of the psychotherapeutic process. For this 
simplicity to be valid, it must be of an abstract nature. 
"Wherever a system becomes reduced in complexity, it 
loses its options and therefore becomes less and less stable." 
(9*0 This statement by Barry Commoner can serve as an elegant 
| distillation of much of what has been discussed in the preced¬ 
ing pages. Only simplicity at more abstract levels, i.e., 
higher logical types, of communication is viable for a 
"healthy" system. Any simplicity which reduces the complexity 
i of what is experienced, reduces the stability of the system. 
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V/e have spent a great deal of time tracing the way In which 
certain LII premises structure perception and therefore limit 
the complexity of what kind of relating can be perceived or 
remembered. We have shown how this can lead to "instability" 
in a person or a family. We have shown how different thera¬ 
pists help to improve a patient’s stability by either foster¬ 
ing LII premises which are less constricting and therefore 
allow for a great complexity of experiencing or by fostering 
LI 11 so that a far greater complexity can be perceived because 
it is congruent with these even more abstract premises, premises 
which are isomorphic with the essential pattern of all systems. 
This same distillation applies to this thesis and any 
other effort to give articulation to perceived form. There 
is an inherent danger in simplicity. In our case the danger 
is that in the use of the numbered levels of learning, gradually 
the terms will lose the full complexity for which they stand 
when encountered over and over by a reader or when used over 
and over by an author. 
This degeneration is almost inevitable in the use of 
language. Originally a perceived form gives rise to another 
perceived form. The articulation of each form in language 
has a sequence, a form. Gradually the linguistic sequence or 
form begins to structure the further use of language. There 
develops an "if .... then" relationship in language which is 
no longer representative of sequential experiencing, which 
has no causation to it. The linguistic form is simpler. It 
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is "logical”, it achieves Its simplicity, its logic, its 
ordered semblance of causation at the expense of the complexity 
of sequential experiencing. 
The language we use customarily in our day to day inter¬ 
acting is already quite highly structured. What we can say 
is essentially limited by this structure. 
Those who have no insight into this structure and limi¬ 
tation are sometimes given to sorting their world according 
to such simplistic dichotomies as the effectiveness/ineffectiveness 
dichotomy which we discussed in Chapter I in relation to psycho¬ 
therapy. It should be clear by now that since only therapists 
who are able to stand within the specific relating system 
which is the therapeutic relationship at a given time are able 
to approach therapy in a non-paradoxical way, any assessment 
which discards the specificity of people and time in a 
therapeutic relationship in favor of some more general rubric 
such as "school" of therapy employed will of necessity be 
paradoxical and a poor communicative vehicle. 
To discuss any complexity not already inherent in 
usual language, one must invent new language. This new 
language must use familiar words in new ways if it is to 
communicate new complexity. We have attempted to develop 
in this work new ways of speaking about psychotherapy which 
will allow us to experience in some ordered way (no experience 
is random) a greater complexity than we otherwise could. 
Yet already our language is subject to the degeneration of 
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simplification. Our only possible remedy is the awareness 
of this process and our willingness to continually try each 
new formulation against our own experience. The language must 
be continually used in the greatest complexity of contexts 
possible if the simplicity which it achieves in its own abstract 
form is to be durable and reliable. 
Our language, because it is tuilt on understandings 
which seem to be true of all information processing systems 
of the complexity which human beings generate, is potentially 
useful in many areas of human life. It might be a useful way 
of describing the ever-increasing levels of complexity which 
a child learns to organize as it develops. We might find that 
many of the developmental stages in a child’s life which in 
the past have been correlated with physical development would 
be better understood as a logical progression through the 
levels of complexity inherent in the information which the 
child encounters. Our language might be useful in understand¬ 
ing and comparing the forms of various organizations and 
groups. It would certainly be helpful to be able to say what 
sort of organization allowed for the greatest complexity and 
flexibility in a given context. The same way of analyzing 
the flexibility and complexity allowed by systems of different 
forms might make an excellent tool for discussing the necessary 
operating patterns of different political systems. Our 
language in this context might offer an alternative to the 
rhetoric which often makes the expositions of political systems 
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so passionately cloudy. 
These are a few of the many possibilities which the use 
of our language might offer. As stated above, we would have 
to be ever faithful to our model of looking for simplicity 
only when it allows the experiencing of the greatest possible 
complexity at lower logical types. We must also keep true 
to the complexity of the phenomena which we encounter so that 
our language can evolve, ever giving greater congruence to 
what we experience rather than limiting experience by limiting 
complexity in the defense of a rigid simplicity. 
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